THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE PHILADELPHIAN CONFERENCE OF LIBERAL CHURCHMAN

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THERE long existed a feeling that the clergy of the New Learning in the Protestant Episcopal Church made a great mistake in failing to come together for conference. There were many difficulties in the way. Such clergymen were widely scattered. Most of them were strong individualists. Several of their outstanding preachers seemed to rely on shocking the sensibilities of conservatives as the best way to gain a hearing, and the great majority, who do not believe in wounding the sensibilities of others unnecessarily, shrunk from associating with men whom they viewed as irreverent and self-advertising outlaws. Moreover, a large group of cultured Broad Churchmen have always made it a boast that they were of no party.

Of course the Anglo-Catholics or Ritualists constituted an aggressive and powerful party : but close associations were regarded as natural to these believers in organization, such combination, it was held, would only prove hurtful to the free progress of a more enlightened theology. So the Liberal element in the Protestant Episcopal Church did nothing. Every now and then there would be some association formed after a General Convention to prevent the change of the Church's official

title and check the advance of Ritualism, but it never lasted long. Conceived in an apologetic spirit, it soon died of lassitude amid deprecatory explanations of its existence.

Then there came a sudden and convincing proof of the value of organization even on a small scale. A clergyman in a diocese in the south-west was threatened with a trial for heresy on account of views that were widely known to be held and expressed by leading rectors, professors and bishops further east. No names are mentioned here because it is not expedient that that clergyman should all his life long be labelled by this incident. This threatened trial would have certainly been carried through, and the minister unfrocked or suspended, had not a group of New York clergymen, who had banded themselves together for the defence of the comprehensive constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church, bestirred themselves and contributed and collected money to bring the accused clergyman east, and secure for him friends and defenders. The result of their energetic agitation was to arouse for him powerful protectors, and the case was dropped.

Such a palmary proof of the value of organization could not fail to make an impression even upon Liberals, as the clergy of the New Learning prefer to call themselves in America, in order that they may differentiate themselves from the Fundamentalist and Modernist controversy in the Protestant Churches, which is not the line of cleavage in the Episcopal Church.

The visit of Dr. H. D. A. Major to Philadelphia in 1926 led to a gathering of the clergy of the New Learning in his honour at a luncheon at St. Stephen's Community House; about fifty clergy of the diocese of Pennsylvania and the vicinity sat down together. The fellowship was felt to be so helpful, and the testimony of Dr. Major to the necessity and effectiveness of the organization of Modernists in England was so convincing, that the Philadelphia clergy were encouraged to try the effect of a Conference of Liberals in the Province of Washington, a Province that contains the dioceses within the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia. The Vestry of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia, which is one of the outstanding Liberal Churches of the Protestant Episcopal Church, authorized its Rector to play the host to such a Confer-

ence if it could be gathered. The Philadelphia Branch of the National Church League, the organization whose New York members had been so effective in preventing the crushing of the Western clergyman, entered into the plan heartily, and agreed to provide entertainment for visiting clergy and co-operate in every way.

The result was the Conference in Septuagesima, 1926. It was the first distinctively Liberal Conference of the kind in the history of our Church. The Church Congress is a debating society or symposium of all schools. This Conference was based on a different foundation. It was a gathering of the believers in the general methods and results of Higher Criticism, of Psychology, and in general of the New Learning. It proved a great success. Such was the history that lay behind the second Conference that took place on February 15—16 in Septuagesima week, 1927. The total attendance was 200, among them three bishops—the Bishop of Pennsylvania, the Bishop of Missouri, and Bishop Atwood, the retired bishop of Arizona.

The opening paper was contributed by the Rev. Dr. Walter Franklin Prince, Ph.D., the Executive Research Officer of the Boston Society of Psychical Research. Dr. Prince is widely known to all students of psychic phenomena by his own writings and by his collaboration with the late Dr. Hyslop. The newspapers in North America gave extensive publicity a few years ago to his exposure of reputed psychic manifestations in Nova Scotia. His thesis was that many events in the Bible narrative, generally termed miracles, may have been effects of a supernormal world, since 'the tendency of serious and scientific psychic research is in the direction of demonstrating the existence of the spiritual ego as a real entity, of the existence of transcendent spiritual forces, and of supernormal facts reaching as far as the occasional manifestation to the living of the love and care and thought of those who once lived on earth.'

According to this expert investigator, there have been recorded in modern times a large number of cases where intelligent, sane and honest persons have seen apparitions under evidential circumstances, and these apparitions, while subjective, nevertheless appear to have objective causation. Thus weight is given to the validity of the belief of the early Christians that

Jesus, having promised to reappear, did appear to His disciples after His death.

Of telepathy Dr. Prince said : 'We have abundant evidence for telepathy now, both spontaneous and experimental.' Thus *Mark* ii, 6-11, becomes more credible where it is affirmed that Jesus was able to read thoughts. And the case of St. Peter and Ananias falls within the same realm of plausibility. Clairvoyance, which is well attested in modern times, would account for the statement of Jesus to Nathaniel : 'Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee.'

The element of dreams came in for a large share of attention as evidential of a psychic world. Many of the prophetic dreams which were afterwards realized, and the predictive quantum in the words of Jesus, would receive substantial support from the evidence of psychic investigators.

The casting out of demons, so moot a point to New Testament critics, has many modern parallels, and the hypothesis of the New Testament writers may not have been far wrong.

In conclusion, Dr. Prince said, 'Psychic research has immensely strengthened my respect for and confidence in the Bible.'

These statements were corroborated by many incidents of an extraordinary character, which carried the greater weight because of Dr. Prince's reputation as an exposer of frauds. In the discussion, the usual narratives of extraordinary experiences were given, all supported by plausible, and to some minds convincing, evidence. There were also the usual objections, some drawn from 'hard-boiled' good sense, and some from philosophy. Great diversity of opinion prevailed. Some advanced thinkers evidently had no use for what they regarded as a recrudescence of superstition. Others regarded the topic as one which the investigations and conclusions of such scientists as Crooks, Lodge, Barrett and Alfred Russell Wallace had made 'a probable opinion,' and entitled to investigation. Its insertion into the programme of the Conference was not meant to indicate that Liberal Churchmen as a class have any special penchant for this subject, but serves to show that they are open-minded seekers after the truth.

The second paper, by the Rev. Samuel Shoemaker, of Calvary Church, New York, dealt with the subject of Conversion. This topic was opportune by reason of the public interest in the methods of Conversion known as 'Buchmanism,' on which Mr. Shoemaker is especially qualified to speak since he had been brought into the ministry by Mr. Buchman's influence. Mr. Shoemaker did not undertake either a defence or exposition of Buchmanism; Conversion was his theme, and he stuck close to it. The Church, he held, has relied too much upon discussing themes and not enough upon wrestling with the souls of men and women in a life and death struggle. It therefore faces the problem of Conversion almost as a fresh question, hitherto thought of in connection with the Salvation Army and Rescue Missions. Yet it was not to the prostitute or to the publican that Jesus said 'Ye must be born again,' but to the cultivated, religiously-minded gentleman, Nicodemus, the type of man who to-day would find himself in ready accord with all our super-practical Church schemes. From this we may gather that Conversion should not be left to the workers in the slum sections alone, but is needed just as greatly by the privileged and the educated.

The average Christian layman, however, views an experience like that of Conversion with a mixture of repulsion and suspicion. He refuses to believe that the definite act of self-surrender is the supreme condition which all must fulfil to achieve Christian perfection.

Included in the idea of self-surrender are four distinct steps: (1) The break with sin. Many a sin does not look like a sin when it is lying in the dark, but a man has to get it out into the open where he can face it for what it is. (2) The daily quiet time. (3) Winning one's friends for Christ. (4) Choosing one's life work on the basis of God's will and not ours.

'I do not believe we shall win this generation for Christ,' said Mr. Shoemaker, 'without a religion of greater power, demandingness, and definiteness than the one we are offering to it. Studdert-Kennedy says it takes a passion to conquer a passion. We are trying to stand out against virulent temptation and blasting scientific materialism with a milk-and-water gospel

of mild and procrastinating self-improvement and moderate and inexpensive good-will.'

The discussion opened by Professor George C. Foley, of the Philadelphia Divinity School, soon turned from Conversion to Buchmanism, and the importance given sexual passion in Mr. Buchman's dealing with his converts. Mr. Shoemaker held that Mr. Buchman had been greatly maligned. Many members of the Conference were unconvinced, but others felt that as long as Christian teachers are human, so long will it be impossible to have a religious awakening entirely free from one-sidedness or theological crudity. The paper was read with a moving simplicity and persuasive charm, and its spirit of consecration made its influence felt in a heightened earnestness of spirit in the Conference.

At the night session the well-known Biblical scholar, Professor George A. Barton, of the University of Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia Divinity School, read an essay on 'The Eucharist in the New Testament.'

The following is the summary of the argument: In spite of the uncertainty of the text of *Luke* xxii, 19-20, St. Paul's witness that our Lord established the Eucharist as a memorial is sufficient, since the Apostle to the Gentiles conferred with St. Peter within a few years after the Crucifixion (*Gal.* i, 18). For twenty-five years the Eucharist was celebrated as a common memorial meal in the evening. When abuses crept in at Corinth, St. Paul directed (I *Cor.* xi) that hunger should be satisfied at home, and the Eucharist be made only a symbol of a meal. Though not adopted at once everywhere (see *Didache* 9, 10), St. Paul's directions ultimately prevailed. St. Paul was not influenced by the Mystery Religions and did not believe the elements to be the actual body of Christ, for in St. Paul's thought the Church was Christ's body. Between St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel great changes occurred. Only twice does St. Paul speak of Christ's death as a sacrifice, and then only in fleeting figures. The Cross did not suggest to him an altar any more than an electric chair suggests to us a Communion Table. The author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* introduced sacrificial figures. As more Gentiles were converted, the Church competed with the Mystery Religions. To Ignatius the Eucharist was a sacrifice,

and the elements the 'bread of God.' In opposition to this view the author of the Fourth Gospel, by his silences, by the utterances which he attributes to Christ, and by his emphasis, declared that Christ never instituted such a rite. In *John* vi the great aim is to spiritualize the expressions 'eating Christ's flesh and drinking his body.' This brief abstract does scant justice to this scholarly and judicious paper. It evoked expressions of admiration and agreement. Especially grateful were those who were dissatisfied with the current glib hypothesis that St. Paul was greatly influenced by the heathen mysteries. That a Jewish Rabbi, the disciple of Gamaliel, the disciple of the great Hillel, should be influenced by Greek philosophy is a reasonable hypothesis, but that the lofty and exclusive monotheism of Judaism should not protect a great Rabbi from the crude superstitions of the mystery religions seems unthinkable without stronger proofs than a few phrases about 'initiates' and cognate terms.

The last paper of the day, 'The Use and Abuse of Ceremonial,' by the Rev. Beverley D. Tucker, Jr., D.D., of Richmond, Virginia, met with unqualified approval. Two violently contrasting incidents in the religious life of the American Expeditionary Force in France during the War drew the attention of the author to the abuse of ceremonial and its use. The one was the instance of a Roman priest who pinned a sacramental wafer to a tree that his men might worship the Christ on Calvary; and the other, a Y.M.C.A. secretary who invited the men to celebrate the Eucharist in the following fashion: 'Fellows, we are going to have the Holy Communion. Let everybody come up and help themselves.' Dr. Tucker's conviction was that there is a place for ceremonial in a spiritual religion for three reasons: First, ceremonial may be a witness to the reality of the Divine Presence; secondly, it may be a witness to the beauty of the unseen and eternal; and lastly, it may be a witness to the corporate life of man.

Ceremonial as a witness to the reality of the Divine Presence involves a consideration of the question whether the outward expresses a spiritual situation which comes into existence only through the outward means, as the Catholic affirms. Using the Holy Communion as a point of examination, he found no reason

for supposing that Christ was more really present after the moment of consecration of the elements than before, or that the ceremonial acts did more than affirm what already existed.

He found ceremonial of value as a witness to the beauty of holiness which Protestantism has too often neglected, but two notes of warning are necessary: first, it is not the place of ceremonial to produce beauty, but to suggest its presence; and, secondly, simplicity is an essential attribute to Christian worship.

As in time of national stress a flag or a tune stirs men's hearts to a sense of their oneness as citizens, so the symbolism of ceremony has its place in witnessing to the corporate life of the Church.

The sermon at the Holy Communion on the second day of the Conference was preached by the Right Rev. Thomas J. Garland, D.D., Bishop of Pennsylvania, who was also the celebrant. The text was II *Peter* i, 5-8. We can but summarize the central message. 'For us the great consideration is not what men have thought in the ages past, or even what we ourselves thought in the years gone by, but how we may manifest in our lives our fellowship with God.' Churches have different theories about the sacraments, and their ceremonies differ widely. If one thinks only of difference in methods, forms, theories, they seem at times irreconcilable, but when kneeling at the Communion Table, Christians should be able to agree that, whatever may be the human interpretations, or theories, or beliefs, God wills His children to live in a closer fellowship with Him, and through Him with one another.

The morning session of the Conference on the second day was opened by the Reverend Dr. Charles O. Scoville, of New Haven, Connecticut, with a plea for greater precision in our discussions. He wished that theology could follow the method of science in its clear definitions, exact comparison with known facts, and continuous experimental work. Not infrequently theology uses the exact method of proof as far as it will go in the right direction, and then without warning turns to archaic and obsolete words and expressions as 'devil,' 'substance,' 'begotten not made,' and many like them, and quietly assumes that we are proving to a new world our faith by the same method and in the same way that scientific beliefs are made acceptable.

Many of our words have no concept of an external reality behind them, even in the mind of the user, and are mere dogmatic phantoms of a past age; yet we assume that by putting them together in the right sequence we are speaking the words of the eternal God as His final revelation to men. Dealing with the duties of a free Church in a free State, Dr. Scoville implied rather than affirmed that the Church usually went off at half-cock on political and economic questions.

Dr. Twombly, who has done such efficient work in improving moral conditions in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, took a different view; he held that the forces of 'banded ill' must be met by the organized force of the Church. The usual differences disclosed themselves as the debate progressed; some holding the Church should not meddle with matters that call for political remedies, and others holding that its commission is to destroy the works of the devil in all their manifestations.

After the luncheon, at which three Bishops and one hundred and twenty-seven members of the Conference were entertained by the Parish, the paper of the Right Rev. Dr. Harris, Bishop of Marquette, absent on account of sickness, was read by Dean Southworth. Our space will not permit us to give an abstract of this eloquent paper, which was a call to united action in the face of medieval propaganda. This call to united action met with the response usual among Liberals. Some thought that any action would be misunderstood. The Rev. Alexander G. Cummins advocated organization. His monthly, *The Chronicle*, is an outspoken opponent of medievalism. Others were fearful lest the Conference should lose sight of its larger function of developing the theology of the New Learning, and creating fellowship among its scattered teachers, and should degenerate into an Anti-Ritualistic Conference.

Sober second thoughts, however, calmed these apprehensions. The leading spirits of the Conference agreed that Bishop Harris's main contention was incontrovertible; that organization must be met by organization if the comprehensive character of the Church was to be retained. A resolution to that effect was passed.

The newspapers, however, gave such excessive, in some cases exclusive, notice to this last paper by the President of the

National Church League, and a Bishop of the Church, that it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the purpose of our Conference is larger than a campaign for organization. One who attended wrote thanking the inaugurators of the Conference for 'maintaining such a clearing-house for reverent thought.' That is a much truer estimate of our purpose in meeting.

Among our visitors were men widely known but seldom met, and numerous were the expressions of pleasure at becoming better acquainted with them. Undoubtedly the Conference meets a great need. It shows how manifold are our tasks. Many of our leaders are singularly lacking in imagination and statesmanship as to how to fit the Church to accomplish its mission. In the Middle West, where Bishop Harris lives, the weakness of our Church is in its departure from the principles of the Reformation, and in its close assimilation to Roman teaching and worship; in the conservative South, there is need for a more progressive theology; in our great industrial centres and our badly-governed cities, the call of the hour is for a Church that trains its members with a passion to create a more Christian environment for the next generation, and a more Christian ethic in social, industrial, and political life. It is the hope of the inaugurators and friends of the Conference that it will be impelled along its way by these three impulses.

Next year we hope to invite some of the English leaders of thought, either Modernist or Liberal Evangelical, or both, to attend and take part. In that event the Conference will assume more of the character of a National Conference of Liberals East of the Mississippi.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS

By Douglas White, M.A., M.D., Chairman of the Council of the Churchmen's Union.

WHAT is Christianity? That is the question which exercises every thoughtful religious mind to-day. For two thousand years it has been held to revolve, as an ellipse, around two foci; the one is called the Incarnation, the other the Atonement. Curiously enough, there is no good evidence that either of these ideas was present to the mind of the historic Jesus. This fact—if it be a fact—might give us pause at the outset. If the ideas which these words represent are in accord with the general mind of Christ, then they may represent Christianity; if not, they must either be abandoned, or else sc re-interpreted as to come into harmony with that mind.

The words at least—Incarnation and Atonement—have become pivotal, ant the ideas which they convey are closely interrelated. Whatever you think of the one is bound to react on your thought of the other. In this matter, I beg of you not to be afraid of thinking deeply, and not passively to accept stereotyped opinions. Stereotype is the enemy of vital religion.

What do we mean by an atonement? We mean one of two things. The word has come to represent to us the idea of a transaction of some sort between God and Jesus, by which something within God's nature has been satisfied so that He is able to forgive men. That is one meaning. The other is at-one-ment or reconciliation, a reconciliation which requires no satisfaction, since God is Love. Is the atonement a satisfaction of God's justice or a revelation of His love? Which is the true interpretation? They cannot both be true. It is not possible for the mind to accept and assimilate mutually contradictory hypotheses. Those hypotheses which are repugnant to the growing moral sense of mankind have got to be eliminated, and a line chosen, and stuck to, which is in accord with that

sense. Such a path is always found to widen out into vistas undreamt of.

I do not propose to traverse even briefly the history of thought on this subject. Irenaeus, Origen, Anselm, Abelard, Socinus, Grotius, Calvin—all are familiar names; they have all propounded theories, more or less in accord with the modes of thought of their times—mostly in terms of commercial, feudal, regal, legal, or penal habits and customs. More recently others have adapted representative ideas (again borrowed from current political notions) to the work of Christ, in the form of representative penitence or confession. Now I want to include *all* these theories, from Anselm downward, except that initiated by Abelard, in one great category, rather than attempt to deal with them seriatim.

I think I can safely leave aside the doctrine, first propounded, I believe, by Irenaeus, that the death of Christ was a scheme by which the devil was out-manœuvred. It certainly held sway in the Church for some eight hundred years, but is now chiefly of antiquarian interest, except for a few who hesitate to reject a form of thought which held the Church for so long, and who seek to find in it some substance independent of the form in which it was presented. In form, at least, it was but a picturesque melodrama, with God and the Devil for hero and villain; our ethical sympathies, however, lie with the villain.

Anselm burst up that system of thought. The Devil had no rights or status whatever, and did not require either satisfaction or out-manœuvring. But Anselm — deeply as I revere his memory as representing the main line of theological advance in history—substituted for this doctrine that of satisfaction rendered to God by Christ. This is the main doctrine which in some form has held the Church from that day to this. Anselm did not put it in the repulsive shape given it by the reformers; but, no less than they, he did claim that Christ was able, on behalf of man, to render to God some kind of satisfaction, absolutely required, which man in the nature of the case was unable to render. Whether that satisfaction takes the form of adequate homage, 'vindication' of law, penalty, penitence, confession, does not really matter in the end. Some sort of satisfaction was absolutely required by His Majesty, Holiness

or Justice. In all cases the difficulty lay within the nature of God, and the death of Christ was the plan by which the *impasse* was broken. All these theories, without distinction, represent the atonement as an objective feat; they define (as I have said elsewhere) the effect which the sufferings of Jesus had on the mind of God, enabling God to square justice with mercy, love with holiness, and so to forgive men. The act lay outside of men's ethical co-operation, though inviting their worship and sympathy. It was an act completed at a definite point of time, once for all; and it altered the attitude of God to men; not indeed by *making* God into a God of love, but by unchaining the love which, apart from it, was held in check by the other elements of His nature. I think that puts fairly the position as it has been held in various special forms for a second eight hundred years. It is still so held by quite a number of eminent clergymen, both of the Church of England, Presbyterian, and Free Churches. It is supposed to be involved in one or two phrases in the Gospels, and in several of St. Paul's writings. As typical of this type of mentality at the present day, let me quote J. K. Mozley's *Heart of the Gospel*, which puts shortly his views as expounded at greater length in his *Doctrine of the Atonement*, in which he maintains the necessity of satisfaction. 'If,' he says, 'the direct aim or most far-reaching result of the Cross was to make men penitent or to awaken them to love, the New Testament is a misleading book, with its emphasis continually misplaced.' 'The atoning Christ,' he says in his *Doctrine of the Atonement*, 'acts on God for man.' Such satisfaction he thinks a pre-requisite to forgiveness. He manufactures phrases which clothe the same idea in obscure words. 'God on Calvary is the price of God at Pentecost.' 'The identification of God with man is complete not in the Son of God made man, but in the Son of God made sin.' In a rhetorical passage which seeks to weld together most of the specific and incompatible vices of two thousand years of theology, he describes Christ's passion as 'Holiness which has endured the full blast of evil directed against it, and has taken to itself the experience of penalty which follows in the track of sin, and a love which sets up salvation in the midst of judgment, so that the condemnation of sin shall not mean the destruction of the sinner.'

In this, and other similar utterances, he seems to stamp with his approval the substance, though he mislikes the form, of all the satisfaction theories from Anselm to Moberly, with some Origenistic flavouring thrown in. In short, he upholds without shrinking the view that God necessarily required, prior to forgiveness, some form of satisfaction which man in the nature of the case was unable to provide. It is perfectly plain; but is it true?

Very different is the tone of the thoughtful, liberal, simple book by Canon V. F. Storr (*Problem of the Cross*, 2nd edition, 1924). Yet even this author has not quite abandoned the satisfaction-to-God hypothesis. 'We are bound to see,' he says, 'in the Cross, not only a revelation of God's love (that comes first), but a homage paid to the violated moral order; Jesus bowed his head to the doom which sin involves'—(this is Anselm pure and simple)—'He was not punished. He did not satisfy an offended Deity; but He showed what sin really meant, how it involved a judgment of God against the sinner' (that is the essence of Grotius). To-day neither Anselm nor Grotius will pass muster.

On the whole, then, we may say that the doctrine of satisfaction to God is still dominant in the distinctively Anglo-Catholic section of opinion, and in the distinctively Evangelical, though in slightly different forms; while in the group of what may be called broader thinkers it is obsolescent.

What do we think then of this doctrine, that God, on account of the other elements than Love in His character, required some sort of satisfaction (to His justice or righteousness) before He could forgive? For my part I do not believe a word of it. Whatever may be said of St. Paul, it runs counter to the whole life, words and, as far as we can see, thought of Jesus himself. 'Thy sins are forgiven'; 'Her sins are all forgiven because she loved much'; 'Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive'; 'When they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both' . . . no sign that the Passion to come had any 'objective' effect on the forgiveness which He proclaimed free to everyone who brought penitence and love. The idea of *procuring* forgiveness was clearly foreign to His mind. The kingdom of God was a kingdom of free forgiveness. Repentance and forgiveness go hand in hand. Look at the prodigal son coming home; it was the

elder brother, not the father, who claimed that some justice or satisfaction was required. The Church has sympathized with the elder brother, whose plea Jesus gently but firmly set aside. 'There is joy in the heart of God over one sinner that repenteth.' Penitence, not sacrifice, is the rule of the road. Ah, then, you may say, something is required after all. Why penitence? Simply that only the man who is sorry is capable of receiving the proffered gift. Receptiveness is the condition of all giving —not arbitrary, but in the nature of things. The doctrine of prior satisfaction is utterly subversive of all that Jesus came to teach. The father of the prodigal was none other than the God of Jesus. It is the parable of parables.

Where are we, then? Does the atonement mean nothing? Verily, no. There is the alternative, which is as true as the other is false. It is derisively called the 'moral influence theory.' That path may not look very bright at first, but it leads to green pastures and still waters. Abelard was, I think, the first who consciously trod it—Abelard, who knew the joy and sorrow of love. I think Abelard alone began to disentangle this view of things from the current thought of his age. He accepted Anselm's negation of a compact with the Devil, and added his own contribution, that the atonement mainly consisted in the drawing of men's hearts to the suffering Christ. That was the object of the life and death of Christ, that man should be reconciled to God. The validity of his contention has not been denied by any; it has assumed an ever-increasing value in the minds of Abelard's spiritual progeny, notably of late in the work of J. M. Wilson and Hastings Rashdall, whose Bampton Lectures form the modern classic on the subject. I only wish that the latter could have lived to draw out further the conclusions and implications of the truth which he champions. The attitude is based on the concept that the work of Christ was not to bring any satisfaction to the mind of God, but to show forth the mind of God, and by doing so to lead men to repentance. The message is not 'Christ has secured God's forgiveness,—the rest lies with you,' but 'Jesus has declared that God is a loving Father; you have only to come back to the love from which you have wandered.' The sinfulness of repentant man is no bar to the forgiveness of a righteous God, because the penitent man is

not only on the road to forgiveness, but on the road to righteousness too. Righteousness is the fruit of forgiveness; forgiveness is the reciprocal of penitence.

The main objection to this way of looking at things is the feeling that by His sufferings Jesus completed some work; that there was some finished work, finished apart from man's co-operation; therefore this work must have been in the nature of a transaction with God. The expression is derived from the Fourth Gospel: 'It is finished,' said Jesus. Only two chapters before, the author explains his meaning: 'I have finished the work. . . . I have revealed Thy name to the men whom Thou hast given me.' The finished work is the revelation of the Character of God. This He revealed in His life, His words, His sufferings, so that the same writer says, 'Beloved, if God so loved us we ought also to love one another.' Not only ought, but must. If we really believe that God loves us, we cannot help it. In the spiritual world no less than the physical, every action produces its appropriate reaction; men always become like the God they believe in.

But some theologians talk of this explanation as being 'merely subjective,' as if there can be a subjective response without an objective stimulus calling it forth. That stimulus arises from the radiance of the divine love which we see in Jesus, not only in His death, but in His life. As Jesus suffered from the ignorance, folly and wickedness of the men of his own time and place, so God suffers at all times and in all places—and, suffering, is ready to forgive. I grant you it is hard to believe; it is a vast venture of faith; yet I think it is the essence of Christianity, for it is what Christ believed.

Look at the universal Christian experience. Why does the picture of Jesus on the Cross appeal to the conscience of mankind? Not because they feel that their evil deeds have any definite causal relation to the crucifixion in history, but because in the Crucified they see the eternal relation of God to sin; not because they are beholding a transaction made in the distant past for their benefit, but because in those sufferings they catch the reflected light of an eternal truth. God is reigning from the tree—not two thousand years ago, in a distant part of the earth, but now and here. The love of God is timeless; Jesus brought

it into time, and wrought its golden thread into the history of human thought.

It may be objected that this sort of view gives only a symbolic value to the passion of Christ; that it depicts Him as bearing and forgiving the sins of the men with whom He came in contact, so that other men are referred back for their forgiveness away from Him to God the Father. Yet Christ did nothing for the men of His own time that He does not do for us; to them and us alike He brought by His life the message of God's forgiving love; and I know not what else there was to do. Through Him alone we and they alike receive it.

I wish to deal further with this aspect. It involves the concept of a suffering God. This idea has been gaining ground among religious thinkers for the last half-century. I think Bushnell was the first. He says: 'There is a cross in God, before the wood is seen on Calvary hid in God's own virtue itself'; 'This is the Eternal Story, of which Christ shows us but a single leaf.' And Dinsmore: 'There was a cross in the heart of God before there was one planted on the green hill outside Jerusalem. And now that the cross of wood is taken down, the one in the heart of God remains, and it will remain so long as there is one sinful soul for whom to suffer.' If Jesus in His words and deeds did reveal to men God's character, if He did the things He saw His Father doing, then we cannot separate that revelation of love from the suffering which it entailed.

Our thought cannot dissociate love from suffering (at least potential), still less can it imagine forgiveness into which suffering does not enter. Forgiveness implies an injury inflicted. If there is no felt injury, forgiveness has no meaning. Its value is measured by the reality and extent of the suffering. The father's forgiveness of the prodigal son was measured by the father's suffering. The forgiving spirit of Jesus towards His executioners exhibited the trinity of love, suffering, forgiveness. That passion was not a scheme to obtain God's forgiveness of man, but an exemplification of God's forgiving love.

I do not think that Jesus was consciously exemplifying or revealing the forgiveness of God at the passion; most revelations are made unconsciously by the person who reveals. Acts of selfless heroism are not thought of as such by the doer. Yet

we do know from the Synoptic Gospels that Christ taught the love of God as the great fundamental of religion; again and again free forgiveness—without sacrifice or propitiation—was His theme. He became like the God He believed in. God is your father; why treat Him as if he were not? That was why His message was called 'Good News.' It was what men wanted then; it is what they need now.

But after the tragedy was over the disciples naturally began to reflect on its meaning. Their minds were soaked in the sacrificial idea, and it was natural that this should form the framework of their conceptions. It cannot be doubted that St. Paul's thought, at any rate in the earlier epistles, was not free from this fault, though fortunately he never built up such notions into any hard and fast theory; this unpleasant task was left wisely undone till Calvin swung his bludgeon. The Fourth Gospel itself is not quite free, though its words do not jar on us like some of the Pauline phrases. The 'Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world' has a sacrificial tone, and perhaps also the 'propitiation' text in the epistle. But I do not believe there is anything of this in the teaching of Christ Himself. I think there is an *a priori* improbability against it, as well as the actual evidence.

In spite of all the satisfaction theories, all of which only serve to obscure the love of God, still Christians have continued to believe in that love. It has been the real motive force in true religion. What we want to-day is the removal of all such obstructive theories and liberation of the 'Good News' of Christ. It is what the backward races want. Their trouble is that the only gods they worry about are those who need propitiation. The belief in a real God of Love is the one thing that can help them.

In taking for my theme the Christian doctrine of forgiveness I do not wish to isolate such doctrine. Forgiveness does not stand by itself; it is part of a spiritual process. Forgiveness is but the introduction to that union with the Divine wherein salvation consists. It is the getting on to the road, not the end of the journey. It is the coming out, or the coming back into the sunshine in which alone our spirits can really live. There is always the danger of arbitrary isolation of one part of the

spiritual process from the next, which has been carried *ad nauseam* in the artificial contrast between 'justification' and 'sanctification.'

I am convinced that if Christianity is to prevail in any form as a real force in civilized life, that form must be intelligible. The whole of progress depends on a firm belief that the universe is intelligible, though it may never be perfectly understood. Religion and ethics must be at one; we cannot accept a definition of God which is at variance with ultimate ethical ideals. I for one cannot conceive of a God who could receive or experience any satisfaction, either to His justice, His righteousness, or His truth, in the crucifixion at the hands of stupid men of the most wonderful character in history. The very suggestion that these ultimate ideals that live in God—justice, love, mercy—can be in any sense opposed to each other or mutually inhibitory, is preposterous at the outset. The Love of God cannot be contradictory of the moral order of the universe. The moral laws, the moral sequences of nature, are written plain in the lives of individuals and nations. The soul that sinneth, it shall die; moral failure leads to spiritual death. It is as true as the other sequences of nature. You cannot get round or dodge it. It simply happens. It is equally true that if a man turn away from his wickedness he shall save his soul alive. But the change of attitude can only take place as the result of an inward perception of the real situation. He needs to see the light if he is to travel along the road. That light is the forgiving love of God, which guides his feet into the way of peace. There is no contradiction between the goodness and the severity of God, between His love and His holiness. All operates in perfect harmony. The atonement is not a plan invented to dodge the spiritual laws of nature, but a revelation of those higher laws, along with an inspiration to live in conformity to them.

As I look through what I have written, it seems to me little but platitudes. My only excuse is that the heresies of one generation become the platitudes of the next. At any rate, I am very sure that the day of atonement by satisfaction has passed; atonement begins when man perceives and responds to the love of God. It is the heart of the Gospel; there is no other. It is potent; it is simple; it is complete. It is a religion in itself; and I believe it is the religion of Christ.

THE BICENTENARY OF NEWTON'S DEATH*

WE meet to-day to commemorate by a religious service the bicentenary of the death of Sir Isaac Newton. It is quite characteristic of the attitude of the English people towards the national Church that a group of mathematicians and astronomers, laymen all, should have desired to have such a religious service as the conclusion of their celebrations. They know, as every educated man knows, that Newton's splendid achievements, enshrined in his *Principia*, finally overthrew certain beliefs which at the time of the Reformation were held by all, Catholics and Protestants alike. They know that the contest in which he won the decisive victory was but the first of a number—I mention geology, Darwin and Biblical criticism—in which scientific method has successfully challenged views associated with traditional theology. None the less, they expect the English Church to be liberal, to join unreservedly in praising the genius of a great Englishman and in thanking God for his life-work. Their expectations are not disappointed: for the English Church is as illogical and, at its best, as sensible as the average Englishman.

To foreigners we are always something of a puzzle. The Thirty-Nine Articles of our Church, to which every clergyman still subscribes, belong to the pre-Copernician period of knowledge. They were in substance drawn up only ten years after a printed copy of Copernicus' great treatise was put into his hands on his death-bed in 1543. Our Prayer Book was last revised in 1662, a few years before the ideas of the *Principia* first took shape in Newton's mind. The Church has thus apparently ignored the vast change in human thought which science has made since the Renaissance. Its theology seems to be associated with crude beliefs as to the history and structure of the universe

* A Sermon in Grantham Parish Church on Sunday, March 20th, 1927, by the Right Reverend E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., D.D., F.R.S., Bishop of Birmingham.

which were held in antiquity. But, in fact, its theology has been continuously re-shaped by its leading divines, and the process has not yet ended. So Newton lies under a monument in Westminster Abbey and Darwin was buried near by in the same great church. 'Doubtless in each case such honour was rendered by order of the Government,' a foreigner would conjecture. No; English clergymen still have the power to say who shall be buried in Westminster Abbey.

It is then with no misgivings, with no hesitation, that to-day we meet to praise Newton in the parish church of the town where he went to school. Six miles away, near the pleasant park of Stoke Rochford, he was born on Christmas Day, 1642, a puny infant 'so small that they might have put him into a quart mug.' In this neighbourhood he lived for the first eighteen years of his life, an inventive, meditative boy obviously unsuited to farm the small manor which his father had owned. Whence came his genius? We cannot say. His father's family had been settled in this neighbourhood for about a century. His mother was the sister of a local vicar on whose advice he was finally sent to Trinity College, Cambridge. There seems to have been no trace of mathematical ability in any of his forbears. But, so far as environment went, he was a son of the parsonage. His father died before his birth. His mother's second husband was a clergyman. The boy was thus brought up under clerical influences. Such influences must have done much to give him the puritan austerity, the combined piety, frugality, and generosity, and the interest in theology which he retained throughout his long life. It is a mistake to believe, in consequence of a well-known gibe of Voltaire, that Newton only turned to theology when his powers failed because of the strain of the *anni mirabili*, the marvellous years, in which the *Principia* was produced. His theological interests, like his piety, persisted throughout his life. We may regret that he did not confine his activity to a domain where his powers were supreme. We must admit that his theological writings were of little permanent value. Yet they show extraordinary width of reading and no little perspicuity. The publication of Newton's tract on the textual criticism of two New Testament passages was deplored by an English bishop as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. But Newton was

correct in his judgment: and the draft revision of the Prayer Book now before the public omits the famous verse of the three heavenly witnesses (I *John* v, 7) to which he took exception.

It is well known that Newton refused to take Holy Orders, and that he was only, by virtue of a special patent from the Crown, enabled to remain as a Fellow of his college while holding the Lucasian Professorship at Cambridge. There seems to be no reason to doubt that he was urged to take Orders in later life and that, had he done so, he might have received substantial ecclesiastical preferment. To reward a man of science by making him a bishop or a dean seems incongruous to us to-day. But it must be remembered that the connection of the Church with education and learning was far closer then than now: and the Mastership of the Mint, the reward which Newton actually received, was not especially suited to his gifts. Newton's probity and industry while he had care of the coinage have earned the praise of historians and economists: but a lesser man might have done equally valuable work.

Why did Newton with his high character, sincere piety and interest in theology steadily resist ordination? What were his religious views? The question has at times been somewhat acrimoniously debated. But, as a fuller knowledge was gained of the papers preserved in manuscript after his death, it finally became clear that he could not bring himself to accept the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity. He was an ethical theist with a profound veneration for Christ: but he was not prepared to allow that the Nicene formula adequately expressed the interrelation of the divine and the human in the Person of Christ. As to the miracles of the New Testament and in particular the Virgin Birth, he had no doubts. In that, as in his sympathy with Arianism, he was a child of his age. Of that age also were his views of the so-called Mosaic cosmogony of *Genesis*. In an interesting letter written in 1680, when his intellectual powers were at their zenith, he expressed the opinion that Moses 'described realities in a language artificially adapted to the sense of the vulgar.' Leibniz at the same time showed a far more modern understanding of the geological process.

When we pass to Newton's metaphysics, and in particular to his views as to space and time, we reach ideas which the theory

of relativity has shown to be of transcendent importance. Whence did Newton get the conceptions of absolute space and absolute time which underlie the laws of motion which he formulated? I think it is not to be doubted that they come from the group of divines honourably known as the Cambridge Platonists. The importance of these men in the development of English religious thought has become increasingly clear in our own day and more especially to English Modernists whose endeavour to reshape Christian theology merits the close attention which it receives. More and Cudworth were both older contemporaries of Newton: each was living when the *Principia* was written: and More's spiritualized space corresponded closely to Newton's famous scholium. God, as Newton put it, 'is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; He is not duration and space, but He continues and is present. He continues for ever and is present everywhere; and by continuing to be always and everywhere, He constitutes duration and space.' In this passage Newton breaks up the space-time continuum; duration and space were separated. But the metaphysic becomes strengthened rather than weakened if, modifying Newton, we say that 'by continuing to be always and everywhere God constitutes space-time.' Space-time so conceived becomes the primal stuff of the physical universe through which and in which God's purpose of creation is achieved. God thus constitutes the nexus out of which man has emerged.

It is my purpose to-day to set before you Newton's religious sympathies and thoughts, so I make no attempt to describe the great system of dynamical astronomy of which his laws of motion are the foundation. As it sprang from his brain it was marvellously complete and well-nigh perfect in expression. To make it he invented a new calculus which in his hands was so flexible that, to disarm criticism, he gave it geometrical form. A new era in mathematics began with his discoveries. Instead of slow and painful progress, 'line upon line, here a little and there a little,' Newton jumped forward: and, as the centuries pass, men will continue to marvel at his splendid genius. In our own day a great thinker has made an immortal name for himself. But it is a mistake to think, as some imagine, that Einstein has overthrown Newtonian dynamics: he has rather brought gravitation itself

within a modification of his predecessor's scheme. Newton's fame is secure. But he, were he alive, would be the first to praise the achievements of those who carry on his torch of knowledge. Did he not, with genuine humility, liken himself to a boy playing on the seashore, now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, while the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before him?

The mathematician, like the poet, is born, not made. The science of mathematics is for the few, endowed with special ability which the chances of life permit to be trained and developed. But the conclusions of the mathematician have an interest for multitudes who cannot understand his technique. Newton, in finally establishing the truth of Copernican astronomy, made humanity enter upon speculative enquiries of the highest importance.

What is man's place in the universe? How is he related to the purpose immanent in the whole? Newton gave little indication that he realized how extensively his work bore upon such enquiries, though there is one interesting passage in his writings where he asks: 'If all places to which we have access are filled with living creatures, why should all these immense spaces of the heavens above the clouds be incapable of inhabitants?' Reticent though such a sentence is, it was Newton who finally forced the educated world of men to recognize the meanness of man's domicile. The earth had been the centre of the universe: Newton revealed it as a humble satellite of the sun. It needed but recognition of the fact that our sun is but one of millions of stars, and man's outlook was transformed. Are there no other stars in the galactic universe which have satellites? We cannot believe it. Are those satellites devoid of life? It is incredible. Has life always taken the same evolutionary course as that which has led to the creation of man upon this earth? Has such evolution never progressed beyond the stage at which man now finds himself? We are practically forced to answer that other types of physical development are alike conceivable and possible and, further, that mental and spiritual attainment, far higher than that of man, is probably now existent elsewhere in the Universe. And, when we give such answers, what is man in the great scheme of things? Though Newton has been dead two centuries, it is only in our

own day that his countrymen, in the mass, are asking the questions to which his discoveries inevitably led.

On the fine statue by Roubiliac which takes the place of honour in the ante-chapel of Trinity, there is inscribed the line,

Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit,

'who in genius surpassed the whole world.' It is the tribute of Lucretius to Epicurus, and a greater than Epicurus merits the praise. Wordsworth saw that statue, an inspiration to many an undergraduate before and since his day, and wrote the lines:

> The marble index of a mind for ever
> Voyaging through strange seas of Thought, alone.

But through stranger seas than Newton ventured has he set men voyaging alone. What is our destiny, as individuals and as a race? Made of dust and water, specks on a small globe, apparently of no special importance in the vast range of creation, we live for but a tick of the astronomer's clock. Light reaches us to-day which began its journey before humanity had appeared upon this earth. Are we then of any importance in God's sight? Have we, as individuals or as a race, any permanence? Are we, after all, such stuff as dreams are made of? I give the old answer: 'the things which are seen are temporal, the things which are not seen are eternal.' The body returns to dust and water, but the mind, which ranges through space and time with a freedom that partakes of the divine, shall not perish. The spirit of a man who strives for truth and seeks goodness belongs to the realm of the eternal. Here it is fashioned by labour, by self-discipline, by reverence and love. Elsewhere in its perfection it shall have a richer existence. Does it matter that we are little more than point-instants in space-time? I think not, for eternal values are not measured by rods and clocks, nor are they to be found in the blind forces of nature. 'Not by might nor by power but by my spirit,' saith the Lord. And Newton with his simple piety would have accepted the Hebrew prophet's words. As the spirit of man is transformed by the spirit of the Lord, as righteousness and truth fit him to serve God and think His thoughts, he becomes a Son of God and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven.

RELIGION IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY POETRY

By J. H. Fowler, M.A., formerly of Clifton College; Author of *Life and Letters of Edward Lee Hicks*, etc.

I.

GENERALIZATIONS about the eighteenth century, like so many other generalizations, are sometimes found untenable in the light of fuller knowledge. Long ago Leslie Stephen, in his delightful lectures on *English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, pointed out how completely ordinary notions about the dissipation and coarseness and low morality of English society in that period were belied by the beautiful and healthy faces that look out upon us from the canvases of Reynolds and Gainsborough. What of the ordinary notion that after Milton and Dryden, though wit and polish might survive, inspired poetry ceased in the land except for a few anticipations of the re-birth of romance that was to come with the turn of the century? Mr. Nichol Smith, the compiler of the latest Oxford anthology,[1] is evidently of opinion that the nineteenth century was wholly unfair to its immediate predecessor, and that its disparaging verdict cannot be maintained. It is true that he expressly disclaims the office of judge; but in effect he judges, by denying all virtue to the traditional antithesis between 'classical' and 'romantic,' and by endeavouring to show that the spirit of poetry was never dead or dormant and that what is usually taken to be the characteristic note of romance was sounded again and again through the century.

In this paper I am concerned with religious poetry only. But if the poet is thought of in his highest capacity of *vates* or prophet, if a definition once quoted by Bishop Westcott,[2] that the poet is 'one who sees the infinite in things,' be accepted as conveying at least part of the truth, we shall find in its religious poetry peculiarly apt material for judging the strength or shortcoming of the century. And just here, as it happens, Mr. Nichol

[1] *The Oxford Book of Eighteenth Century Verse.* Chosen by David Nichol Smith. Clarendon Press, 1926.

[2] Westcott, *Religious Thought in the West*, p. 253.

Smith is more helpful than previous anthologists. It is curious to reflect that F. T. Palgrave, a devout spirit and himself a hymn-writer of no mean quality, could make no room in the Third Book (the eighteenth-century book) of his *Golden Treasury of the Best Songs and Lyrics* for any of the hymns of Watts or the Wesleys or Cowper, though he had admitted to his Second Book specimens of the sacred verse of Herbert and Vaughan. Was it merely that the hymns were so familiar from childhood as hymns that it never occurred to him they were also the purest lyric poetry? Whatever the explanation may be, Mr. Nichol Smith has done well to give them a place in his collection, for we cannot judge the poetry of the century without them.

To the early years of that century we owe our noblest national hymn, 'O God, our Help in ages past.'[3] The frigid notion that by the 'sons' of Time Watts meant the years — a notion that was recently given currency in the correspondence columns of the *Times* and some church newspapers—is conclusively refuted by the publication of the hymn in its entirety. The stanza which precedes the one in question runs :

> 'The busy tribes of flesh and blood,
> With all their lives and cares,
> Are carried downwards by Thy flood,
> And lost in following years.'

Watts's robust faith found no more difficulty than the Psalmist in believing human decay and dissolution to be in accordance with the Divine will. 'Thou turnest man to destruction : again thou sayest, Come again, ye children of men.' 'When thou hidest thy face they are troubled : when thou takest away their breath they die, and are turned again to their dust.'

Mr. Nichol Smith assigns no fewer than fourteen pages to Watts. There is an *Ode on the Day of Judgment* 'attempted in English Sapphick,' the theology of which is as remote from our own ideas as the theology of mediaeval paintings on the same theme. But 'When I survey the wondrous Cross' and 'There is a Land of pure Delight' are happily full of beauty and consolation still, even though the imagery of the latter hymn is to us not a forecast of literal fact but a concrete symbolising of spiritual truth. If we so interpret, are we doing violence to the

[3] But the first line, as Watts wrote it, was 'Our God, our Help in ages past.'

author's own meaning? If you should think so, ponder awhile on his poem of *True Riches* in *Horae Lyricae*, 1709:

'I am not concern'd to know
What to-morrow Fate will do:
'Tis enough that I can say
I've possest myself to-day:
Then if haply Midnight-Death
Seize my Flesh and stop my Breath,
Yet to-morrow I shall be
Heir to the best Part of Me . . .
I've a mighty Part within
That the World hath never seen,
Rich as Eden's happy ground,
And with choicer Plenty crown'd . . .
Here are Thoughts of larger Growth
Rip'ning into solid Truth;
Fruits refin'd, of noble Taste;
Seraphs feed on such Repast . . .
There beneath the smiling Skies
Hills of Contemplation rise;
Now upon some shining Top
Angels light, and call me up . . .
Yet the silly wand'ring Mind
Loath to be too much confin'd
Roves and takes her dayly Tours,
Coasting round the narrow Shores,
Narrow Shores of Flesh and Sense,
Picking Shells and Pebbles thence:
Or she sits at Fancy's Door,
Calling Shapes and Shadows to her,
Foreign Visits still receiving,
And t'herself a Stranger living.
Never, never would she buy
Indian dust or Tyrian dye,
Never trade abroad for more
If she saw her native Store.'

Diction and rhythm may speak to us here of the eighteenth century, but we are not far away from the atmosphere of Vaughan and Traherne and the mystics of all the ages. Lastly, in Watts's *Cradle Hymn* ('Hush! my Dear, lie still and slumber') we have lines that, for all their quaintness, the late Dean Beeching judged worthy of a place in his *Book of Christmas Verse*.

The latest exponent of Addison[4] has elected to represent him as 'the first Victorian' born a hundred years before his time—an eminent Victorian, that is, of the type that Mr. Lytton Strachey has delighted to imagine, a hollow worshipper of conventions and respectabilities, deceiving himself and others with

[4] *Essays in Biography*, by Bonamy Dobrée. Clarendon Press, 1925.

an overpowering sense of his own virtues and importance. Can anyone who reads the four hymns which Mr. Nichol Smith has reprinted from the *Spectator* of 1712 possibly accept such a portrait of their author? They are 'The Lord my Pasture shall prepare,' 'When all thy Mercies, O my God,' 'The Spacious Firmament on high,' and 'How are thy Servants blest, O Lord!' Every line of them speaks the language of sincerity. Thackeray's picture of 'the dear parson in the tye-wig' is far nearer to the truth than Mr. Dobrée's cynical sketch.

Not less delicately beautiful than the imaginings of seventeenth-century mystics, though expressed with a clarity and simplicity to which they seldom attained, are some lines in *The Petition for an Absolute Retreat* of Anne, Countess of Winchilsea (1713), a poetess whose influence has been traced in Wordsworth. She compares the privilege of contemplating Heaven from an obscure corner of the earth to the astronomer's direction of his telescope upon the skies:

> 'Fitly might the life of man
> Be indeed esteem'd a span,
> If the present moment were
> Of delight his only share;
> If no other joys he knew
> Than what round about him grew:
> But as those who stars would trace
> From a subterranean place,
> Through some engine lift their eyes
> To the outward, glorious skies;
> So th' immortal Spirit may,
> When descended to our clay,
> From a rightly govern'd frame
> View the height from whence she came;
> To her Paradise be caught,
> And things unutterable taught.'

Few eighteenth-century reputations have suffered a more complete eclipse than that of Edward Young. His *Night Thoughts* long shared with Blair's *Grave* and Pollok's *Course of Time* the somewhat unfair advantage of being poetry which the most rigid Sabbatarian could approve as appropriate reading for Sunday. The *Night Thoughts* further shared with Blair's *Grave* the honour of being illustrated by Blake. But George Eliot's scornful essay upon Young was generally accounted as damaging to her victim as a well-known essay by Macaulay had been to Robert Montgomery. Far more just, and really appre-

ciative, is a paper in Mr. Mackail's recent *Studies of English Poets*. Young was not contemptible either as moralist or religious poet, but Mr. Nichol Smith fails to represent him at his best. That best is indeed surprisingly good, as Mr. Mackail, with his sure instinct for great lines, has shown. He cites, for example:

> 'Godhead streaming through a thousand worlds';

and

> 'Heaven flies, death urges, knells call, Heaven invites,
> Hell threatens';

and

> 'His grief is but his grandeur in disguise,
> And discontent is immorality.'

II.

'It is a happy world after all. The air, the earth, the water, teem with delighted existence.' I lately chanced upon this characteristic sentiment of the egregious Paley when I was being shown the treasures of the boudoir of a friend's little daughter. This was the motto for September 21 on the block calendar which hung upon her wall, and it was the last one she had read, for on that day she went to a boarding-school. I could not help wondering whether she had shared at all the good man's cheerfulness, or had detected a subtle irony in the choice of such a motto for this of all days in the year. Not to Priscilla alone in these days would the words seem ironic. How queerly they contrast with a typical poem of our own age, Mr. Thomas Hardy's *In a Wood*:

> 'Pale beech and pine so blue,
> Set in one clay,
> Bough to bough cannot you
> Live out your day?
> When the rains skim and skip,
> Why mar sweet comradeship,
> Blighting with poison drip
> Neighbourly spray? . . .
> Touches from ash, o wych,
> Sting you like scorn!
> You too, brave hollies, twitch
> Sidelong from thorn.
> Even the rank poplars bear
> Poorly a rival's air,
> Cankering in blank despair
> If overborne.'

The comfortable optimism which runs through so much of eighteenth-century literature is well exemplified in an ode on the Enthusiast by William Whitehead, who became Poet Laureate in 1758. Dr. Johnson gives two definitions of this word as it was understood by his generation, 'one who has a vain confidence of his intercourse with God,' and 'one of elevated fancy or exalted ideas.' Whitehead's use seems to include both meanings. The enthusiast of his ode goes out into the country on a glorious day of early summer, and, enraptured by its charms and the delights of solitude, he bids adieu to the world of 'human hopes and human fears' and rhapsodises thus:

'Here contemplation points the road
Through Nature's charms to Nature's God!
These, these are joys alone!'

For this the voice of Reason rebukes him, and assures him that God is to be found in the contentious world of men as well as in the quiet scenes of Nature:

'He bids the tyrant passions rage,
He bids them war eternal rage,
And combat each his foe:
Till from dissensions concords rise,
And beauties from deformities,
And happiness from woe.

Art thou not man, and dar'st thou find
A bliss which leans not to mankind?
Presumptuous thought and vain!
Each bliss unshar'd is unenjoyed,
Each power is weak unless employed
Some social good to gain.'

Contentment and benevolence breathe in the lines, but their writer is one for whom the problems of a creation 'groaning and travailing together in pain' have not even begun to exist. We suspect him of finding all well in the created universe because he himself has not yet been called to suffer.

A deeper note is struck in Dr. Johnson's beautiful tribute to his friend Robert Levet, a 'practiser in physic':

'In misery's darkest caverns known
His useful care was ever nigh,
Where hopeless anguish poured his groan,
And lonely want retir'd to die . . .
His virtues walk'd their narrow round,
Nor made a pause, nor left a void;
And sure the Eternal Master found
The single talent well employ'd.'

Johnson's piety, simple, sincere and deep, is manifest to all readers of his private *Prayers and Meditations*, and indeed to all readers of Boswell. It finds noble expression in the lines on Prayer in *The Vanity of Human Wishes*:

> 'Still raise for Good the supplicating voice,
> But leave to Heav'n the Measure and the Choice . . .
> Yet when the sense of sacred Presence fires,
> And strong Devotion to the Skies aspires,
> Pour forth thy Fervours for a healthful Mind,
> Obedient Passions, and a Will resign'd;
> For Love, which scarce collective Man can fill;
> For Patience, Sov'reign o'er transmuted ill;
> For Faith, that panting for a happier Seat,
> Counts Death kind Nature's Signal of Retreat.
> These Goods for Man the Laws of Heav'n ordain,
> These Goods he grants, who grants the power to gain;
> With these celestial Wisdom calms the Mind,
> And makes the Happiness she does not find.'

Gray's *Elegy* is not a Christian poem, and though the scene is a churchyard, the church itself has curiously little part in it. Yet the poem is full of religious feeling, inspired not only by a fine and tender sympathy with humanity but by a childlike trust in the fatherhood of God.

From the hymns of the Wesleys Mr. Nichol Smith has taken little, but all he has taken is pure gold. John Wesley is represented by

> 'Thou hidden love of God, whose height,
> Whose depth unfathom'd no man knows';

Charles by 'Christ, whose Glory fills the skies,' 'Come, O thou Traveller unknown,' and 'O Thou who camest from above.' The verbal music of these four hymns, in a century which we are apt to think of as liking hard metallic beats of rhythm, is astonishingly beautiful. There is the same singing quality, born of the purest lyric emotion, in William Cowper's 'Hark, my soul! it is the Lord.' Mr. Nichol Smith gives three other hymns from the famous Olney hymn-book. Two are by Cowper, 'Oh! for a closer walk with God' and 'God moves in a mysterious way'; and the third is John Newton's 'How sweet the name of Jesus sounds.' Newton has been reprobated since his death as a slave-trader, and severely blamed for encouraging the morbid side of Cowper's religion; but at least we must acknowledge the

unaffected sweetness and sincerity of his best-known hymn. In the Olney collection, and in the best of the Wesleys' too numerous hymns, the religious poetry of the century attains its highest level. No hymns of any century surpass them in purity of devotion and in perfect beauty and simplicity of form.

One other remarkable product of the century remains to be mentioned—the *Song to David* of the inspired madman, Christopher Smart. This wonderful ode comprises eighty-six six-lined stanzas, from which Palgrave excerpted three for his *Golden Treasury*. It is a difficult poem, incoherent in places, but shining here and there with a great splendour. The student of poetry will be reminded at times of George Darley and William Blake, but also of Browning's *Saul* and Mr. Ralph Hodgson's *Song of Honour*. I quote four stanzas, choosing some that have not already been made familiar by Palgrave:

'Sweet is the dew that falls betimes
And drops upon the leafy limes;
Sweet Hermon's fragrant air:
Sweet is the lily's silver bell,
And sweet the wakeful tapers smell
That watch for early pray'r.
Sweeter in all the strains of love
The language of thy turtle dove,
Pair'd to thy swelling chord;
Sweeter with every grace endued
The glory of thy gratitude
Respir'd unto the Lord . . .
Strong is the lion—like a coal
His eye-ball—like a bastion's mole
His chest against the foes:
Strong, the gier-eagle on his sail,
Strong against tide, th' enormous whale
Emerges as he goes.
But stronger still, in earth and air,
And in the sea, the man of prayer;
And far beneath the tide;
And in the seat to faith assign'd,
Where ask is have, where seek is find,
Where knock is open wide.'

On the whole, it seems likely that a survey of Mr. Nichol Smith's large and representative selection of verse, in all its departments, may confirm, against the compiler's own wish, the prevailing impression that the fires of poetic imagination burnt low through the greater part of the eighteenth century. Even the much-abused (in both senses of the word) antithesis between

'classical' and 'romantic' has its uses and is not to be lightly discarded; and such a generalization as Traill's 'century of victorious but unsatisfying common sense' is not really overthrown by proving that there were many exceptions. But a study of the definitely religious poems will at all events modify any unfavourable verdict; for here we see the poetry of the century at its best.

It is indeed good to be reminded that throughout this century there were those 'whose loves in higher love endured,' whose aspirations were lifted as high as mortal can lift them, whose passion burnt with as pure a flame. And when this devotion now and again found rhythmic expression, the song was not seed that fell upon stony places. The thoughts awakened response in thousands of kindred hearts, and the hymns became, and have remained, so much a part of current speech that we forget that they belong to our poetry also.

THE PROBLEM OF JESUS IN FRANCE. MYTH OR HISTORY?

By the Reverend C. J. Wright, B.D.

IT is usually felt to-day that no account of the beginnings of Christianity is adequate which fails to emphasize the historic personality of Jesus. This feeling is common both to liberal and to conservative theologians, both to modernists and to traditionalists. Whatever else these may disagree upon, they are at one in maintaining that the message and life of the historic Jesus are essential not only to a right understanding of the content of the truth of Christianity, but to a right understanding of the development and spread of His religion in the early centuries. 'There never was a Mithra,' as it has recently been said, but there was a Jesus; and this difference, most will feel, has been a historically determining factor.

Even this position has, however, at different times from the eighteenth century onwards been challenged. Certain eccentric minds have believed that they could account for the beginnings

and growth of the Christian religion without having recourse to the hypothesis of a historical founder, and have indeed explicitly denied the historicity of Jesus. Most of the readers of this paper will know that twenty years or so ago there was a kind of small epidemic of this negation. Mr. J. M. Robertson in England, Prof. W. B. Smith in America, and Dr. A. Drews in Germany seriously championed the view that Jesus as a historical founder of Christianity had never existed. Drews in *The Christ Myth*[1] referred to precursors of his—Bruno Bauer, Bolland, etc.—who had maintained similar views. Robertson in *Christianity and Mythology* traced the picture of Jesus in the Gospels 'to a mixture of mythological elements in heathenism and Judaism,' and summed up his conclusions thus: 'Christianity so-called, in short, we find to be wholly manufactured from pre-existent material within historic times.'[2] We had thought, until recently, that such a theory had disappeared into the limbo of forgotten things, or that whatever interest it might have for the future would be reserved for the student of psychology. There has, however, been a disposition in France to resurrect the theory. The attempted resurrection is associated with the name of Dr. P. L. Couchoud, who in a series which he is editing under the general title of *Christianisme* published in 1924 under the title of *Le Mystère de Jésus* some articles written by himself for *Le Mercure de France*, the substance of which he also elucidated in a series of discussions at the *Union pour la Vérité* in Paris in the early months of 1924.

I have recently read alongside one another Couchoud's book and two others which in France have been called forth in answer to it. One of these is by Prof. Maurice Goguel of the Faculté libre de Théologie protestante, Paris, and is entitled *Jésus de Nazareth: Mythe ou Histoire?*[3] The other is by an erudite Roman theologian, the R.P. de Grandmaison of the Society of Jesus, and is entitled *Jésus dans l'histoire et dans le mystère.*[4]

[1] Eng. Tr., 1910.

[2] p. 276. See also the same author's *A Short History of Christianity, Pagan Christs: Studies in Comparative Hierology,* and *The Jesus Problem: Restatement of the Myth Theory.* See also *Ecce Deus: Studies in Primitive Christianity,* by W. B. Smith.

[3] Payot, Paris, 1925. Eng. Tr., 1926.

[4] Bloud et Gay, Paris, 1925.

To peruse these three volumes together is an altogether instructive and suggestive study. For Dr. Couchoud, Jesus has no historical existence. 'Je crois,' so he predicts, 'que vers 1940 Jésus tout entier aura passé du plan des faits matériels dans celui des représentations mentales collectives' (*op cit.* p. 107). He calls upon Christian thinkers to abandon all historical foundation for their faith. 'Ne vous fiez pas à une douteuse légende. Ce que vous prenez pour le port est un gouffre mortel. Hissez la voile! Allez au large, où il vous semble qu'est la tempête! *Ces flots vous porteront, hommes de peu de foi*' (italics his; p. 186). For Dr. Goguel the belief in the historicity of Jesus is founded upon the most certain grounds of historical investigation; and M. Couchoud's book is characterized by him as 'the dream of a poet rather than the work of a historian' (E.T., p. 5). To Dr. de Grandmaison, in his more slender critique of Couchoud, the belief in the historicity of Jesus may be said to be *supported* by the investigations of historical science—I say *supported*, for some will leave its perusal with the uneasy feeling that Dogma, not History, determines the conclusions reached.

It is not my purpose here to give a *resumé* of the imaginative conclusions reached by M. Couchoud. They differ little from the views of the Christ-Myth school already referred to. Perhaps, however, it is well to note that to the icy barrenness of historical negation he conjoins a quite mystic and poetic appreciation of the rôle which this mythic Jesus has had, and will continue to have, in history. In this he differs from most of his precursors.

Our concern here, however, is not with the place of Jesus 'in the experience of men,' but with the grounds for the belief in the Jesus of history. It is here that Prof. Goguel has rendered a distinct and not untimely service. For however bizarre the Christ-Myth theory may seem to scientific historians, a certain type of mind seems to be attracted by the theory. In certain secularist circles in this country the theory seems to be regarded as the last word in scientific history, and this in spite of the fact that Mr. F. C. Conybeare as long ago as 1914 published under the auspices of the R.P.A. his *The Historical Christ*, in which he dealt very faithfully and effectively with some of the 'sole-

cisms' or 'howlers' (to use his own terms) of his confreres. In *The Rationalist Annual* for 1927 the first article is devoted, in an appreciative and docile spirit, to a 'condensation of arguments in works by Robertson, Drews, Whittaker and Couchoud,' and in the closing paragraph we are told that 'if criticism result in the disappearance of an historical Jesus, men will not really lose anything.' Therefore, to have upon the re-emergence of the theory the reasons for its rejection so cogently and lucidly set forth as they are in this volume of Goguel is a real gain. I propose, therefore, briefly to set forth the main reasons which forbid our regarding the Christ-Myth hypothesis as other than fantastic and fanciful. While submitting to the guidance of Prof. Goguel in some of these reasons, I would state them in the order and emphasis wherein they appear to my own mind.

I would first state a general principle, essential at least to my own understanding of history. One of the chief features, and factors, in the evolution of humanity is the emergence of the great, the outstanding, personality. Movements of thought and life have their origin and inspiration in concrete personality. The familiar abstract 'tendencies' which are regarded by certain types of mind as accounting for everything under the sun have a concrete beginning somewhere, somewhen. The 'needs' which these movements are regarded as satisfying—thus assuring to them on this hypothesis their perpetuity—were *first* the needs of some definite personality in whom was born—or, if you will, inspired—the idea, the truth, the doctrine, and the emotional and practical response which gave to the 'movement' its character. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* One cannot understand the evolution of history without an understanding of the personalities in whose minds epochal movements began, and from the inspiration of whose teaching and life they, through the mediation of other personalities, received their continued impetus in after ages. History is not an affair of abstractions; it is an affair of men. Even what are called 'myths' have, it is impossible not to believe, some kernel of fact from which they have sprung. Ideas do not descend from the skies: they are begotten within human minds. Further, they are, I believe, born in the womb of a fact: the facts are not imaginatively created in the womb of an idea. M. Albert Houtin remarks in his *Short History of*

Christianity: 'The history of Christianity without Jesus seems to me as inexplicable as the history of Islam without Mahomet, or that of Pythagorism without Pythagoras.' MM. Loisy and Guignebert are also unable to escape a similar conclusion.

An emphasis on this general standpoint may be permitted here, for much is just here at stake. Scientific history is, I imagine, the most difficult of all studies. Our presuppositions in the last resort seem so frequently to have the decisive word. In spite of our yearning for strict impartiality, no one can ever quite achieve it; for to achieve it one would have to cease to be oneself, with the type of mind one has in the inscrutable nature of things inherited, and with the training which life has been able to impart—or which, shall we not more correctly say, one has been able, in virtue of his personal idiosyncrasies, to *extract* from life. In saying this I do not wish to regard as inevitable an attitude of historical despair, for that would, obviously, be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the standpoint of this article. But I do wish to suggest that frankness in the acknowledgment of 'presuppositions' gives strength and not weakness to a historian's position. The presupposition most accordant with my own understanding of history is, I may be permitted to repeat, that great historical movements whether of thought or of practice begin in the concrete great personality. And I would suggest that Renan's words forty or fifty years ago are not without a certain application both to the question under discussion and to ourselves, its discussers. 'Centuries deficient in virtue like ours,' he wrote, 'are essentially sceptical. Judging everyone by themselves, they call the great ideal figures of the past impossible and chimerical. To please certain minds, history should be constructed without a single great man. When you show them a picture surpassing the level of mediocrity to which they are accustomed, they accuse you of introducing legend into history. They believe that all men have been as base and selfish as themselves. Now this is one of the richest and most complete of legends.' I would further suggest that we have still much to learn from Carlyle's *Hero* philosophy of history. To ourselves in 1927, as to Carlyle in 1840, to give greatness to the times and not to the man is 'but melancholy work.' 'The Time calls forth! Alas, we have known Times *call* loudly enough for their great

man; but not find him when thus called! He was not there; Providence had not sent him; the Time, *calling* its loudest, had to go down to confusion and wreck because he would not come when called.'

But I hasten to the more specific, if not more pertinent, arguments which scientific historians can bring against the Christ-Myth theory. The central problem for students of the beginning of Christianity is the question as to the relation beween the Jesus of the Gospels and the Christ of the Church, or, if it is preferred, the 'Christ of experience.' A question here of almost bewildering complexity, except on the one hand to the extreme traditionalist and on the other to the extreme mythologist. To the former, of course, the problem does not exist. To him the 'whole Christ' of early dogmatic history cannot be sundered from the Jesus of the Gospel story. This oneness is achieved either by conferring a historical and scientific inerrancy upon the books which compose the New Testament, or by regarding the development of thought within the New Testament and the early centuries as determined by a type of inspiration absent from all other literature, from all other minds, and from all other periods of history. And so, to give one manifestation of the extreme traditionalist position, in the Gospels is discovered One who could utilise omnipotence and procure omniscience at will, thus making it unavoidable for people to ascribe omnipotent and omniscient deity to Him. The upshot of this position is to cut the knot of history by what I may be allowed to call *miracle-shears*. For the latter, also, the knot is cut in an arbitrary manner—this time by what I may be allowed to call *mythological shears*. Believing that the road leading from a definite historical person to the Christ of the Creeds is untraceable, they deliver themselves from the perplexities which beset the historical enquirers after this road by denying the existence of such a person. Or, being unable to believe that any historical person could by the perfection and harmony of his humanity give rise to the beliefs which afterwards expressed themselves in the Creeds, they write 'Myth' over Gospel narratives which leave upon most minds a deep impression of historical verisimilitude. Even Mark's Gospel becomes to M. Couchoud 'un pieux pot-pourri, sorte de grosse soupe chrétienne où tout trempe et se

mêle' (p. 98, *op. cit.*). Christian history thus is only to be understood as the progressive humanisation of a God.

Both these solutions will doubtless have an attractiveness to facile minds of the extreme right and of the extreme left. But since our concern here is confined to maintaining the chimerical nature of the extreme left solution, I will now come more closely to the contentions so cogently set forth by M. Goguel.

The 'evidence' may be conveniently divided into two sections: first, that of *non-Christian witness*, and, second, that of *Christian witness*.

A. Non-Christian Witness.

Josephus. The almost complete silence of Josephus as to Jesus[5] is utilised by the mythologists as a strong plea for their theory. (See, for example, in addition to the books already cited the recent volume of Georg Brandes, *Jesus a Myth.*) It may indeed seem to some surprising that Josephus, who had much to say about the Sadducees, the Pharisees, the Essenes and the Samaritans, has said so little about Jesus and the Christians. But this comparative 'silence' is, as M. Goguel has well pointed out, more embarrassing for the mythologists than for their opponents. 'By what right, indeed, should it be permissible to conclude from it that Jesus never existed, and not permissible to deny that a Christian movement existed in Palestine prior to the year 70?' (E.T., p. 37). The omissions of Josephus are surely most naturally explicable by the object he had in writing and by the public to whom he was writing. 'Thus it is that he has scarcely at all spoken of the Messianic cult, which nevertheless constituted the centre of Jewish thought in the first century. That he did so was because this cult was a menace to Rome, for the Kingdom of the Messiah could only be built upon the ruins of the Empire' (*ibid.*). This is a similar conclusion to that of Prof. E. F. Scott, who, speaking of Josephus in *The First Age*

[5] The two refs. in Josephus are in the eighteenth and twentieth books of the *Antiquities*. The first of these passages is regarded by Goguel, contrary to the opinion of Harnack, Burkitt and others, as betraying evidence of a Christian hand, but it is suggested that 'the interpolator confined himself to retouching what Josephus had written.' De Grandmaison says guardedly: 'Sub iudice lis est' (*op. cit.*, p. 44).

of Christianity. says: 'He knew that any favourable notice of Jesus would be displeasing to his public, and preferred to say nothing.'

Philo. The silence of Philo as to the Gospel facts has, likewise, been a cause of astonishment to some. These seem to forget that he died shortly after the year 40, and that, as M. Goguel says, there is nothing to prove that Christianity had reached Alexandria before this date.

Talmudic literature. Both M. Goguel and M. de Grandmaison dismiss the references to Jesus in this literature in a few brief sentences. M. Goguel says: 'That the Talmud and other Jewish sources say nothing about Jesus which is not the distortion of Christian tradition is sufficiently explained by the date of these documents and the fact that those who compiled them were governed by entirely polemical considerations. Their sole object was to combat the Christians; they were not interested in writing the history of their religion. The first mention of the Christians in this Jewish literature is the curse contained in the *Schemonè Esrè*, the daily prayer of the Jews (at the close of the first century), 'May the Nazarenes and the Minim perish!' (E.T., pp. 38-39). To M. de Grandmaison the Talmudic legends about Jesus are 'historiquement négligeables'; and he adds that the best Jewish writers make their own, on this subject, the judgment of Professor Arnold Meyer: 'An explosion of shallow fanaticism, of malignant sarcasm and of vulgar fancy.'

With regard to Jewish testimony to Jesus two points may be emphasized. First, that the Talmudic references, such as they are, cast no doubt on the historicity of Jesus. Secondly, that modern Jewish critics who have given themselves to the serious study of the life of Jesus rest their investigations upon the historical data to be found in the evangelical narratives. In this connection the works of Montefiore and the recently translated investigation of Dr. Joseph Klausner of Jerusalem (*Jesus of Nazareth: His Life, Times and Teaching*) may be referred to.

Tacitus. The familiar reference of Tacitus in the *Annales* (xv, 44), written in the second decade of the second century, in which he tells how Nero, in order to destroy the rumour that he had set fire to Rome, laid the blame on the Christians, is perhaps the only specific reference in Latin literature which is directly

incompatible with the Christ-Myth theory. 'The author of this name, Christ, had under the reign of Tiberius been condemned to death by the Procurator Pontius Pilate. This execrable superstition, held in check for a time, broke out anew, not only in Judaea, the birthplace of this evil, but also in the city in which all atrocities congregate and flourish.' M. Goguel sums up his critical analysis of this passage when he says elsewhere: 'Ce témoignage ne peut être expliqué ni par des sources chrétiennes ni par des sources juives.'[6]

Suetonius and Pliny. Reference should also be made here to the passages in Suetonious and Pliny the Younger. The former in the *Life of Claudius* tells us of the expulsion of the Jews from the city '*impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes*' (*cf. Acts* xviii, 2). Not much can be with certitude deduced from this reference as to the historicity of 'Chrestus.' The latter, in what is regarded as the first Latin text to mention the name of Christ, wrote in the year 110 A.D. from Bithynia to Trajan for advice in dealing with the Christians in his province. These Christians, he says, were accustomed to meet on a particular day and to sing an antiphonal hymn to Christ 'as though to a God' (*quasi deo*). The *quasi* here seems suggestive. If Pliny had known that the Christians worshipped a mythical God like to other heathen divinities would he not, it may be suggested, have omitted the *quasi*? What was it in Christ which distinguished Him from other divinities but the fact of His historical humanity?

To conclude this section. The paucity of references to Jesus in the non-Christian literature has not only furnished the mythologists with one of their stock arguments but has frequently occasioned surprise to simple-minded Christians. This surprise is, I imagine, only made possible by a lack of historical imagination. Many modern Christians naïvely infer that because the Gospel facts are to us the most significant events in human history they must therefore have been so regarded by the world of the time. To such I would commend the striking little story of Anatole France, *The Procurator of Judea*, which con-

[6] *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, November—December, 1925, p. 511 (in Art: 'La Vie et la pensée de Jésus. Leur rôle dans le Christianisme primitif.')

cludes thus: 'Jesus?' Pilate murmured, 'Jesus of Nazareth? I cannot call him to mind.'

Anti-Christian Polemic. It is a striking fact, to which M. Goguel draws attention, that with the exception of Lucian all our knowledge of the early anti-Christian polemical literature has been preserved for us by Christian apologists. Our chief indebtedness here is to Origen, to whom we owe what we know of Celsus's work. Now anyone who will read Origen's *Contra Celsum* will draw, I imagine, at least one certain conclusion, namely, that Jesus was to Celsus a historical person. The early opponents of Christianity went to the Gospels themselves for the facts on which they assailed Christian belief. So far from regarding the whole evangelical narrative as a fictitious crystallization of mythical ideas or fancies, we find that they instance the facts themselves as evidence for their anti-Christian conclusions. They pointed out contradictions and incoherences in the Gospel narratives, but they did not point out what would have seemed to them the central incoherence and contradiction, if the Christ-Myth theory were true. They eliminated so-called 'miracles,' but it never occurred to them to eliminate the historical reality of the person of Jesus. Since it is impossible to imagine that the Christians at the end of the second century did not believe in a historical Jesus, it is likewise impossible to believe that anti-Christan apologists such as Celsus, who wrote his *True Discourse* in the year 180, would have refrained from assailing this belief if they had not regarded it as unassailable. To my own mind this is the strongest argument to be deduced from anti-Christian literature of the early centuries.

B. Christian Witness.

Docetism. Reference should be made to an argument which may be deduced from the primitive Christological heresy known as Docetism. This heresy, it may be said in passing, resulted from the endeavour to achieve a coherent statement of the Person of Christ as both human and divine. The Docetists, in contrast with most moderns, were concerned to establish divinity as the primary factor in their Christological explication; and in order to achieve this primacy they felt it necessary to reduce

His humanity to a mere appearance. Now it seems of the highest significance to note that while they made various fantastic endeavours to show, by 'transposition' of the Gospel tradition, that the humanity of Jesus was but an illusory garment clothing a divine Being, they never sought to assail the historicity of the words and actions of this Being as recorded in the Gospels. Docetism, therefore, which might *prima facie* be expected to furnish some substantiation of the Christ-Myth hypothesis, is found upon examination to furnish a very signal argument for the repudiation of that hypothesis. M. Goguel acutely says: 'If the Docetists had had the slightest reason to think that Christ was no more than an ideal person without historical reality, they would not have expended such treasures of ingenuity to give an interpretation of His story which cut Him off completely from too intimate contact with humanity. The Docetists thus appear as witnesses to Gospel tradition' (E.T., p. 79).

Paul. No investigation of this question would be adequate which did not examine the 'evidence' of the apostle Paul. What, we have to ask, have the Christ-Myth theorists to say of him? Now M. Couchoud, it is interesting to note, seems to have achieved at least this uniqueness among those who maintain the mythological hypothesis, namely, he accepts the authenticity of the main Pauline epistles. 'They are,' he says, 'the most advanced promontory on which we can stand in order to penetrate the irridescent mist that shrouds the first days of the faith' (*op. cit.*, p. 77). A task requiring an almost breathless ingenuity must confront him who undertakes to elucidate the authentic testimony of Paul without concluding that at least he believed in a Christ 'according to the Flesh.' This ingenuity is not, however, beyond the powers of M. Couchoud, who with magnificent calm declares: 'Il n'y a dans Paul aucune allusion à un personnage historique du nom de Jésus' (p. 145). I willingly confess this ingenuity to be beyond my powers of rational, if not of humorous, appreciation. Instead therefore of climbing this promontory under the dizzy lead of M. Couchoud —to whom, let it be said, by the way, Paul is 'un chétif orgueilleux,' 'un gueux (!) qui conquérait le monde' (p. 78)—I will content myself with following in a sedate manner the patient and steady footsteps of M. Goguel. He with historical apposite-

ness devotes a considerable section of his book to the examination of the Pauline testimony. Conclusions only can here be summarised.

(*a*) Paul, the persecutor of the Church, is a witness for the historicity of Jesus within a few years of Calvary. He persecuted the Christians because they were exalting one whom he and his co-religionists regarded as 'accursed' in virtue of the manner of his death.

(*b*) He refers on two occasions incidentally to James and to other brothers of the Lord (*Gal.* i, 19; I *Cor.* ix, 5).

(*c*) The controversies between Paul and the Jerusalem apostles are based on the former's lack of a qualification which the latter possessed. That qualification was a knowledge of the Christ in the days of His flesh, and *this qualification Paul did not contest.*

(*d*) While Paul's epistles contain few references to the facts of the Gospel narratives, yet, as M. Goguel cogently establishes, 'they presume a Jesus who lived, acted, taught, whose life was a model for believers, and who died on the cross' (E.T., p. 109). His aim was to show that the Jesus of history was indeed the Christ, and the very fact of this aim establishes that no one questioned that Jesus had existed.

Christological Dogma. When we come to the argument which may be deduced from the growth of Christological dogma we are on more difficult and debatable terrain. Vital questions for modern theology are here at stake. Any student of the question of the historicity of Jesus will very soon discover that he is led inevitably to the deeper question as to what kind of person is historical. The historical question, we find, is interlaced with the theological question, and to determine what is precise history and what is theological interpretation is a by no means easy question to answer. I will put the essential question as it confronts my own mind. Is Paul's Christology an interpretation which the historical facts themselves as to the acts, and words, and so self-consciousness of Jesus, imposed *of necessity* upon his mind, and so upon the minds of all Christian generations to follow? *Or* is that Christology an interpretation which, while resting upon the facts as to the historic Jesus, is dominated

—or, if that is too strong a word, at least *determined as to its form*—by what may be called Christological ideas existing in Paul's mind before he became a Christian, and, therefore, derived from Jewish Messianic doctrine? I do not propose to enter upon this question, so crucial for the theology of the future, to which M. Goguel devotes one of the most interesting, and certainly most significant, sections of his book. I will here merely give his conclusion, and largely in his own words. He holds that 'there is in Paul an element whose origin is in the Jewish Messianic doctrine,' believing with some others that 'after eliminating what is specifically Christian in the Pauline Christology, there is found a system of coherent ideas which finds its place in the most natural manner in the development of the Jewish Messianic doctrine. This Christology,' he continues, 'existed in Paul's mind before his conversion.' As counterbalancing, however, this thesis he goes on to declare the position which is essential to the argument he adduces against the Christ-Myth theory. 'Nothing, however, would be more erroneous than to consider the Pauline Christology as only a simple development of Jewish or Judeo-Hellenic premises. That which gives him his originality is the synthesis built up of these elements and the historical episode of the life and death of Jesus.' By this recognition of two sources for the Pauline Christology—the historic Jesus and the Judaic Messianic notions—M. Goguel is led to oppose the Christ-Myth theorists. 'It is not possible,' he asserts, 'to reduce to a common element the historical and dogmatic constituents of the Pauline Christology, as M. Couchoud would do.' To M. Couchoud there is a homogeneous conception of Christology based solely upon pre-existing ideas. To M. Goguel there is a heterogeneous conception which is a synthesis of historic and of pre-Christian elements. In Paul we are not dealing, he says, with a system developed from myth or doctrine, but from the interpretation by this doctrine of an historical fact' (E.T., pp. 126-127). 'Far from contradicting the historical personality of Jesus, the Pauline Christology would be incomprehensible if it had not made the historical fact its starting-point' (p. 100). Similarly, M. Goguel holds, with Paul's soteriological ideas. This doctrine also 'assumes a double starting-point for its development. One is a doctrine of redemp-

tion whose origins must be sought in Judaism; the other is an historical episode, the life of Jesus. It is not possible, as M. Couchoud has attempted, to attribute to it a more homogeneous character, and by reducing one of these elements to the other to maintain that the history of Jesus was deduced from a drama of redemption' (p. 136).

In the non-Pauline epistles of the New Testament Prof. Goguel sees a similar development. 'The Gospel history serves as the base of the development of a doctrine of redemption, and the further we advance the more does the doctrine grow in importance and tend to substitute itself for the history of which originally it was the interpretation' (p. 147). From this it will, I think, be manifest that we are driven back, at last, to an investigation of

The Gospel Narratives themselves. For it is on this ground, as it seems to me, that the issue will in the last resort have to be determined, on the one hand, between much traditionalist theology and literary and historical criticism, and, on the other, between the Christ-Myth theorists and the exponents of that science. This fact will be recognized if the following features of the situation are noted. Much traditionalist theology has this, also, in common with the mythologists, that it maintains a *homogeneity* in the Gospel tradition. To the apologetic which has been considered indispensable to Christianity until recent years this is the homogeneity of historical fact; or, in other words, that historical science is not at liberty to achieve any reduction of that history by seeking to show on historical and literary grounds that certain events narrated in the Gospels owe their existence there to dogmatic or apologetic or mythical tendencies. Similarly, the mythologists declare for a homogeneity of Gospel tradition, in their case, of course, the homogeneity being that of mythical creation; or, in other words, that historical science is not at liberty to distinguish the historical personality from certain modifications or embellishments due either to legendary and miraculous growth or to the influence of the Old Testament.

I have no wish to give undue prominence here (though intellectual integrity demands that it be stated) to a thesis obvious to every student of the Gospel literature of the last thirty years, namely, that the traditionalist position is now untenable. Suffi-

cient non-historical matter is recognized even by conservative critics in the Gospel tradition that to declare for a 'homogeneous block' can only be regarded as a pedagogic apologia due to the difficulties or exigencies of the practical situation. The scope and purpose of this article, however, concerns me to give emphasis to the untenability of the mythological position.

Very briefly let it be said that the general teaching and portrait given to us in the Gospels has the stamp of a great historical creative personality. To interpret the Gospels in the light of the myth theory is to demand a miracle of literary creativeness to which there is no parallel. The *teaching* of the Jesus of the Gospels, besides, has such a unity, an aroma, a spirit, a genius (to use the words of Mr. Montifiore in *The Synoptic Gospels*[7]) that to deny the historicity of Jesus merely requires us to posit the existence of another teacher as unique and as great.

Further, the great weakness of the mythologists is that in the name of literary and historical criticism they treat the Gospels as if all the labours of recent scholars who discern there different historical and literary *strata* had never been. Here I return to Professor Goguel, who sees in the presence of these different *strata* one of the strongest reasons for the overthrow of the mythical theory:

> 'Si la tradition évangélique n'était que la traduction en récit d'une apocalypse mystique, elle présenterait un caractère d'homogénéité qu'elle n'a pas. On n'y remarquerait pas cette discordance entre le cadre et la substance des récits qui a frappé la plupart des critiques récents. Si elle était une création de la foi chrétienne il n'y aurait pas, sur nombre de points, des différences parfois importantes entre ce qui nous est présenté comme la pensée de Jésus et ce qui apparaît comme l'expression de la foi chrétienne primitive' (*Art. cit.* pp. 510-511).

To discuss the amount of this non-historical matter would, of course, require a treatise. Suffice it here to state M. Goguel's views. He frankly recognizes the influence of prophecy upon the Gospel history—like many British historians. He notes (1) 'creations due to prophetic exegesis,' (2) 'modifications due to prophetic exegesis,' and (3) the 'influence of prophecy on the facts' themselves. Like both conservative and liberal critics, he discerns elements of folk-lore—as, for example, in the darkness, the earthquakes, and the resurrection of the saints associated

[7] Vol. I. Intro. p. cv.

with the death of Jesus; 'but,' he adds, 'it would be no more legitimate to conclude from this fact that the death of Jesus is a myth than it would be to presume that Julius Caesar had never really existed because numerous writers have related that his death was accompanied by signs not less extraordinary' (E.T., pp. 205-206). In the narrative of the multiplication of the loaves 'the miracle is not the essential thing.' With regard to the walking on the water, 'the mythical and supernatural element appears to have intervened, not at the origin of the tradition, but in the course of its literary development. What is there surprising in the fact that the editors of the Gospels, who did not consider Jesus an ordinary man, should have attributed a supernatural power to Him over the elements,' (p. 206).

From all this it will be seen that the question of the historicity of Jesus cannot be divorced from those larger problems which are at present engrossing students of Christian origins. Those problems are chiefly three. First, the Personality of Jesus. Secondly, the evolution of Christian dogma. Thirdly, the evolution of Cultus and of the Institution known as the Church. The three problems, however, are so inter-related that the conclusions reached on any one of them involves and presupposes the conclusions as to the other two.

We welcome the conclusions of M. Goguel that Christianity was 'born out of the preaching of Jesus and the impression He had made upon the few men who had grouped themselves around Him'; that 'it was the personality of the Master which linked together the Gospel preached in Galilee and the religion of the primitive Church, and which explains the organic unity of the entire movement initiated by Jesus'; that 'not only did the thought of Jesus exercise on the Church (especially in the moral sphere) a decisive influence as the source of her inspiration, but still more was it the impression left by the personality of Jesus which gave the impulse through whose activity the whole system of Christian thought was developed' (p. 243).

THE FALSE DUALISM BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR

By the Rev. H. O. Peck, author of *The Divine Society.*

THE modern world unquestionably is suffering, in every department of its life, from a false dualism between the religious and the secular: between man's attitude and activity toward the eternal and invisible, so far as he has any such attitude and activity, and his relations with the world which appears to his senses. But there has arisen, possibly by way of reaction against this false contrast and opposition, a false *identification* of religious and secular, which we must examine and dismiss as speedily as possible. There is a widespread assumption that without the professions of any definite religious beliefs, and without any special acts of religious observance or the recognition of peculiarly religious times and occasions, the ordinary daily tasks may be performed with a religious significance more cogent and emphatic because it is nowhere isolated from secular life. The argument is that every day should be sacred, all occasions hallowed, every transaction a sacrament. And no doubt there is much to be said for such a mode of living, since it is the life of the blessed who stand in the presence of God in heaven.

Unfortunately, however, so far as we can discern, it has not satisfactorily established itself in this world, and the theoretic identification of the religious and the secular seems to produce, not saintship, but rather a smug and shallow self-complacency. Certainly its practical effect has not been a sublimination of the secular, but a degradation and impoverishment of religion. The waters of life flow out into the desert and are choked and lost in the sand. To say that all days are alike may be intended to mean that they are all days of the Lord. What is actually meant is that the Lord's Day becomes the day for an extra hour in bed, tennis parties, and letter-writing. And if any criticism be offered, the reply is made that to rest and recoup the body and to attend to one's affairs are duties as fully and thoroughly religious as any. Or again, to say that the reformation of the secular order is a sufficient religious activity may be intended to mean that the

earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof. What it actually means is that men will come to scuffle for some secular cause by purely secular means; and the 'social gospel' which finds the whole of religion in political activity ends by becoming the old political game.

For, always dogging the steps of this easy-going, 'once-born' kind of religion, or so-called religion, are the great antinomies of infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, outer and inner, natural and spiritual. This world, with all its activities, is temporal and contingent. And we, carried upon the stream of the phenomenal and ephemeral, have somehow to rise above it and secure our relation with what is eternal and absolute. Otherwise we can find no sure sanctions for conduct, no criterion of life, no sense of a goal. We shall find ourselves judging by ephemeral and phenomenal standards and interpreting life's value by the natural canons of pleasure and profit. We shall become completely secularized, of the earth, earthy. In the limitations of our finite existence within a time-process, the attempt to relate ourselves with the Eternal must take the form of special acts, occupying particular moments, and directed not immediately to secular ends, but simply to the Unseen. The primitive instinct for religious 'occasions' is vindicated by the profoundest considerations of psychology and justified by the experience of the race. The religious life must be based upon *a religion*: otherwise it will tend to become indistinguishable from the level of its secular environment.

It is necessary, then, to conceive religion as concerned primarily and directly with the Eternal and Invisible, but as clothing itself in some definite cultus-form, however simple. It seems otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to concentrate the full power of the human will, at any time, upon the attainment of fellowship with God; for, however seriously we may propose to ourselves the task of finding a divine communion in and through the common secular employments, it is undeniable that the more generously and whole-heartedly we devote ourselves to the day's work, the more liable are we to be distracted by its details and problems from that invisible fellowship which we seek as its guiding principle. Nor, upon the whole, can it be doubted that the most splendid and enduring works have been

wrought in the strength and in the conviction of vocation derived from the practice of definitely religious acts and the recognition of purely religious occasions. And it is safe to assert that with the cessation of such practice, religion would rapidly cease to count as a recognizable factor in the life of man.

Yet, upon the other hand, the very acceptance of religion as a thing of particular seasons and actions may have the effect of so contrasting the religious and the secular as to leave them in no kind of harmonious relation. And perhaps the danger increases as religion emphasizes seasons, builds up its organisation of worship, produces its own characteristic music and architecture. It is not entirely a staggering wonder that the attempt is sometimes made to forsake the chiming voices and awesome silences of the sanctuary, and to bridge the gulf between the realities of prayer and the racket of the workaday world by a type of religion which clothes itself directly and only in the accepted secular garb of the surrounding society. It blossoms in buns and billiard balls, and welcomes jazz music in praise of God. Unfortunately such symbolism seldom seems capable of being symbolic of anything beyond a somewhat vague emotion of philanthropic jollity; and in its atmosphere men do not readily kneel in penitence and faith.

The unbridged chasm between sacred and secular is nevertheless intolerable, for its existence means that if religion be taken as a genuine and necessary concern of man, the world must be regarded either as a sphere of temptation which the soul must flee at all costs, or else as a purely non-moral environment of our religious life, in which our natural activities run parallel with out spiritual course, but never merge with it or even touch it. It has to be confessed that both conclusions have been accepted at certain times and by certain groups and schools professedly Christian. It is easy to understand that any religion with a strong ethical sense and a clear vision of the fact of human sin should be liable to conclude that this world is an intrinsically dangerous habitation for the soul, even though such a conclusion may be a misinterpretation of the religion's own presuppositions. Both Catholic asceticism and Protestant puritanism have exhibited traces of such Manichaeism. If we may believe Troeltsch, Max Weber, Tawney and others, the second

f the two forms of dualism proved not a little attractive to later rotestantism, in which there arose the conception that there is non-moral sphere in which the ordinary business of living proeeds, and wherein the behaviour of Christians and non-hristians alike is necessarily swayed by the same indefeasible aws. The whole development of English political philosophy n the seventeenth, and of economic theory in the eighteenth entury seems to bear testimony to this. The discipline of a upernatural ethic was abandoned in government, trade and inustry. The Christian principle of love could not be any longer pplied, even in theory, to purely economic operations; and the hristian, observing no more than the secular rules of the maret, was quite justified in prospering by using such gifts or dvantages as he might possess, for his own benefit. Mr. Tawney ignificantly places before his account of the Puritan movement text from Tyndale's translation, 'And the Lorde was with oseph, and he was a luckie felowe.'[1]

Now, any such dualism is possible only so long as it can, by arious subterfuges, obscure the examination of its philosohical foundations. Concerning the former of the two views nentioned, that, namely, which regards the world only as a nare of the soul, it may be said at once that it is plainly irreoncilable with the Christian doctrine of creation. If the natural vorld is essentially an evil to be fled, the less the Christian soul as to do with it the better. But the soul of man is incarnate in uch manner as to be organically united with the world. Not nly its physical embodiment, but its psychological habit is irmly related with the objective environment. And the world s supplied with significance by the activities of human thought nd labour. If therefore he is to flee the world, a man must ventually find himself accepting some doctrine of nihilism. He will agree with what is usually supposed to be the Buddhist ttitude towards all phenomenal existence, and this must necesarily include his own personality. He will admit the claim of Paul Dahlke that Gotama accomplished the supreme philoophical feat when he 'wiped out the world.'[2] But he himself

[1] *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.*

[2] 'For higher thought there is not than the Buddha-thought which wipes out the world, and with it its bearer.'—Dahlke, *Buddhist Essays*, quoted by Mookerji, *Men and Thought in Ancient India*, 1924.

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will have wiped Christian theology out of his consideration in doing so.

If, however, it be maintained that the conception of an evil world does not of necessity imply departure from faith in God and belief in the soul's personal relation with Him, the reply is that we can believe in a world essentially opposed to the highest human interest only if we are prepared to surrender Christian theism and accept a fundamental and eternal dualism. But the co-operation of the two opposed forces in the creation of man and the world, inter-related and inter-dependent as they are, cannot be explained. And, moreover, the whole conception of the world as a field of trial and temptation through which the soul must 'run the gauntlet,' as it were, to gain its true home, means that religion must divorce itself from the secular cultural development of mankind. The world's achievements in art and science and politics have been a waste of time, and can never be anything more. And when we consider how such a view must cripple and confine the doctrine of God's providence and limit human joy, we may well be thankful that the entire movement of modern thought, with all its mistakes, has at least made it extremely improbable that Christian theology will ever again be troubled by this kind of heresy.

The characteristic modern dualism is other than this. It is rather that of a parallelism between a natural and secular order, without moral significance, and the world of religion, in which the laws of either are confined to their own field and never impinge upon the other. The vast modern assumption that the organization of human society is an operation governed by non-ethical forces and factors, and may be successfully achieved without any conception of the eternal foundations of life: the construction of political and economic theory totally apart from religious faith or creed, have implied that if religion be indeed concerned with realities, they are not those which we meet in trade, industry and government, and that in these provinces a Christian must submit to the control of the operating natural laws. And it is the lamentable fact that too long the Christian Church has refrained from giving to this view the complete and direct contradiction which, if the Christian faith be the supreme interpretation of reality, it deserves. For the conception can

support itself upon no adequate philosophy, and collapses at the first touch of criticism.

Christian theology allows, of course, that God does create the non-moral, but it could scarcely agree that any work of God could be intended to subserve no spiritual purpose whatever. At any rate, not even God can create a moral being and at the same time place his conscious volition beneath the sway of non-moral forces. He cannot create a living soul, half of whose action may be the worship of God, and the other half must be the worship of mammon. To admit that man is an ethical agent is to admit that he is wholly an ethical agent, whenever he chooses an end and seeks means to achieve it. It is not usually denied that in their economic activities men do choose ends and seek means, and to say that a man is bound to choose a particular end is to contradict oneself. Economic 'law,' indeed, is, in large part, only the recorded behaviour of masses of men in given circumstances. Scientific economics does not discover the source of that behaviour, and cannot even pretend to do so without exceeding its own province. In so far as the statement of economic law confines itself to what are truly processes of nature and certainties of mathematics, it is valid enough. It may also provide trustworthy guidance concerning the probable action of men, so long as a particular assumption as to their motive may reasonably be made. But this does not prove that the action is ultimately determined by non-ethical forces. It allows the possibility that human action upon a natural environment may undergo great changes, whereof the source is in worlds beyond the power of economics to discuss.

If this be admitted, it follows that the so-called 'natural' field of human endeavour may at any moment be invaded by free action choosing ends which lie altogether beyond the earthly horizon, and thus remoulding the world-order. At all events, however the philosophical verdict may lie, the modern world is itself convincing proof that neither religion nor the secular movement of life is benefited by a divorce which precludes any such supernatural revolution. While the one appears to languish, the other presents an increasing confusion. While the one seems to the world's eye to grow unreal, the other, in the judgment of many acute observers, becomes unmeaning and dangerously

mechanical. In this modern dualism it is the secular which seems more and more to come into power over human thought and action, involving us in a noisy and distracting scramble from which decency and dignity seem ever upon the point of departure.

The sphere of religion seems to decline in importance. Men grow less and less concerned with it. There is, however, no need to discuss the possibility of religion becoming a mere addendum of a secularized humanity, falling into an accepted place as a sentimental or emotional indulgence. For when religion does that, it will have lost the last shreds and rays of honour, and will cease to be religion. Whether it claim dominion over the secular order or not, it must at least assert that the realities with which it deals are those of greatest significance for mankind. But we have seen that no sort of divorce between the realities of religion and those of our existence in a natural environment can be rationally sustained, and we are thus forced to seek a conception of their relation which shall do justice to both.

We have said that the primary concern of religion is with the Invisible and Eternal Creator and Source of the soul and the world. It now follows that the communion with that Reality thus attained must shape a definite attitude of the soul to the world, so that human personality and society may be the means of clothing the natural with supernatural meaning and directing it to spiritual ends. And this is intrinsically involved in the Christian doctrines of God, Man, and Redemption. The doctrines of God's creatorship and man's freedom, considered together, support the conclusion that man is intended to be a 'worker together with God'; and this can mean only that to man is allotted a share in completing the significance of the created universe. But since he is a creature, he cannot perform this task by choosing his own self-derived and selfward-directed ends. Created by God, he is here to do the will of God; and created within social relations, he can do the will of God only through an activity fraught constantly with social reference.

The philosophical basis of this position is not difficult to perceive. The Christian doctrine of creation always implies that God is love, since Christian theology will not allow that God

was moved by any need for His own self-completion or self-satisfaction. Creation is not a divine growth or becoming. It is the expression of the principle of a perfection eternally existing. God is love. But this must mean that the social principle operates within the Divine Being. Within God the whole activity of love is perfectly realized. And if man is to co-operate with God, he must be in the image of God, and must be radically social. But in his finite life his social communion needs a common, objective medium, which is found in that natural world which all human hands touch and which provides a common register of all our moral decisions. It is thus precisely the work of man to supply this natural order with its culminating significance as the means of expressing the divine life. He has to make of it the instrument of a divine-human communion in a co-operative relation.[3]

It follows that the restored consolidation of men in Christ must have the effect of transforming the natural order, and bringing the whole development of secular culture beneath his sway. The historic Incarnation reveals God at work beneath the veils of things seen; and it is impossible for the Church to hold that any normal human function is permanently 'secular' and in isolation from the supreme divine purpose. Rather, the world is seen to be rich with wondrous potentiality. It is the possible sphere of the divine Kingdom. For ages the Church experienced scarcely a tremor of doubt upon this question, and, however imperfectly, set to work to realize the Kingdom of Christ upon earth.

The present reaction against the Victorian adulation of modern 'progress' has certainly produced some extravagant praise of the Middle Ages. But sober students of informed Christian sympathies will not be disposed to quarrel with the assertion that the decadence of the Middle Ages did see the partial collapse of a great theory of human life. There is a contrast between the ultimate sanctions accepted by the governing centres of mediaeval and modern thought. We live largely upon the secular assumption—upon the theory that human association and a large part of individual conduct are determined

[3] Along these lines the writer would also construct a philosophy of the Church's Sacraments.

by the laws of an order which has no relation with the ethical and spiritual facts and forces of the Christian revelation. And it is this fundamental error which lies at the roots of our modern embarrassment. The assumption has a disastrous effect. It relegates spiritual values to a practical ineffectiveness in the world. Neither modern capitalism nor doctrinaire socialism is willing to accept other than an economic account of society. This means that aesthetics, philosophy, and religion alike are to be accounted mere epiphenomena. The exploitation of the world's natural resources bears no profound moral and mystical fruit in brotherhood. Music, sculpture, painting and letters are in danger of being ensnared by the economic motive and of selling themselves as ministers of base passion. Politics become *Real Politik* and the means of the economic enrichment of class or nation at the expense of other classes or nations. And science finds the most signal expression of her powers in the work of spreading death and destruction across the earth's fair breast.

It is sufficiently clear that no release from these threatening ills can be achieved by any proposals governed by that secular assumption which is so largely responsible for our trouble. The acquisitive motive cannot be socialized by being 'enlightened,' either by Karl Marx or by Henry Ford. Our Lord did not propose to enlighten it. He proposed to substitute an entirely different motive. By emphasizing the Fatherhood of God, and our utter dependence upon Him, He taught that human action should proceed from the motive of profound gratitude. He said that the end of our life was not in material things, and regarded riches as positively dangerous. He declared that life should be organized, not for rewards and gains, but for service, and that ministration to human need was the prime criterion of distinction. His gospel is a divine inversion of accepted human standards; and always it implies that the Fatherhood of God shall have its expression, through the human response, in every field of action. He carried the divine love to the extreme test of the Cross, and proved that it is better to die for love of the eternal than to live for love of the temporal; but He rose again to reveal that this final offering was not the failure, but the triumph, of God in the world, and that religion, by being true to itself, will not ultimately be mastered by the secular, but may eventually subdue it.

Now, since the spiritual control of the secular order is to be, at least in some part, mediated through human operation, and the expression of human personality is inconceivable without a social relation, it is not surprising that God's redemptive effort issued in a society claiming His historic act as its foundation. The Church of God is still the world's most significant phenomenon, a strange and puzzling anomaly to thorough-going secularists, but a beacon of hope to those who believe that the natural order in itself lacks full significance and completion. But the condition of the Church as veritably God's instrument and body in the world is sufficiently anomalous; and the enormous accusation against it, made not only by foes but with more cogency by its best friends, is that it is not now producing effects which may be recognized as wholly and supremely characteristic. It is not sufficiently concerned to provide a divine embodiment within the secular process. It worships God high above the tumult and sorrow of the world. But it does not bring Him down to reign in the world's government and work.

If the changes through which we are living are to issue in a truly humane order, capable of providing a progressively liberalizing environment for the souls of men, it seems that there must be a return to the invisible ground of our existence, and a renewed attempt to appreciate this work as intended to be the sacrament of eternity. This must mean the consolidation of society within a bond of supernatural experience and sanction; and it is the simple truth, discovered after all our restless searching, that we need no other fundamental ideas than those expressed in Christian theology and the Christian Church. But the Church, to perform its saving work now, must recognize that although it has not finally bridged the gulf and abolished the dualism between religious and secular reality, when faith and spirit have been clothed in sacrament and visible cultus, it is nevertheless thereby committed in principle to a fuller secular embodiment which it must strive to realize. If any time or place is specially religious, the application must follow that all times and places, and the whole human operation in this world are to receive religious meaning by being shaped and used by the divine-human co-operation.

It goes almost without saying that the unification of the Christian society and of the Christian witness is necessary for the

true control of the secular by the spiritual, since the whole communal significance of Redemption is confused and endangered by a divided Church. The restoration of Christian unity is the supreme world-cause of our time. But if it be outwardly achieved, it will fail to serve the Divine purpose unless that one Christian Society be conceived as rightly claiming men's first and strongest loyalty, and holding them in fellowship not to be broken at the dictates of national, political, or economic interest. And its authority must be expressed by its own honest efforts to ensure that all those who accept the Christian faith shall accept the implications of the faith: the harmony of personal freedom with social co-operation, the employment of the natural order for spiritual ends, and the construction of a civilization and culture which shall be the practical expression of the worship of the Eternal Society of the Blessed Trinity. The problem of how the Church is ever to regain an effective hold upon the secular order is a baffling one; but we have adequate illustrations from history of how it must not be attempted. And we know the first step. We have to quicken the conscience, inform the mind, and invigorate the will of the Church itself. To a Church entirely prepared to do His will, God will assuredly give opportunities beyond our dreams.

THE CHURCH AND ITS MINISTRY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS SOCIAL PURPOSE

By Professor F. W. Barry, King's College, London.

I.

FOR centuries all men's thought about the Church, their claims for its ministries and institutions, have been conditioned by archaeology. Men have looked back to the history of the past to trace apostolical successions, as guaranteeing by sheer continuity the authentic life of the Spirit in the Church: or to justify, by appeals to antiquity, the claims of younger Christian denominations regarded by the elder as schismatic. This emphasis of thought is now shifting, partly because we

cannot feel so certain about the actual facts of history to which our fathers so confidently appealed, and we will not base our claims for the Church on a foundation that may prove unstable; but much more because the whole bent of the modern mind is towards evolutionary conceptions. The essential facts about any organism, the essential values of any institution, reside, we feel, less in what it has been than in that which it is tending to become. Teleology controls our thinking. Value, we hold (going back in this to the Greeks), is essentially conditioned by purpose. We look to the end which anything subserves—to its future, that is, rather than to its past—when we would determine our attitude towards it. On the whole we should agree with Aristotle that the essence or definition of anything can only be properly stated in terms of function, and that its 'excellence' or worth is relative to the end for which it exists.

This tendency of current thought has penetrated our theology. Our ideas about the Church are beginning to move from history to teleology. We should find the nature of the Church and the justification of our claims for it less in a merely historical appeal than in the thought of the end for which it exists and its attempts to realize that end. It is plain that if this line of argument should come to be generally accepted, it involves a theological revolution, and no less far-reaching changes in practice. The appeal will no longer be to museums, but to the evidence of the life of spirit. By their fruits we shall know them. When men ask, 'Is this a true branch of the Church?' the answer will not depend on title-deeds but on the signs of the fruits of the Spirit—on the loyalty and effectiveness of the Christian group in question in realizing that redemptive purpose for which the Catholic Church as a whole exists. The slogan, 'We have Abraham to our father,' which was found inadequate by John the Baptist, will no longer figure in Christian apologetic: we shall all submit to the pragmatic test—'the axe is laid to the root of the trees, every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire.' Incidentally, as we shall see later, this will involve, at long last, a revised conception of the intellectual training for the Ministry and the kind of things which the clergy ought to know. But equally, such a thought of the Church as existing in right of its redemptive purpose must

deeply penetrate and affect the worship and practice of its members. Our more immediate concern is with this aspect.

The Church of Christ is the chief instrument of the Kingdom of God in the world. Its nature and task show the duality of that which it exists to realize. The Kingdom of God *is*, essentially, a temper and quality of mind—that which the New Testament calls *agape*. But, as is clear at once from the nature of things and from the recorded teaching of the Lord, this inward sovereignty of God in the minds and wills of men and women must express and externalize itself in an actual social order. There is nothing hidden but that it should be made manifest, a law which He never tired of emphasizing, both by way of warning and encouragement. Spirit must always clothe itself in body. Thus the Kingdom of God is at once a right relationship to God in the inmost springs of thought and motive, *and* the outward expression of that attitude in a society of right relations, realizing the Divine Will for men.

And the Church exists for this two-fold task. It is to be the expression of the Spirit first of all for the 'conversion of souls,' to bring men into fellowship with God. But that in itself *involves* a social task. For (1) there are no such things as 'souls' in the sense of the old religious language or of the Platonic tradition. We cannot say to-day, 'I *have* a soul'; the truth is rather that I *am* a soul, or, more strictly, am becoming one. There is not 'the mind' plus a separable soul: there is personality, moving towards God. But the self is its experiences; and as experience for us is conditioned by environment, it follows that the attempt to redeem the self out of or apart from its environment is an actual impossibility. The traditional emphasis of Christian thought on the 'Resurrection of the Body' is surely concerned to guard this vital fact, as against the thin sub-Christian conception of the mere immortality of the soul (Strip off all those memories and experiences which come to me from environment through the medium of the bodily organism, and what is left is not, as Plato thought, pure soul, undefiled and unadulterated, but quite literally nothing). It emphasizes that for us 'salvation' is not an escape, but a redemption. It involves this (2) because the external world is (as Mr. Peck has finely put it) 'the common register of our

moral decisions.' The movement of a man's spirit towards God will express itself in act and conduct, *i.e.* in the modification of environment. But you cannot isolate A and his environment from the life and environment of B, C, D . . . Any change in one affects all the others, such is the interdependence of our lives.

Thus, on both grounds, the 'conversion of souls' involves in itself, and not merely as result, the redemption of the whole social order to be the expression of God's sovereignty in the medium of human life. It is this conception of its redemptive task which ought to control our thought about the Church. By its faithfulness to it, the Church stands or falls.

II.

The Church is the creation of the Spirit, and the Spirit is the creator of value. The Holy Spirit of Christian theology, mediated and conferred by Jesus, infuses new quality and richness into life at every level. To that the New Testament bears vivid witness. It gives us an overwhelming impression of the whole of life in all its width and range, with all its mutual social obligations, all its manifold interests and contacts, raised to new levels of possibility. Every motive is supernaturalized, every recognition of worth enriched. Natural goods become supernatural. The Society, as the Body of Christ, is the expression of the Christ-spirit in all its aims and activities, not only in those which we commonly call 'religious,' but in its economic organization, its art, its literature, its social functions.[1] It is the nearest approach which has been achieved yet to realizing on earth the City of God in S. Augustine's wonderful definition—*concordatissima et ordinatissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo* (the most perfectly ordered and articulated society enjoying God and one another in God'). Its worship was the crown of its social life, with its roots in common work and common purpose. The gathering on the first day of the week was not merely a collection of individuals assembled for devotional exercises (as it is with us in the modern world): it was the wor-

[1] Perhaps I may refer to my paper read at the Southport Church Conference for amplification of this.

ship of a social group, bringing its common life and aspiration in offering, consecration, and thanksgiving. In this Society was realized the new creation of S. Paul's thought. The Christ was indeed the 'Second Adam,' the focus of new human possibility, lifting commonplace men and women with all their normal interests and motives to higher qualities of living, in a life centred in a new loyalty. The Church was *agape* in action—the Bride prepared for her husband, clothed in the white raiment of the Saints.

It must be emphasized that this Church was not a selected company of gifted people. The New Testament shows frankly and relentlessly how poor and unpromising was the material from which it was built. The essential Christian miracles are moral, and this is the greatest of the *Gesta Christi*. The Church was, and always is and must be, the spiritual home of the average man, enabling each (as Miss Underhill has put it) 'to be a little more supernatural' in that company than he is alone. It is built, like every other institution, on the basis of the biological instincts, against the background of the common day, which must always consist—for most men and women—in the winning of bread and the fashioning of the home; it has to deal with the ordinary stupidity, selfishness, and timidity of our race. All these it redeems, re-directs, transfigures, so that bread (for which men kill one another) becomes the very symbol of the Divine Love and the ordinary tasks of common men become the expression here in space and time of the Spirit which proceeds from the Eternal. Here we have a religion which is *alive* because it has its roots in life and action. For all genuine religion, as Professor Whitehead has said lately, must 'verify itself at all temperatures,' not merely on the peaks of contemplation nor merely in the valleys of daily duty.

III.

We need not here spend time in pointing out how this society of the Spirit has ceased to be a fact in our world. This is just the problem we are to discuss. The specialization of life in the modern world has meant that religion, too, becomes specialized

-one sphere or department of life side by side with all the hers. Historically, religion has always meant this, a recog-zed complex of cult-acts and attitudes handled by a profes-onal priesthood. The Hebrew prophets undermined this tion and early Christianity destroyed it. But the pressure of rcumstance to-day is driving the wedge between religion and e, and the Church has become, as I have written elsewhere, st a 'devotional association' and not a fellowship of life and ork. And in consequence all that is most alive in English-eaking Christianity is tending *either* to re-emphasize the purely eligious' note in Christian worship *or* to equate religion with cial duty. Both of these are surely false tendencies. For, on e one hand, Christianity and what historically has been 'reli-on' are two different things and not the same. On the other nd, the equation of religion with art, ethics, or social service, early evacuates religion of its own unique, distinctive content. o we seem to be rather in an *impasse*. And no attempts at popu-rizing or 'rotarizing' Christianity will avail till we have got ir thinking clear and made up our minds about the relation etween the activities that are called religious and the other aims and activities of life. Is there any clue to this major oblem?

The clue lies, probably, in our assertion that the Church is e creation of the Spirit. Jesus is, for us, the supreme expres-on, the supreme mediator of the Spirit, which is God in creative d redemptive action. But as the Old Testament stands behind ir Lord, so the gift of the Spirit through Him presupposes also e background of the Spirit's work before the Incarnation—od's redemptive work, as I have said, presupposes His crea-e. At every stage in the long story of emergent evolution the irit has evoked from life and consciousness an increasingly h and clear response to value. In the primitive stage the re-onse is primitive and is made by the 'economic' motives. The st impulse towards ordered life, the achievement of some ability and dignity even in the matter of the food supply, by eatures that hitherto lived for the day's kill, is a rudimentary treach after value. The earliest dawnings of religion, the first pulse towards creative art, the birth of intellectual curiosity, e attempts at forging social law and order—all these are the

creation of the Spirit, drawing man to the earliest recognition that the life is more than meat and really consists in an unseen world of value.

Each recognition of the new value means, obviously, a fresh stage in the self-disclosure of the Divine to man which culminates in the Incarnation. The recognition of value carries with it the imperative obligation. Value is that which *ought* to be: it is not, like man's apprehension of it, the product of evolutionary forces. Value is that which we recognize as *sacred*, as having claims upon our loyalty. And whatever it is that a man apprehends as sacred, there is the essentially religious attitude. Advance in the life of Spirit involves not only progressive apprehension of ever higher and richer values, but also that of their right correlation in the hierarchy of value which depends from God, the Absolute Source of worth to whom worship (the recognition of worth) is offered. The 'good life' consists—so Professor Laird[2] has argued—in the consecration of the self to realizing (in due proportion and harmony) the highest values of which the self is capable. Goodness resides in the objects of our choosing; but there is also an intrinsic goodness in the 'virtuous will which responds to their goodness and dedicates itself in the right attitude to the realization of these values. It is just in this that 'virtue' consists.

Now this position can, in my opinion, be re-translated so as to meet our difficulty. If for virtue we were to write religion, and if we interpret religion as *agape*—the distinctively Christian attitude of mind—we shall be near the solution of our problem. As a matter of history, the various values emerge into consciousness successively, but in life their claims are contemporaneous. And into the matrix of the life of Spirit devoting itself to the pursuit of value, even upon the most elementary level, comes the new power which we call 'Holy Spirit,' permeating that search with a new quality and bringing it into conscious relation with the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Holy Spirit directs and transfigures that redemptive outreach after worth which is itself the creation of God's spirit, and raises it to a supernatural level. The Christian life is the life thus dedicated, actualizing, at whatever level its circumstances and capa-

[2] *A Study in Moral Theory* (1926).

ities make possible, that value which is God's self-expression, n the spirit and leadership of Jesus Christ. No one life can chieve all value; no one disciple can know the fullness of hrist. The Church is, in ideal, the human race consecrated in mutual endeavour to achieve within the field of our experi- nce the values which are the expression of God's Being, and fting it up in worship and adoration to the Father in whom all re fulfilled. This life of the Spirit verifies itself, as we have emanded, *at all temperatures*. Economic activity, science, art, olitics—none of these are the same thing as religion: religion esides in the attitude towards them which refers them all through hrist to the Father. It is thus that the Church, in redeeming, redeemed; and this conception of the Christian life ought to etermine Christian institutions.

IV.

Designedly, I leave for subsequent discussions the implica- ons that must follow if such a suggestion as this were accepted. will only add a few remarks on the future of the Ministry.

It would seem to follow (1) that the whole conception of the aining needed for the Ministry requires a very thorough re- inking. At present it rests on a purely *historical* interpretation f God's redemptive task. 'We have heard with our ears and ur fathers have told us the noble work which Thou didst in heir days and in the old time before them.' But what of His oble works here and now through the redemptive work of the resent Spirit, winning men from the merely phenomenal to live or the life that is real? In accordance with the traditional con- eption, which still dominates all liturgical worship, what a man arns to equip him for the priesthood is all about things that ave happened in the past—'dead' languages, 'fossilized' doc- ines and 'ancient' history. But we cannot expect the twentieth entury, as it seeks for value in its own time and manner, to ex- ress its aspirations after worth in terms of Jewish faith and istory. No doubt they 'heard of the same at Ephratah and ound it in the wood,' but this awakens in us no responsive choes. Nor can men with their minds so trained and coloured e expected to give clear spiritual leadership in the faith and

name of Christ to our generation in its constructive tasks. The whole thing needs to be thoroughly revised in the light of this new conception of the Church.

(2) It is, to my mind, exceedingly doubtful whether the Ministry as conceived at present is not becoming an anachronism. It has served the world in the past magnificently, but changing circumstances are outgrowing it. In a world of increasingly specialized function the unspecialized man is ineffective, because he has no special line of mastery along which to give spiritual leadership. You cannot really 'specialize in religion,' because religion is an attitude consecrating the tasks and claims of life. On the other hand, it is patently impossible to demand of the ordained Ministry any degree of specialized skill and knowledge along all the many lines of modern life. The way out would seem to lie in a recognition that all attempts at realizing value in the inspiration of the Holy Spirit are genuine forms of Christian priesthood, and in conferring the Church's commission on men who in their own sphere of ministry—education, art, commerce, government—are giving themselves to this very thing. Some—with the needed gifts and aptitudes—will be commissioned to preach, to lead in worship and to administer the sacraments: some to lead men in the life of the Spirit along the lines of their own professions. But none will be greater or less than the other. In this way, though on grounds of expediency there will always have to be some whole-time ministers, their numbers will be greatly diminished, and the leadership of the Christian community will be more and more thrown up from its own ranks and recognised by the Church as it appears. (This seems to have been the New Testament procedure, as Mr. Rolland Allen keeps on insisting.) And in this way worship will spring out of work as blossom flames out from the growing tree, and spiritual leadership out of the constructive tasks of life.

LIGHT-MYSTICISM

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[N this paper I hope to demonstrate, within the sphere of mystical theology and experience, the existence of a set of alues and categories whose centre of reference is the idea of ight. I shall try to show that the origins of this conception are artly literary—driving their roots down into the sacred canon, strological and Hermetic speculation, making their way into hristian theology by the door of Alexandrian syncretism and eo-Platonism—and partly realistic, due sometimes to patho-ogical causes, at other times the result of visionary experiences f the highest validity. I shall then endeavour to illustrate ie symbolic value of Light-Mysticism, as a corrective to the iarriage-symbolism so often used to describe the exalted pro-esses of contemplative prayer, and as adequately expressing ie sense both of the 'wholly other' and of the nearness and ntimacy of the mystical experience. I shall give grounds for elieving that whatever be the exact nature of this supernatural lumination which crowns the working of the consciousness, it s 'veridical,' possessing a supreme value for imaginative wor-hip and in the moral energies which it releases for mankind.

The picture of God as Light and of the soul as a particle of ight; the description of the Godward journey as enlighten-ient and of the arrival at the final goal as the contact of light ith Light—this is the basis for a type of mysticism predomin-ntly rational in character, avoiding the pitfalls of sexual and nthropomorphic imagery on the one hand and the pedantic bstractions of the *via negativa* on the other.

First, then, concerning origins. I do not propose to spend ong over the primary source, for the light-symbolism of the ible, beautiful as it is, has already been sufficiently exploited.[1] hough God is not directly called Light in the Old Testament, Ie is the fount of Light which He has created. He is the tmosphere in which the Light is known—'In Thy Light shall

[1] See especially the article 'Glory' in H.D.B.

we see Light'; 'O send forth Thy light and Thy truth, that they may lead me.' He is the moulder of the illuminated human consciousness—'The Lord is my Light and my salvation.' The Shekinah is the localized focus of this Divine radiance. This is the most probable source of the New Testament definitions of God as dwelling in Light unapproachable, the Father of the heavenly lights. In the Fourth Gospel, as in Clement, Christ is the *Photagogos* who, Himself the Light, leads men to the deifying vision of the Father. There does, not, however, seem to be any need to trace this idea back to the 'Life and Light Gnosis' of the Oriental sect of the Mandaeans.[2]. The thought is not an alien on Semitic soil.

But naturally it is more at home in a Hellenic setting. So Philo calls God an archetypal splendour, 'sending forth numberless beams.' He is 'the intellectual Sun behind the visible sun, supplying from His invisible fountains streams of visible light to all who can see.' This was written in Egypt, the immemorial home of the worship of the Sun-God. It was the home, also, of the Hermetic literature, in which the regulative definition of God seems to be that of Light. In *Poimandres* we read how 'from the Light there came forth a Holy Word.' 'Mind, the Father of all, who is Life and Light, gave birth to Man,' who is therefore bidden to 'lay hold on the Light; partake of Immortality.'

Here is clearly expressed the hope of 'deification' by the vision of the Light. In the last great prayer made by Hermes, Tat and Asclepius, when they come forth from the sanctuary at sunset and facing southward adore the archetypal Light, we read: 'It is by grace alone that we have attained to the Light; we have found salvation in the Light Thou givest.'[3] For, as we are told in another book, 'the beauty of the Good bathes his mind in Light, and takes all his soul to itself, and changes the whole man into eternal substance.'[4]

Some of the early mystics adopted the missionary policy of presenting Christianity as a 'Mysteriosophy,' by which the soul wins the gift of deification or immortality through the vision of God, who is often imagined as a Being of dazzling splendour.

[2] *cp.* Estlin Carpenter, *The Johannine Writings*, pp. 237 *f.* and 320.
[3] Scott, *Hermetica*, I, 375. [4] *Ibid.* I, 191.

n the *Epopteia* of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the god was re-ealed by means of a 'peculiar fairy illumination.' For Lucius, -puleius' initiate, θρονισμός followed ἐποπτεια. He looked into yes of God and became himself divine. Dio, again, speaks of spectacles' which he sees in 'an alternation of light and dark-ess.' In some of the Mithraic mysteries, says Halliday, 'the eophytes were blindfolded during the earlier stages of the eremony. The illumination (ἔλλαμψις, compare the Christian ωτισμός), the sudden bursting of a great light, occurs at the ioment of revelation, when the consummation of the religious xperience is realised in the union with God.'[5]

The individualist of the ancient world sought salvation ωτηρία) not by mysteries but by that optimistic astral-mysticism hich has been so brilliantly investigated by M. Cumont. All iscussion of astrology must centre round the great figure of osidonius, whose encyclopaedic outlook 'expresses with unique ompleteness the general mind of the Greek world at the Chris-an era.'[6] He took 'the cosmic emotion which every man feels nd transformed it into a religious sentiment.' To us, astrology nplies fortune-telling and chicanery: to Posidonius it was a erfect organ of contemplation. His system is admirably pitomised in the stately periods of M. Cumont:

> 'The resplendent stars which eternally pursue their silent course above us are divinities endowed with personality and animated by feeling. On the other hand, the soul is a particle detached from the cosmic fires . . . Itself a fiery essence, it is kin to the gods which glitter in the firmament. Thus contemplation of the heaven becomes a communion. The desire which man feels to fix his eyes long upon the star-spangled vault is a divine passion which transports him. A call from heaven draws him towards the radiant spaces. In the splendour of the night his spirit is intoxicated with the glow which the fires above shed upon him . . . He gives himself up to ecstasy, which frees him from the trammels of his flesh, and lifts him, far above the mists of our atmosphere, into the serene regions where move the everlasting stars . . . Then he partakes in the life of these luminous gods, which from below he sees twinkling in the radiance of the ether; before the appointed hour of death he participates in their divinity, and receives their revelations in a stream of light, which by its brilliance dazzles even the eye of reason.'[7]

[5] Halliday, *Pagan Background of Christianity*, pp. 258-263.
[6] Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, p. 94.
[7] Cumont, *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, pp. 44-145.

So, also, Ptolemy declares that as he watches the stars move in their course, his feet no longer touch the earth. 'I ascend to Zeus himself to feast me on ambrosia.' This is that νηφάλιος μέθη of which Philo speaks. And Arellius Fuscus, the rhetorician of the Augustan age, calls on men to leave all other professions and lift up their minds by means of this science.

The exalted metaphysic of astrology, tinged with emotion, issued in an exalted ethic. The astrologer has the status and bearing of a priest. If his fiery soul would ascend to the luminous region of the stars, it must not be weighed down by carnal pleasures. No meanness of soul is possible before the mighty spaces of the sky; no impurity before the steadfast gaze of those celestial eyes.

Much of this—the need for self-purification, the supra-rational illumination, the kinship which makes communion possible, the ability to ante-date the perfect experience——passed over into Neo-Platonism, and thence to Christianity. For although Tertullian attacks the decadent astrology of the second century, pointing out that the Magi had to return home 'another way,' many Christian mystics are the spiritual kinsmen of Posidonius.

In the fourth century *Testament of our Lord* the Bishop is instructed to be constant in prayer, especially 'at early twilight when the star of the Dawn riseth.' It was the custom of Suso, as the watchman's horn announced the day-break, to greet the bright morning star, and sometimes, it is said, the heavenly spirits who were never far from him would intone the responsory: *Surge et illuminare, Jerusalem.* And even Raymund Lull, though he was the great foe of this 'science of deceiving,' yet of him too it is written, 'at midnight he would arise, look out upon the heavens and the stars, and cast away from him all thoughts of the world.' Luis de León strikes the same note in a beautiful poem, and Ruysbroeck is uplifted in contemplation of 'the wandering stars shining in the supreme clearness of the sky.'

The anthropology of the astrologers, in the shape of what is called 'element-mysticism,' has also influenced Christian thought from Clement of Alexandria to Ruysbroeck. The Pythagoreans fancied that in the abodes of light the soul had its

proper home.[8] The Stoics held that the soul was an ethereal body (*αἰθέριον σῶμα*) which would rise up to the stars. It had the form of light (*φωτοειδής*). In the fifth century B.C. it was a popular idea that the soul, after death, entered the Aether, 'the luminous atmosphere above the clouds.'[9] There it is that Electra expects to find her dead father. Heracleides carried the idea into the realm of semi-philosophical astrology. From him it passed to Posidonius. The point is, of course, that the soul makes for its own place. It is a *lumen*, and so, on breaking from its earthly prison, it mounts aloft, passing eagerly through the grosser atmosphere till it comes to the grand and placid dwellings of the stars.

The light-mysticism of the ancient world seems to have made its way into Christian thought indirectly through Neo-Platonism and the pseudo-Dionysius and directly through Clement of Alexandria. In the *Paedagogos*, he expounds this ancient theory of the soul. Speaking of the results of baptism, he points out that when a surgeon tries to remove a film from the eyes, he does not supply a new light unpossessed before, but removes the obstacle and leaves the pupil free. So baptism wipes off the sins which obscure the light of the Divine Spirit and leaves 'the eye of the spirit free, unimpeded and full of light, by which alone we contemplate the Divine, the Holy Spirit flowing down to us from above. This is the eternal adjustment of the vision, which is able to see the eternal light since *like loves like*: and that which is holy loves that from which holiness proceeds, which has appropriately been termed light. . . . Hence I am of opinion that man was called by the ancients *φώς*.'[10] When Tertullian similarly calls the soul a *lumen*, he is anticipating the far-flung mediaeval theory of the 'divine spark.'

Clement interprets the sacraments in terms of the light-mysticism. Baptism is a process by which 'the holy light of salvation is beheld.'[11] Through initiation into this 'most blessed mystery,' we are introduced to 'the knowledge of pure and tranquil visions, contemplating them in pure sunlight.'[12] The

[8] *cf.* Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 517.
[9] *Ibid.* p. 436.
[10] *Clem. Alex., Paed*, ch. vi. *φώς*, man; *φῶς*, light.
[11] *Paed*, ch. vi.
[12] *Strom*, v. 14.

gnostic must be consecrated to the light.[13] In the *Exhortation* he addresses Tiresias:

> 'Christ, by whom the eyes of the blind recover sight, will shed on thee a light brighter than the sun . . . thou, old man, who saw not Thebes, shalt see the heavens. O truly sacred mysteries! O stainless light! My way is lighted with torches, and I survey the heavens and God: I become holy whilst I am initiated. The Lord is the hierophant and seals while illuminating him who is initiated.'[14]

Indirectly these ancient conceptions entered Christianity through Neo-Platonism. Plato himself in the *Republic* (vi, 508) had used the symbolism of light in a suggestive and penetrating manner. Plotinus, as we shall see, placed Light in his hierarchy of supreme values. The end of contemplation is to be 'transfigured to very light and light alone,'[15] till at last we are 'grown one with the light in its purity.'[16] In the full tradition from the Mysteries, Proclus believed in deification through enlightenment. 'Suddenly they receive into their bosoms the divine illumination itself, and naked—as they would say—are partakers with the divine.'[17] Those who possess the divine light 'radiating from above and ever perceive it' are 'established as gods among a multitude of spirits.'[18]

These doctrines had great influence on the development of the Christian gnosis.

But the origins of Light-Mysticism are not purely literary. Many would say with Mother Isabel Daurelle, 'The Light which has filled my soul has not come from Books but from the Holy Ghost,' though all would not echo her admission that she had 'neither ecstasies nor visions.'[19] No student of mysticism can avoid being struck by the frequent warnings issued by the experts against certain psycho-physical automatisms experienced by beginners in the spiritual way. The massive good sense of St. John of the Cross devotes a long chapter[20] to these apparently supernatural phenomena, 'produced through the in-

[13] *Strom*, v. 11.
[14] *Exhort*, ch. xii.
[15] Enn. I, vi, 9.
[16] Enn. VI, ix, 9.
[17] Qu. Halliday, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
[18] *Elements*, par. 184.
[19] Qu. Butler, *Western Mysticism*, p. 16.
[20] *Ascent of Mount Carmel I*, ii, xi.

strumentality of the outward senses.' As an ascetic and a dualst he will have none of them. 'For, inasmuch as they are exterior and in the body, there is the less certainty of their being from God.' Foremost among these delusions he names 'certain extraordinary lights and brightness.' The mediaeval catalogue was always the same; we find it anticipated by Walter Hilton[21] and in 'The Cloud of Unknowing.' 'Oftimes the devil feigneth quaint sounds in their ears, quaint lights and shining in their eyes, and wonderful smells in their noses; and all is but falsehood.'[22]

Some of these phenomena belong to the sphere of pathology rather than of religious experience. St. Hildegarde was a prophetess and visionary of distinctly abnormal psycho-physical constitution, subject to recurrent functional nervous disorders throughout a long and active life. Her interest for us lies in the fact that all her visions were seen through the medium of a dazzling light. She calls God *Lux vivens*. Her name for Reality was 'Cloud of the Living Light.' 'From my infancy,' she declares, 'I have always seen this light in my spirit . . . more brilliant than the sun.' She herself illustrated her writings, and many of the beautiful illuminations of the Wiesbaden Codex of her works have been reproduced in a paper contributed by Dr. Singer to *Studies in the History and Method of Science* (Oxford, 1917). He considers that some of her visions present the symptoms of scintillating scotoma, recognisable by all sufferers from migraine. 'In all,' he says, 'a prominent feature is a point or a group of points of light, which shimmer and move, usually in a wavelike manner, and are most often interpreted as stars or flaming eyes.' In her illustrations of the *Zelus Dei* and 'The Heavenly City,' curious fortification figures extend outwards from a highly coloured centre. 'Often the lights give that impression of *working*, boiling or fermenting, described by so many visionaries, from Ezekiel onwards.'[23] Her vision of the Falling Angels might almost have been induced by the pressure that is

[21] *Scale of Perfection*, I, xi.

[22] See *Cloud of Unknowing*, ch. 48-52. Father Baker gives a longer and somewhat different list.

[23] *Scientific Views and Visions of St. Hildegarde*, p. 53, plates xxiv and xxv.

so often put upon the eyeballs by the hands in some conventional attitudes of prayer:

> 'I saw a great star, most splendid and beautiful, and with it an exceeding multitude of falling sparks which with the star followed southward. And they examined Him upon His throne almost as something hostile, and, turning from Him, they sought rather the north. And suddenly they were all annihilated, being turned into black coals . . . and cast into the abyss that I could see them no more.' [24]

Another explanation was proposed by Dr. Kilner in his interesting but fantastic book *The Human Atmosphere*. This was an attempt to show that everyone is surrounded by an atmosphere or aura, intimately connected with the body, varying according to the temper and character of the individual, which under certain conditions may be observed.[25] 'This mist,' he says, 'the prototype of the halo or nimbus constantly depicted around the saints, has been manifested to certain individuals possessing a specially gifted sight.' The inference is that the clairvoyant faculty of the mystics has enabled them to see this luminous aura, and so prompted their use of the light-symbolism.

On yet another suggestion this light-sensation is explained by the theory of photisms. In his recent book on *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Professor Leuba has given it as his opinion that in the great number of instances when the mystics use the word 'light,' they use it in a realistic and not merely a symbolic sense. 'The perceptual quality of the experience cannot be doubted.' [26] The mystic sees the object of his vision vested in a dazzling brilliance. More frequently when the vision is passed, as 'a sequel to profound dynamic disturbances affecting the very springs of life,' the whole world is transfigured by a new radiance unobserved before. Such a phenomena is called a photism. Neither William James nor Leuba, both of whom cite many instances, attempt to explain them. The former says it is a sensory automatism of a hallucinatory nature[27]: the latter declares it to be 'incontestably wholly physiological in origin.' The chromatic effects of mescal and hasheesh are very similar. The Burning Bush, St. Paul's experience on the Damascus

[24] *Ibid*, p. 53 and plate xxi.

[25] Evelyn Underhill refers to this theory with approval. *The Mystic Way*, p. 120.

[26] Leuba, p. 255.

[27] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 251.

road, the Transfiguration, the fires of Pentecost, Constantine's Cross in the sky, are all explained in this manner.

But to call a thing a photism is simply to give a vivid human experience an academic name. The vision is classified, but it is not explained. And further, a distinction must be maintained —and Prof. Leuba, somewhat uncritically, does not observe it— between visions of initiation and those 'sequel-experiences' which are properly called photisms. Both are made of the same stuff, but the value of the former—in the influences it exercises and the thought it inspires—is far higher. During the Welsh Revival of 1905, a Mr. S.M.J. experienced a vision which transformed his life. Travelling along the high-road late one evening, he observed a faint light playing over his head and approaching the earth. He shut his eyes, but it remained visible. Then the vision stood before him, 'and in the bright and glorious light I beheld there the face of a man.' Then to the Welsh countryman was revealed the wonder of the *stigmata*.[28] In the same revival a schoolmaster was converted. He behaved in an extraordinary manner, jumping and shouting, and lay partly unconscious for a fortnight. 'The house and everything seemed brighter,' he declared afterwards, 'and he saw a vision of a place beautifully white.'[29] That is a photism, the sense of a transformed universe which is one of the after-effects of conversion. It is undoubtedly a real experience, but its value is far lower than that of the initiatory vision which drives its subject forward into a life of heroic activity.

It is interesting, however, to notice that some of these light-visions were induced by a form of auto-hypnotism. When Boehme was about twenty-five years of age, his eyes were one day suddenly dazzled by the sun vividly reflected by a polished pewter dish. 'And then the spirit did break through.' He was surrounded by the light of God and saw into the very ground of the universe.[30] By the same means, the Hesychast monks of Mount Athos were able to stimulate at will their vision of the uncreated Light.

It is obvious that these automatisms will not be taken seriously by the modern world. They are too 'objective'—to use

[28] Proc. Soc. Psych. Research, Vol. xix, p. 139. [29] *Ibid*, p. 128.
[30] *Aurora*, xix, 10, 13.

an old-fashioned term. They lack validity, for they really did occur. They belong wholly to the realm of time and space which it is the business of the mystic to transcend.

In the greater visionaries, the light seen is an intellectual light, fit symbol of the fact that the object of the vision belongs to the region of celestial day, to an atmosphere of illumination and glory. The nature of this experience cannot be defined. The light is something more than a mere symbol: something less than the rather crude realism we have been describing. St. Teresa tries to define it. 'I do not mean that we see a sun or any other brightness, only that there is a light not seen, which illumines the understanding.'[31] This 'whiteness and brilliancy is inconceivable. It is not a brilliancy that dazzles, but a delicate whiteness and a brilliancy infused.' So a modern mystic has told the writer, 'To me there is a spiritual river, and at the source of the river is Light—wonderful, golden, glowing light —not like red gold, but like pure yellow gold.' So intense is its reality that the vision of it at once brings harmony to the soul, and cures the body of all minor ills.

It is noteworthy that in the majority of cases where the human Christ appears to the visionary there is this sensation of radiance and light. This is probably due to deep-laid presuppositions in the mystic's mind. He thinks of Christ as clothed in glory (δόξα): he has always seen Him surrounded by a halo. There is nothing so infectious as a vision; Lucie-Christine will see her Lord in the same glory as did St. Paul. So St. Teresa notes 'the beauty of the whiteness of Christ's hands.'[32] Angela of Foligno sees in the Sacrament 'the throat of Christ more splendid and beauteous than the sun.'[33] In the Wiesbaden Codex, St. Hildegarde generally associates the gold and silver colouring with the figure of the historic Christ. When the Sadhu Sundar Singh was converted to Christianity, the radiance of his vision was so intense that he thought the room was on fire. 'Then as I prayed and looked into the light, I saw the form of the Lord Jesus Christ.'[34] In the same way, the

[31] *Life*, xxvii, 5.
[32] *Life*, trans. D. Lewis (1924), p. 253.
[33] *Divine Consolation*, trans. M. G. Steegman, p. 230.
[34] Streeter and Appassamy, *The Sadhu*, p. 6.

author of the Old English 'Dream of the Rood' owes his vision of the rood, clad in 'weeds' of light and glory, to the memory of a golden crucifix glittering in the radiance of the altar-lights. Julian of Norwich, whose mystic experiences were originally stimulated by what was presumably a wood or metal crucifix held before her eyes in sickness, always thought in terms of subdued and sombre colours, half-lights, greens, greys and browns.

What happens during the supreme moments of contemplative prayer? Saints of all ages have wrestled with the stubborn medium of language in their attempts to describe the indescribable. Such accounts are necessarily symbolic. The ideas of Love and Marriage, inheriting from 'The Song of Songs,' are often used, especially when the stress is on the immanence of the experience. The symbols of music and harmony are used by St. Augustine and Rolle. The Sufis employ the more popular imagery of the tavern. These illustrations are sufficient to convey a sense of the enhancement of life, the unification of personality, the consciousness of nearness and response so familiar to all contemplatives. But they do not sound the note of wonder, of awe, or of illumination; and they insufficiently express the cleansing, restorative effects of contemplation. This the light-imagery supplies.

Thus to St. Augustine Light was no mere symbol; his Platonism grasped it 'as a great vital ontological Reality,'[35] and his definition of contemplation is 'To reach a kind of spiritual contact with the unchanging light.'

For St. Gregory, too, the Light-symbolism was the most effective way of expressing the touch of God. Contemplation is 'the endeavour to fix the eye of the heart on the very ray of the unencompassed Light.'[36] It is to pass into the light; an antedating of the Beatific Vision, which is 'to behold God's Face and see the unencompassed Light.'

Spenser regards the goal of life to be the possession of the Light in contemplation:

> 'And looke at last up to that Soveraine Light,
> From whose pure beams all perfect beauty springs,
> That kindleth love in every godly spright,
> Even the love of God.'[37]

[35] Butler, *Western Mysticism.* [36] *Morals on Job*, 23-42.
[37] *An Hymne of Heavenly Beautie.*

This light cleanses the soul which touches it. So the pseudo-Dionysius says, 'The Divine Goodness, this our great Sun, enlightens, nourishes, perfects, renews.' 'He, the Good, is called spiritual light. He cleanses the mental vision of the very angels: they taste, as it were, the light.'[38] Ruysbroeck illustrates the ethical effects of contemplation by imagining a quantity of dry straws placed in 'a mirror curved like a basin.' The mirror is exposed to the light of the sun, and the straws catch fire. 'So within thyself, if thou hast an open heart, devoutly lifted up to God, the light of His pity, illumining this open soul, consumes all thy shortcomings in the fire of divine Love.'[39] The light brings enhanced energy and great comfort. In the famous passage, written by St. Hildegarde when she was more than seventy years of age, she says, 'Sometimes I behold within this light (that is, the light shining through the visible world) another Light which I name "the Living Light itself." . . . And when I look upon it every sadness and pain vanishes from my memory, so that I am an old woman no more, and a simple maid again.'

This purifying process leads to a deeper insight into truth. Eckhart, describing the action of grace upon the soul in contemplation, says: 'In this inflowing grace there forthwith arises that light of the mind into which God is sending a ray of His unclouded splendour. . . . This light is vastly potent.'[40] It enables the initiate to pray, partly by direct influence—thus Cassian reports Abbot Isaac as describing how 'the mind, enlightened by the infusion of the heavenly light,' pours forth unutterable prayers to God[41]—and partly by creating an atmosphere in which God can meet the soul. Ruysbroeck, speaking of 'The God-seeing Life,' says: 'In this idleness of our spirit we receive the Incomprehensible Light, which enwraps us and penetrates us, as the air is penetrated by the light of the sun. And this Light is nothing else than a fathomless staring and seeing.'[42]

The light-symbolism is used to describe the reciprocal character of the relationship between God and the soul. In his

[38] *The Divine Names*, iv, 1, 5. [39] Book of the XII Béguines, x.
[40] Pfeiffer's Eckhart, trans. Evans, p. 66.
[41] Conf. ix, 25. [42] *Sparkling Stone*, ix.

ccount of 'the storm of love between the spirit of man and od,' Ruysbroeck tells how 'these two spirits sparkle and shine ne into the other, and each shows to the other its face. This akes each of the spirits yearn for the other in love.'[43]

That there is a certain economy in the divine approach is dicated by the imagery of a slit or chink through which the ght shines upon men. To St. Gregory this is a favourite symol, and possibly he is its originator. 'The chink of contemplaon'—in this, says Dom Butler,[44] we have Gregory's conception f the nature of contemplation. 'The infinite divine light is the gure under which he conceives God's essence; man cannot ok directly on It, but may see Its ray, subdued and indistinct, s a sunbeam passing through a chink into a darkened room.' t. Bernard says that the celestial light comes 'not in through pen doors, but only through narrow slits.' St. Hildegarde sees flaming light burst from a rift in heaven. Diego de Estella, a opular Franciscan preacher, tells how the light shines through hinks and holes' and 'even through the hinges of the gates of eaven.'[45] It has been suggested that such expressions were oloured by the narrow windows and loopholes of the mediaeval stle. St. John of the Cross, for example, composed some of s exquisite poems in prison at Toledo. He was confined in a arrow, stifling cell, with no window, but only a small loophole rough which a ray of light entered for a short time of the day.

One of the great sorrows of the religious life is the transient ature of this experience of the divine. Some of the mystics ve expressed this very finely under the symbol of a flash of ghtning. St. Bernard says that the 'clear vision of the Divine ajesty' is 'only for a moment and with the swiftness of a ghtning flash.'[46] Boehme compares the state of ecstasy to 'a mpest of lightning, where the flash of fire openeth itself and ddenly vanisheth. So it goes also with the soul. In its battle e soul suddenly penetrates through the clouds and sees God e a flash of light.'[47] Luis de León had the same experience.[48] ometimes, however, the stress is on the suddenness and un-

[43] *Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage*, ii, 122.
[44] *Western Mysticism*, p. 111.
[45] Peers, *Spanish Mysticism*, p. 141.
[46] Cant, 41.
[47] *Aurora* xi, 145, 146.
[48] Peers, *op. cit.* 161.

expectedness of the illumination. So St. Augustine[49] speaks of the swiftness of the mounting soul. 'With the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS.' St. Catherine of Genoa, following Plotinus and the pseudo-Dionysius, uses the word 'subito' to describe the soul's experience. 'Suddenly thou shalt receive light,' says Plotinus, 'suddenly shining.' Abbot Isaac[50] speaks of 'the amazement of a sudden illumination' which 'chokes all sounds of words.' Ruysbroeck[51] describes how, to the good and inward man, 'there is thrown wide the Heaven which was shut, and from the Face of Divine Love there blazeth down a sudden light, as it were a lightning-flash; and in that Light there speaketh the spirit of our Lord, in this opened and loving heart, and saith, "I am thine and thou art Mine: I dwell in thee and thou dwellest in Me."'

The immanence of the experience, which is stressed in the last quotation, is illustrated by St. John of the Cross under the homely imagery of lamps. For just as God 'being infinite Light and the infinite Divine Fire' is, under that symbol, the remote and terrible; so light focussed and enclosed in a lamp, as the Light of God is focussed in our Lord, is a light which shines 'tenderly and lovingly.' Burning in the Lover's side, it leads her through the night of wandering to her Beloved. Shining in the obscure caverns 'where the senses live,' this flame of living love gives strange glories to those dark regions. For 'God is to the soul as many lamps'[52]; as the lamp of omnipotence, endowing her with the light and warmth of love, and as the lamp of wisdom, giving her the warmth of the wisdom of God. In a like spirit Raymund Lull cried: 'Would ye have fire, all ye that love, come light your lanterns at my heart.'

'The mystical temperament,' says Dean Inge, 'has a strong tendency to organic enjoyment, to transferred voluptuous feeling.' The majority of Christian mystics, however, have been protected by the element of awe and reverence from degenerating into erotomania. Here Light Mysticism exercises a bracing influence which counterbalances the effect of the marriage

[49] *Confessions* vii, 23.
[50] Cassian, *Conferences* ix, 27.
[51] *Book of the XII Béguines*, trans. Francis, p. 79.
[52] *Flame of Living Love* iii. St. John bases this imagery on the Vulgate of the Song of Songs—'Lampades eius, lampades ignis atque flammarum.'

nagery of the bhakti-saints. For to the mystical consciousness ght stands for the transcendent 'otherness' of God.

Otto, however, says that our Western art has only two direct neans of representing the numinous'—and they are 'in a note-orthy way *negative*, viz., darkness and silence.'[53] The Orient so employs the cognate imagery of emptiness and empty dis-nces. But a study of the mystics will not confirm this view. ight—which is illuminating and creative energy—is to them as lequate a symbol for the supreme wonder and mystery of God ; darkness and void. Light represents utter purity and the ieer glory of reason. Far from the Johannine Light and Life eing 'a sheer abounding overplus of the non-rational element religion,' as Otto says,[54] Light (φῶς) is terrifying in its abound-g overflowing rationality.

Milton is a striking example of this fact. Prof. Mutsch-ann,[55] of Marburg, has drawn attention to the existence in ilton of a strong 'numinous' element connected with the idea light. While Prof. Mutschmann's contention that the poet as 'an albino by constitution, and must in consequence have ffered from Photophobia and Nyctalopia,' will not command de acceptance, he has assembled a mass of evidence to show at any sort of bright light was unbearable to Milton's strained d weakened eyes, and hence was an adequate symbol for the gust and terrible. And so we have the awe-struck descriptions 'Paradise Lost':

> 'Fountain of Light, thy self invisible,
> Amidst the glorious brightness where thou sit'st
> Thron'd inaccessible, but when thou shad'st
> The full blaze of thy beams, and through a cloud
> Drawn round about thee like a radiant Shrine,
> Dark with excessive bright thy skirts appeer,
> Yet dazle Heav'n, that brightest seraphim
> Approach not, but with both wings veil their eyes.'

ntinually this attitude of terrified and dazzled reverence be-re the Unapproachable is to be noted in the mystics. The dden illumination of the *Epopteia* struck consternation (κατά-ηξις) into the soul of the initiate.[56] When St. Augustine had

[53] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 70.
[54] *Ibid*, p. 96.
[55] In two pamphlets, *Milton und das Licht* (Halle, 1920) and *Milton's esight and the Chronology of His Works* in *Acta et Commentationes iversitatis Dorpatensis* B.V. (1924).
[56] Halliday, *op. cit.* pp. 257 and 271.

a vision of the Light Unchangeable, he cried: 'Thou didst beat back the weakness of my sight, streaming forth Thy beams of light upon me most strongly, and I trembled with love and awe.'[57] St. Gregory[58] speaks of 'the blinking eyes of the mind' in the presence of this brightness. Its brilliancy 'dimmed my sight,' says St. Hildegarde.[59] 'Like the eyes of the bat before the brightness of the sun' is Ruysbroeck's simile.[60] To Henry Vaughan,[61] light denotes holiness; and it is remarkable that the Welsh word 'gwyn'—so often on his lips—means holy as well as white. Of 'Childhood' he says:

> 'I cannot reach it; and my striving eye
> Dazzles at it, as at eternity.'

At first sight, the pseudo-Dionysius has far more to say about darkness than light. 'Unto this Darkness which is beyond Light we pray that we may come.' But in one of the Letters to Dorotheus the Deacon he gives a definition of this Darkness: 'The divine darkness is the inaccessible light in which God is said to dwell.' It is indeed by reason of 'the abundant outpouring of supernatural light' that He is invisible. So bright and glorious is the Light environing the Divine that the initiate is dazzled and bewildered. Darkness, then, is simply the 'numinous-term' for light. This is due partly to the Neo-Platonic theory of contemplation, partly to the blinding effect of the sun upon weak eyes. This experimental cause seems to have aroused the sense of the terror of the Divine Light in St. John of the Cross. Speaking of the Dark Night of the Spirit, he says: 'Why should the soul call "dark night" that divine light which, as we say, illumines it and purges it of its ignorance?' The reason is that 'the brighter a light is, the more it darkens and blinds the pupil of the owl.' So 'when this divine light of

[57] *Confessions*, 7, 16.
[58] *Morals on Job* v, 66.
[59] *Life and Visions*, ed. Steele, p. 137.
[60] D'Aygalliers, *Ruysbroeck the Admirable*, p. 191.
[61] *cp.* Omond, *Mystical Poets of the English Church*, p. 161. Vaughan, Hildegarde and Gregory are essentially light-mystics. Vaughan owes something to Boehme's doctrine of enlightenment, which probably reached him through his brother. Thomas Vaughan was a Rosicrucian, whose system—a motley of Hermetic, Kabbalistic and astrological elements—is expounded in his two tracts, 'Lumen de Lumine' and 'Aula Lucis.' His works have been edited by A. E. Waite, and are interesting as an example of a Light-Gnosticism more continental than English in character.

ntemplation strikes the soul . . . it plunges it into spiritual rkness.' This is interesting: the phrase 'a ray of darkness' not only a convenient synonym for 'that which is infinitely ighter than any earthly light,' but it is the record of experi- ce. The eyes of the soul are weak, and the light causes them eat pain. Before the pure wonder of this light, sense and irit feel as if they 'were beneath some great and gloomy bur- n, in such torment and agony that they would find death itself welcome relief.'[62] St. Gregory, too, tells how 'the eye of our eakness is unable to bear that which shines above us with in- lerable lustre from the ray of His Eternal Being.' Here we e far from an academic theory: we are in the confessional of ery contrite aspiring soul.

St. Hildegarde's vision of the *Zelus Dei*[63] derives its awful- ss from the combination of dazzling light with abrupt motion. looked, and behold a head of marvellous form . . . of the lour of flame and red as fire . . . very awful to look upon. It id three wings of marvellous length and breadth, white as a zzling cloud . . . and at times they would beat terribly and gain would be still. No word uttered the head, but remained together still, yet now and again beating with its extended ings.'

But the mystic is never content with the mere sense of other- ss. That is a mark of immaturity. The soul which at first orships the Glory from afar, in time comes to live *in* the light hich she adores. She sees everything in this light. Of St. atherine of Genoa it was said: 'Within, in the sweet divine ght she saw and heard.'

In the Neo-Platonic tradition, as in astrology, the soul itself kin to the Light. 'The eye could not behold the sun, were not itself sunlike.' And so the highest level of life is not the istful, wondering adoration of the Other, incomprehensible id dazzling, but it is 'when all thy being is transfigured to ery light and light alone' (*Enn.* I, vi. 9), 'made radiant, filled ith the intelligible light, or rather grown one with that light in s purity' (*Enn.* VI, ix, 9). It is the consciousness of radiance id light which gives the mystic 'assurance' that 'the Dispenser true life is present to him.'

[62] *Dark Night* ii, 5.

[63] See Singer, Plate xxiv.

The soul is transformed into the light itself. So in the lovely vision of Brother Jacques of La Massa, as the brothers receive the chalice of the Spirit of Life from St. Francis they become all shining as the sun, Brother John of Parma 'resplendent above all the rest, for he had drunk of the chalice of life more deeply, whereby he had the more deeply gazed into the abyss of the infinite light divine.'

For the Christian, however, the transformation never involves loss of personality. Intimacy is always regulated by awe.

I have tried to demonstrate the existence of a type of mysticism, moral, rational, exalted and therefore valid. It is freer from pathological symptoms than any other known to me. It employs a symbolism at once beautiful and appropriate. It provides a machinery for describing the actual process of contemplation and the reverent intimacy which it inspires. While inheriting from the Catholic ancestry of our religion, it is yet entirely congruous with the modern approach to Christianity. That this kind of mysticism has existed within Catholic Christianity from the beginning should help us to link the ages in harmony.

Light-mysticism is a gnosis, and as such it needs supplementing by other elements of the religious life. But it is a gnosis shrined in history, depending for its value on the fact that the glorious object of its search was once focussed in a human life. Light is always the hierophant of love.

Knowledge of this fact, as Clement says (*Strom.* vii, 10), 'by its own light conveys man through the mystic stages of advancement; till it restores the pure in heart to the crowning place of rest, teaching him to gaze on God, face to face, with knowledge and comprehension.'

Led by the light which reveals the grand progress of the Incarnate Life, and engages the soul in the practice of contemplative prayer, men may 'without doubt,' in the words of Father Baker, 'sooner or later arrive unto the top of the mountain, where God is seen: a mountain, to us that stand below, environed with clouds and darkness, but to them that have their dwelling there it is peace and serenity and light. It is an intellectual heaven, where there is no sun nor moon, but God and the Lamb are the Light of it' (*Holy Wisdom*, 547).

CONFIRMATION

By the Rev. E. J. Martin, D.D., Vicar of St. John's, Rastrick, Yorks.

DR. Gardner in *Modernism in the English Church* makes one statement that is questionable, at least in the sense that many people will rightly question it. It is about Confirmation. He says:

> 'It (Confirmation) partakes far too much of routine and of caste. The children of the well-to-do go through it as a matter of course and hardly regard it seriously; the children of manual workers seldom take any account of it. It has become painfully conventional.'

On the children of the well-to-do I offer no opinion. I have never had occasion to know them. But the children of manual workers North of the Trent take considerable account of it. The complaint of many of the parish clergy (from which I dissent) is not that Confirmation is conventional, but that it is not conventional enough. Young people are not thrust into it automatically by their God-parents. They are left to come forward of their own free will, and they do come forward. Many of the clergy complain that there is too much personal choice and too little systematic response to ecclesiastical rule.

I am well aware that it is quite impossible to disprove Dr. Gardner's contention. It might, however, be useful to state again the Anglican theory of Confirmation, for the genuine English tradition is being steadily obscured.

The one feature common to all theories of Confirmation would seem to designate it the mode of admission to fellowship in the life of the Christian society, the rite of admission being performed by the chief officer of the Society acting for Christ the Head. It is in fact part of Baptism or the idea of Baptism seen as admission to membership. But what action of the baptismal rite was to be held as fulfilling this intention has been variously interpreted. It might be signing with the Cross, anointing, or the laying on of hands. Each of these acts has by some part of Christendom been regarded as Confirmation. The presence of the Holy Spirit in the rite was a simple infer-

ence from the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus after his Baptism in Jordan. But it is quite plain that primitive usage shows no sign of a separation of the rite into two parts, much less is there any evidence of a primitive act of Confirmation. The truth ironically enough is well stated in the proposition condemned in the Decree of the Roman Inquisition *Lamentabili sane* (3rd July, 1907):

> 'There is no proof that the rite of the Sacrament of Confirmation was employed by the Apostles; while the formal distinction between the two Sacraments, Baptism and Confirmation, has no place in the history of primitive Christianity.'

Some Anglican circles, however, find themselves in this matter stern upholders of the Inquisition. They definitely contend that when according to *Acts* viii Peter and John went to Samaria and laid hands on Philip's converts and these received the Holy Ghost, this is exactly parallel to the Anglican rite of Confirmation. The sequel tells that the effect of the Apostles' action was so startling as to inflame Simon Magus with a passion to produce similar results. Is it then seriously to be claimed that the effect of an Anglican Confirmation would be to send Simon to the vestry to make a financial offer to the officiating bishop? It is a very long step to this identification from the cautious words of the English service: 'Upon whom (after the example of thy holy Apostles) we have now laid our hands, *to certify them (by this sign) of thy favour and gracious goodness towards them.*' And how well the prayer says 'After the example of thy holy Apostles,' for the bishop is the minister of the rite not because he is an apostle or the successor of apostles, but because Baptism was one of the earliest prerogatives of the bishop's office, and the Confirmation rite survives as the episcopal share in Baptism.

Once the sealing of admission became distinct from the actual baptism, it only needed the proportionate decrease in the number of bishops to effect the complete separation of the parts and the recognition of Confirmation as a Sacrament, separate and complete in itself. From this, the prevalent and indeed only mediaeval theory, the Anglican development was a remarkable advance. The English service was up to 1662 a gradually modified form of the mediaeval service. By Cosin the rubrics were

collected into a preface and the emphasis was fully thrown on the acceptance or renewal by the candidate of his baptismal vows. The intention is to give reality to Infant Baptism by making Confirmation its ratification, and so escape the danger of turning both Baptism and Confirmation into acts for the functioning of the divine *ex opere operato*.

This view of Confirmation came to be the universal one in England until the Oxford Movement in its quest for precedents led the way back to the doctrine of the past. Many if not all Churchmen confirmed before the twentieth century will recall the baptismal promise as the outstanding feature of the rite.

The justice of Dr. Gardner's words may come in here. There is a strong probability that before the middle of the nineteenth century Confirmation was 'painfully conventional.' Blunt in his notes on the B.C.P. notices that the mediaeval manner of laying on hands was often elevating the hands collectively over a whole group of people and not touching each separately. It is not improbable that this method of laying on hands in Confirmation was common up to 1860 or thereabouts. Blunt quotes one of the oldest English bishops confirming 12,564 persons in the summer of 1865 (some four or five times the number confirmed by many bishops to-day), and concludes that it was physically impossible for an old man to have laid hands on such a multitude. I have been told that this mass or group Confirmation was the usual practice of Vernon Harcourt, who was Archbishop of York from 1808 to 1847.

But no sooner had the more impressive and intelligent method of actual laying on of hands prevailed than a complete change in the theory of Confirmation began to make progress. The researches of the Tractarians brought back the mediaeval doctrine that Confirmation was a Sacrament distinct from Baptism, the special grace of it being the gift of the Holy Spirit. This reversion did not gain the day rapidly. Even fifteen years ago as a curate I can remember the clergy grumbling at bishops after Confirmation, because the bishops having more practical sense than is often allowed them, preferred to talk to the candidates about God's help in the difficulties of life, while their critics wanted a homily on the Holy Spirit which they had temporarily failed to identify as God in daily life.

Unfortunately to-day the mediaeval doctrine has become predominant. Why is it unfortunate? Because the Protestant or Anglican attitude is psychologically effective. It is of far more value to the life and character of youth to think of offering itself for service and undertaking its responsibilities than it is to think of itself as a submissive agent. Obviously both thoughts find a place in any contact of God and man, but one will predominate. It should be the first. The gift of the Holy Spirit is but the seal of the act of self-dedication.

The weakness of the purely sacramental view of Confirmation lies in the following facts: (1) It loses the intimate connection of the rite with Baptism. (2) It fails to encourage the active energy of the candidate and even impresses subconsciously the idea that he is a passive recipient who has to take but not give. (3) It is founded on an antiquarian appeal, ultimately involving an unconvincing exegesis of Scripture, especially of *Acts* viii. The latter point I have discussed. On antiquarian Christianity I cannot do better than quote Professor Burkitt:

> 'Formerly the appeal both of Catholic and Protestant was to something in the past; now the appeal is to something in the present, to what is called experience. It is as if we were living in a State where the only valid titles to property recognized are occupation of the ground and the production of satisfactory crops. In such a State the possession of venerable title deeds is of no use' (in *Outline of Christianity*, Vol. III).

(4) It fixes the activity of the Spirit in the particular and the temporal, the particular act at the special moment of laying on of hands. The association of the divine with the particular has always been the road to materialism and superstition. In this instance it badly obscures the words of the Confirmation prayer, '*daily increase* in Thy Holy Spirit.'

As was to be expected all these features are emphasized in the revised B.C.P. The very important introduction returns to the obscurity of a rubric. Its great importance was that it struck the keynote of personal responsibility at the very opening of the service. The unhappy reference to *Acts* viii appears in the text of the service. The baptismal link is made a separate act, distinguished from Confirmation, which by a sub-title is made to refer exclusively to the laying on of hands. The concluding

rubric which in this office (though not in the old one) leaves to the *judgment of the bishop* permission to admit unconfirmed persons to Communion raises topics outside the discussion of Confirmation. As regards Confirmation it illustrates further the emphasis on system.

The great value of Confirmation—and this would be my answer to Dr. Gardner—is that it not only is an excellent means of bringing youth into responsible contact with the Christian profession, it also serves another very important purpose. It is the opportunity for the clergy to learn something of the mind of youth and of older enquirers, and to help both to find their bearings. It is possible to make contacts then that lead to the best of all ministerial work. But this possibility varies inversely with the systematic character of its treatment. If preparation for Confirmation is a series of dogmatic instructions and a more or less enforced act of private confession, culminating in an official First Communion after the Confirmation, all Dr. Gardner's fears may well be real. But it need not be so, and one hopes it is not so. It is true that the age for Confirmation has become far too low. This makes inevitable the handing out of systematized information before the Confirmation and afterwards a system of organized Communions for young communicants. But granted a reasonable age—rarely less than 16 to 17—and a free method of preparation, we should probably understand better why Nonconformists regard Confirmation as one of the greatest assets of the Anglican Church.

BOOK REVIEWS

A PRELATE AND STATESMAN*

A sympathetic understanding of the fears as well as of the ideals of an epoch is necessary if we are to estimate it aright. Fears are perhaps a more potent factor in the making of history even than ideals. During the earlier portion of the eighteenth century—in fact until the fiasco of 1745 proved them vain, the fears of Englishmen were centred on the Pope and the Pretender.

The position of the Church of England during that period was peculiar and somewhat anomalous. Under the new Whig *régime* it was the Church established by law—was indeed from one point of view part of the Whig

* *Edmund Gibson.* By Norman Sykes, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxford University Press. 21/-. 1926.).

machinery for governing the country; but many of the clergy hankered after the old dynasty. They were Tory officials in what had become a Whig institution. Their loyalty to the Stuarts, which had begun as an obligation and now survived as a sentiment, was an embarrassment to the government and an offence to the public. In 1722 a bishop actually had to be deprived and banished for treasonable correspondence with the Pretender, and a few more bishops like Atterbury would have created an impossible situation. A Whig ministry could not continue indefinitely to support an institution whose officials were disloyal, while persecuting Dissenters who were enthusiastically loyal.

Yet the Whig ministry were loth to antagonise the Church, which represented a strong body of opinion in the country, even though the clergy were as a class unpopular and of questionable loyalty. From the point of view of the Church, too, an understanding was most desirable; the loss of the establishment would have meant not merely a loss of prestige, but absolute extinction. The existing *concordat* somehow had to be stabilised by the conversion of the clergy to the Whig point of view; such was the problem facing an ecclesiastical statesman of the time.

That an *entente* was arranged was, for all practical purposes, the work of a single man, Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London from 1723 to 1748, who has had to wait nearly two centuries for an adequate biography. Gibson was a legalist and had laboriously and exhaustively compiled a complete summary of English Ecclesiastical Law. He was no Erastian, but held strong views about the independence of the spiritual corporation, as over against the secular authority. For example, he advocated the extension of the spheres of the ecclesiastical courts for the suppression of vice and he would not submit to advice or dictation from the secular authority in the matter of theological doctrine. He resisted strongly the Latitudinarian leanings of Queen Caroline, and this it was that eventually caused his breach with Walpole. It was perhaps because he was a sort of High Church Whig that the clergy consented to follow him as far as they did.

Gibson reduced the problem before him to one of persuading the clergy that to support the Whigs would pay. His idea was to use patronage as an engine of persuasion. The confidence of Walpole, and his own position of ecclesiastical adviser to the Ministry, gave Gibson unique powers of directing patronage, and he took care that none but stout Whigs should reach the bench. He had hoped to utilise the Chancellor's six hundred livings in his scheme of persuasion, but eighteenth century traditions were too strong, and the Lord Chancellor would not relinquish his rights of obliging his friends. Still, to have the power to nominate bishops and deans was worth something, and Gibson was quite implacable in his use of it. He was far-sighted enough to see, however, that 'it was vain to attempt to placate the present generation of clergy without ensuring that their successors should be trained in an atmosphere of loyalty,' and the Universities were hotbeds of Tory reaction. He essayed the bold task of converting Oxford. For this he devised two expedients. In the first place he arranged for the selection of a certain number of Fellows of colleges to serve as preachers at the Royal Chapel at Whitehall. He hoped that some contact with the Court might enable these 'booted apostles' to shed some glimmers of light into the senior common rooms. In the second place he persuaded the Government to establish Regius Professorships of Modern History and Languages at both Oxford and Cambridge, ostensibly to supply the diplomatic services, but in reality to insinuate a spirit of modernity into the

Universities. It was not long, however, before these chairs became sinecures, involving no inconveniences of duty save the drawing of a stipend.

Under George II and his Queen, Gibson's influence declined somewhat, though it still remained considerable. The affair of Rundle, whose appointment to Gloucester Gibson successfully opposed on the ground of heterodoxy, was the turning point. A victory is often more fatal than a defeat; Gibson carried the day over this, but the Queen did not forgive him, and by 1737 he retired from his extra-episcopal duties and confined his attentions to his diocese. However, he had kept the ship afloat during the critical part of her passage; a few years more, and Toryism was no longer dangerous. 1745 brought the epoch to a close.

We who see things *post eventum* find it easy to criticise Gibson for lack of imagination and foresight. It is difficult for us to understand why he could not see that the Latitudinarians and Methodists between them stood for what was vital in English theology and religion at the time. But contemporary movements are generally misunderstood; and it is certain that Gibson misunderstood them. Gibson was one of those conservative Englishmen to whom all speculation and all enthusiasm were anathema. Dr. Sykes admits that his bishop took up too rigid an attitude: 'The success of his policy would have been derogatory to the best interests of the Church, and the nation owes a debt of gratitude to Queen Caroline which enabled her to become no less the patron and defender of the Latitudinarian divines than the friend of the author of *The Analogy*.' As for his attitude towards the Methodists, it is no doubt a pity that the Church of England could not make use of Wesleyanism as the Mediaeval Church made use of the Franciscan movement, but the fact was that the eighteenth century men had fresh in their memories the religious excesses of the previous century and the political and social turmoil they had caused. The country could not afford another lapse into religious hysteria. Furthermore, Gibson really treated Wesley very well: had long interviews with him and with Whitefield, which must have been excessively trying to a man of his temperament. And when the churchwardens of St. Bartholomew the Great remonstrated to the bishop that their Rector 'invited Mr. Wesley very frequently to preach in his church' they received the reply: 'What would you have me to do? I have no right to hinder him. Mr. Wesley is a clergyman, regularly ordained and under no ecclesiastical censure.' And, in any case, as Dr. Sykes points out, Gibson died too soon to understand and appreciate the more permanent and valuable results of this religious movement. At any rate the moral for us is that not even ecclesiastical opposition, however well supported, can kill a movement which is genuinely alive. Gibson could not smother theological liberalism or the outburst of a fresh religious revival.

One highly interesting feature of this admirable piece of historical research and reconstruction is that it brings out the conscientious industry and devotion to duty of this eighteenth century bishop. It is customary to regard the prelates of that period as worldly indifferentists, even if, as is generally hinted, they were nothing worse. To administer a diocese like Lincoln, which contained 1,312 parishes, and came as far south as Bedford, was no sinecure; and Gibson speaks of mapping out his Confirmations so as to *reduce* the numbers 'to 300 or at most 400 at each place'! And he contrived 'to go on from district to district at the rate of 400 a day.' As for the bishopric of London, it involved the oversight of the ecclesiastical affairs of the American colonies, the 'Plantations,' as they were termed. Gibson made endless efforts to have things put on a proper ecclesiastical

footing in these distant parts of the King's dominions; but the colonists had not travelled all that distance in vain, and their more or less passive resistance enabled them to evade the bishop's zeal for ecclesiastical efficiency.

Dr. Sykes' biography, though written with a zeal and enthusiasm which infect the reader, is an entirely objective and scientific piece of work. We have here the unusual phenomenon of a piece of Church history which is not at the same time a piece of propaganda. In fact it would be extremely difficult from a perusal of these pages to discern the author's own views, if he has any. But the work might be scientific and at the same time very dull; such a combination is only too common. But, possibly owing to his having had to peruse a vast quantity of contemporary pamphlets and correspondence, the author has captured something of an eighteenth century style. It is a common illusion to suppose that the writers of that day were ponderous; Sterne was not ponderous, neither were Gibbon or Swift or Berkeley or William Law. These writers, it is true, wrote pure English; in this they would to-day be considered eccentric; but their style was neat and pointed. Dr. Sykes makes a happy use of quotation, though his choice has of course been limited by the conventions of modern taste, for the libels and verses of the day were often more lively than decorous. Gibson's biography is a good deal more entertaining than we have any right to expect from a rigidly scientific piece of work, where the writer rarely lets himself go. But the fact is that there is so much original material in the book that we get a lively picture of the period. Such little thirsty glimpses as that of the clerical canvassers of Archbishop Tenison's Bill refreshing themselves with a pint 'at Ye Dog,' and the extracts from private correspondence and memoranda, make all these old battles seem strangely alive and human. This is a first-rate book, written by a member of Gibson's own College, (Queen's, Oxford) and a Scholar on the Lady Elizabeth Hastings Foundation, which seems to have owed its existence to the Bishop's advice.

J. C. Hardwick.

THE RESURRECTION NARRATIVES.*

The Resurrection of Jesus Christ was the foundation of early Christian preaching. Without it, there would have been no Good News to preach. The ground of the resurrection faith was two-fold. The disciples who had companied with Jesus in the flesh were convinced, first, that they had seen him alive after his passion; secondly, that his body had left its tomb which was found empty. The main purpose of Mr. Gardner-Smith's book is to sift the surviving evidence on which these convictions were reached. The narratives which contain it present the most baffling problems of New Testament literary and historical criticism. Taken as they stand, the accounts are manifestly inconsistent with each other, even flatly contradictory. Scarcely anyone would nowadays maintain that the task confronting the investigator is merely one of synthesis and harmonization, and Mr. Gardner-Smith sets out with the conviction that the analysis and evaluation of the evidence promises little positive result. He has done his work thoroughly; the narratives are taken in chronological order and are subjected to a very critical but always reverent examination.

* *The Narratives of the Resurrection.* By P. Gardner-Smith, B.D. (London: Methuen and Co. 1926. Price 6/-. Pp. xxvii, 192.)

With the possible exception of that of St. Paul, Mr. Gardner-Smith believes none of the evidence to be first-hand; as St. Paul is also our earliest witness, his testimony is clearly the most important. It was his opinion that, if Christ had not been raised, Christian faith was vain; he had opportunities of learning the facts, and must therefore be presumed to have been greatly interested in anything that confirmed so fundamental a doctrine. None the less, Mr. Gardner Smith holds that St. Paul does not seem to have been particularly careful to examine the evidence for some of the stories which he heard, as witness his story of an appearance of the risen Christ to five hundred brethren at once—a story which Mr. Gardner-Smith rejects on the grounds that it is inherently improbable, and that no mention of it seems to have survived in the Gospels. On the other hand, the Pauline record of an appearance to James and of an appearance to Peter is a genuine and important tradition. Mr. Gardner-Smith also thinks that, while St. Paul believed that the tomb was empty on the first day of the week, he did not know of its discovery by the women; had he known, he would not have failed to mention this evidence in his argument. St. Paul ignores the ascension as distinct from the resurrection, and Mr. Gardner-Smith thinks he did not regard the appearances to the other apostles as of a different kind from that vouchsafed to himself on the Damascus road. Mr. Gardner-Smith concludes that there is strong *prima facie* reason for accepting St. Paul's stories as correct; he was convinced that the Christ who died was still living and active, and that this faith rested on a solid basis of fact. Clearly he was in a better position to form an opinion than any modern writer.

As the original ending of St. Mark is lost, the evidence of its resurrection narrative is disappointingly meagre. It amounts to no more than an announcement of the resurrection and the promise of an appearance of Jesus in Galilee made by a young man to the women who came to anoint the body, who thereupon fled in terror and said nothing to anyone, 'for they were afraid . . .' Mr. Gardner-Smith is persuaded that the crucial word ἠγέρθη (he is risen) must be rejected from the young man's statement, which in any case would probably not have been remembered accurately; though he is aware that certainty is unattainable, he decides in favour of Professor Lake's tentative suggestion that the women went to the wrong tomb. No one can deny that this is a possible account of the facts which lie behind St. Mark's narrative: equally no one can deny that it has its own difficulties. If, as Mr. Gardner-Smith admits, the women at the time of the burial were not only near enough to observe the location of the tomb, but also to see that the interment was defective in that Joseph had not used aromatic spices, it is scarcely probable that they would so shortly afterwards jointly mistake the tomb; it is definitely improbable if, as is probable, the tomb was in a private garden. Further, if on their way to the tomb the women had wondered who would remove the stone, why should they fly in terror from a young man who was sufficiently friendly to indicate the right tomb? Mr. Gardner-Smith is also disposed to attach considerable weight to the evidence of the apocryphal 'Gospel of Peter,' though he mentions incidentally that it is an example of the lengths to which credulity could go among some not altogether uneducated Christians. It is surely strange to regard 'Peter' as strengthening the case against ἠγέρθη merely because it contains no message to the disciples parallel to that which follows ἠγέρθη in Mark, for 'Peter' twice asserts 'he is risen,' and Mr. Gardner-Smith regards Mark as explicitly stating that the subsequent message to the disciples was not conveyed to them. Again, we

are inclined to agree that there has been some transference to Jerusalem of appearances which occurred in Galilee, and that this explains the resemblances between St. Luke and St. John, and between St. Matthew and the epilogue of St. John. But this is scarcely sufficient proof that the Jerusalem tradition is on the whole late and unhistorical, or that those who accepted it deliberately altered the account embodied in St. Mark and St. Matthew. After all, the original ending of St. Mark *is* lost, and we have no certain evidence as to its contents. If the apocryphal 'Peter' is to count at all, it is evidence that the disciples did not at once return to Galilee; while the general historical trustworthiness of St. Luke is at least as good as that of the end of the first Gospel, or of the appendix to the fourth. Whatever be the truth behind the tradition, it is going beyond the evidence to assert that St. Mark clearly did not intend the report of the women as the original source of faith in the resurrection. St. Mark may well have gone on to relate some incident which enabled the women to regain their courage and to tell the disciples of their experience at the tomb, as sooner or later they must have done. St. Matthew, who *may* have known (however much he has embellished) the lost ending of St. Mark, does record such an incident. Once more, granted the possibility that St. Luke intended from the first to write more than one book, there is no evidence that he could not have known the events recorded in the very dubious first chapter of *Acts* at the time of writing his Gospel.

Does Mr. Gardner-Smith's critical analysis impair the foundation of the Easter faith? He is certainly persuaded that it does not. He regards discussion of the historical value of the actual resurrection narratives as of 'secondary importance':

> 'It would be untrue to say that the manner of the appearance of the risen Lord is a question devoid of historical interest, or even to assert that the Gospel narratives are evidentially unimportant, but the fact of the resurrection is not guaranteed only by them. Even if they all proved to be legendary, the evidence for the central fact would not be destroyed. The uncertainty which surrounded them individually does not affect the truth to which collectively they bear witness.'

Mr. Gardner-Smith finds the most convincing evidence for the resurrection in the fact of the Church, the existence of which is otherwise inexplicable. He finds it impossible to believe that an original error could have produced a conviction sufficiently strong to account for the founding of the Church; and St. Paul's testimony is decisive that the original leaders of the Church arrived at their conviction of the continued personal existence of Jesus on the evidence of their senses.

> 'If any fact in ancient history is well attested, it is this, that the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth, though not anticipating any unusual experiences, came to believe that they had seen the Lord alive after his crucifixion and burial . . . and the only rational explanation of their conviction is that they were right.'

This being so, it creates a probability that some of the inconsistencies and apparent contradictions in the resurrection narratives may be due to the tendency to confuse detail and to the inexactness characteristic of the Gospel-writers rather than to the growth of entirely unhistorical legend. There is no doubt that Mr. Gardner-Smith's conclusions as to the historical worth of the resurrection-narratives affects our view of the historical worth of the Gospels as a whole. Actually Mr. Gardner-Smith has reached a provisonal conclusion on the most pressing problem of the relation of

history to Christian theology, which has at least enabled him to do his work emancipated from all apologetic tendencies. All historical problems being problems of probability, he thinks that in as far as religion is based on history, its foundation can never be secure, and that wisdom lies in reducing the historical element to a minimum. He himself says of his work that the attempts to save something of the Gospel narratives of the resurrection will be welcome to those who fear the total relativity of Modernism, while others will regard it as no more than a halting place on the road to a complete separation of history from theology. For ourselves, we can only record our conviction that it is premature to decide that the future course of Christian theology is to effect such a separation. By no means the last word has been said on the higher criticism of the Gospels, and it is possible that in the end we shall be compelled to abandon far less than some at present anticipate. Radical criticism such as Mr. Gardner-Smith's is of essential value, and his clearness of style delivers his book from the tedium so characteristic of *seriatim* examinations of passages of Scripture. His book will stand as representative of an extreme criticism which yet accepts unreservedly the fact of the resurrection, and it will not be ignored in future serious treatment of the subject. J.S.B.

CHANGING CHINA.*

Recent events in China have brought the problems of that country more prominently to our notice, and a very varied literature has been the outcome. Among those who have sought to find simple causes for a complex movement there have inevitably been some who have blamed Christian missions as the chief cause of offence; but while not many have made these charges seriously, a much wider circle is asking what part religion is playing in China to-day. Has the rising Nationalism involved a deep religious upheaval? Has it found Christianity incompatible with its aims?

Dr. Maclagan, in his Duff Lectures, maintains that the present confusion in China is at any rate partly due to an upheaval in religious beliefs. A heightened regard for the older religious and philosophic beliefs proved intellectually unsatisfactory and led to a movement breaking away from traditional religion and morality. The caprice of this produced a Confucian reaction, which, by another swing of the pendulum, has brought a challenge to all spiritual values. Christianity, involved in this, has in the name of Nationalism been attacked at the same time by those who would reinstate Confucianism, by those who look on Confucianism and other religions as fetters upon liberty, and by those who seek a syncretistic religion in which Christianity would play a subordinate part.

To meet this attack Dr. Maclagan contributes a comparative treatment of the chief forms of religious thought in China: he explains the principal tenets, estimating their value and analysing their weaknesses. In this sympathetic and lucid treatment the writer has produced a valuable study in the relation of Christian thought to native religious ideas, and his own missionary experience lends weight to his arguments. The chief interest centres naturally in the ideas and beliefs of Confucius. His moral earnestness is unquestioned; he had 'an unwavering conviction of the supremacy of virtue' (p. 48) and his doctrine of the essential goodness of human nature, if it cannot, as the writer says, be taken at its face value, has more to commend it than that doctrine of human depravity in which so many

* *Chinese Religious Ideas*: A Christian Valuation. By P. J. Maclagan, D.Phil. (S.C.M. pp. 240. Price 6/-.)

* *China To-day Through Chinese Eyes* (second series). (S.C.M. pp. 152. Price 2/6.)

Christians have professed their belief. At the same time Dr. Maclagan has much to say in criticism of Confucius: though on the verge of an ethical monotheism, he never quite rose to this; 'His prophetic insight was not equal to his opportunity' (p. 39).

The sketch of the philosopher Wang is an able one. How attractive is Wang's definition of freedom as meaning that 'the mind is not embarrassed by desire and that the individual finds himself in no situation in which he is not himself' (p. 142), or his insistence on self-realisation, his appeal to rational insight (p. 138), and his praise of the virtue of humility (p. 145). If one bears in mind that all this is studied here in relation to Christian thought and that the concluding chapters deal specifically with this relationship from the point of view of missions, it will be realised that this is a valuable book.

It is interesting to compare this with the view of the various Chinese writers who have contributed to *China To-day Through Chinese Eyes*. Both books deal with much the same problems, though the native writers are more concerned with the wider question of the present political, industrial and intellectual outlook than with the religious heritage from the past. But in the opinions expressed, *e.g.* concerning the reasons and significance of the weakening of Confucianism, or the strength of the appeal of Buddhism with its curious mixture of philanthropy, mysticism, and atheism, they are significantly at one. We believe we can detect the note of optimism throughout these essays, though they certainly face up to facts. 'Great opportunities are linked up with grave dangers,' says Mr. Chao; 'The clearest demand to-day is for a new leadership among Chinese Christians which can transcend the times in thought and life, and can *lead*' (p. 49). We hope this pitches the key of Chinese Nationalism: for then it has the sympathy of Erasmus. *'Asinorum est cogi tantum, tyrannorum cogere.'*

J.P.H.

MAN AND EVOLUTION.*

The evolutionary issue has been raised anew, and in one of its acutest forms, by Mr. Chesterton's brilliant discussion in *The Everlasting Man*.* The *crux* of the problem, he protests, lies in 'the simple truth that man does differ from the brutes in kind and not in degree.' Against this, he proceeds, evolutionists maintain 'that everything was slow and smooth and a mere matter of development and degree.'[1] There is thus a fundamental contrast between 'kind,' on the one hand, and 'degree' on the other. The bird, for instance, 'has not a mind as man has a mind . . . a mind with a new dimension; a mind like that of a man';[2] and this is equally true of all animals without exception, no matter how high their status may be in the scale of life. Even the intellectual aristocracy of the animal world, the anthropoid apes, must be excluded.

I shall begin by unreservedly accepting Mr. Chesterton's contention here. For it cannot be too emphatically stated that the human mind *is* different in kind from that of all animals. It has capacities or faculties which animals never attain—the power of abstract thought and of will, the moral, the artistic and the religious sense. So much is plain matter of fact. But this means that Aristotle's classic definition of man as 'a political *animal*' is fundamentally wrong. Neither in his body nor his mind, neither

**The Everlasting Man.* By G. K. Chesterton. (Hodder and Stoughton. 12/6 net.)

[1] Pp. 32, 33.

[2] Pp. 36, 37. I take 'dimension of depth' to be figurative and not to mean *spatial* depth only.

biologically nor psychologically, is man an animal. He is most accurately described as 'a social *being*' whose psycho-physical nature presents prominent animal aspects. But this no more makes him an animal than the fact that the Portland vase is composed of clay makes it a brick; and to regard him as an animal, or even as a super-animal, is hopelessly to confuse our categories from the outset.

Granting this much then, it must now be observed that the most recent evolutionist group has also laid its whole emphasis on precisely the same principle. For the familiar phrase 'emergent evolution' means exactly what Mr. Chesterton means—that something not merely new, but unique and unprecedented, is incessantly making its appearance in the universe. Whether we say that these unique things are 'created' or 'generated' or 'produced' is immaterial; the essential point is their absolute uniqueness. This has been insisted upon alike by Bergson, Alexander, Lloyd Morgan[3] and many other scientific and philosophic writers, who have applied the argument not to the human mind only, but also to life and consciousness. It may indeed hold true even of matter, if this is actually the result of some transformation of ether—if, that is, it is not indestructible, but may be both annihilated and (shall we say?) 'generated.'

Thus emergent evolutionists hold much in common with Mr. Chesterton. But the essential difference still remains that they affirm, while he denies, that the final unique result is invariably the outcome of a 'slow and smooth' process. 'Smooth,' in truth, is a gloss of Mr. Chesterton's own; he has here forgotten the fierce intensity of the never-ceasing 'struggle for existence.' This point, however, need not be pressed. The real issue lies between continuity and discontinuity; and in this respect both contestants alike fail to appreciate the simple principle that removes the contradiction and reconciles their opposed standpoints. For we must recognise that there is no such absolute contrast between 'degree' and 'kind' as Mr. Chesterton asserts. He has no right, in other words, to speak of 'a *mere* matter of development and degree.'[4] 'Mere' is quite out of place here. The plain fact is that whenever changes in degree go on cumulatively for a long period, they finally lead to a change in something *more* than degree—that is to a positive change in kind.

The question therefore is not whether the final outcome is a matter of degree *or* of kind, as if each of these possibilities totally excluded the other; for it is really both—it is at one and the same time a change in degree *and* in kind. The accumulating differences in degree of themselves yield something more than degree—that is, kind.

The truth of this principle, however, need not be debated in such questionable spheres as that of human evolution, because its operation is easily perceived within quite familiar experience. But it is completely ignored both by Mr. Chesterton, who insists that such a difference in kind can never be one of degree, and in the opposite direction by the earlier evolutionists, who regard all advance as one of degree only and never actually of kind. The recent emergent school again, on its part, has hitherto failed to make it sufficiently plain that whenever degree is carried far enough it always merges, or insensibly transforms itself, into kind. Too much emphasis is still laid on the unforeseen, the unpredictable, the incalculable.

But, as I have just observed, we need not go beyond well-known phenomena to discern at work this principle of the transformation of degree into kind. Every human being, *e.g.*, originates from a single microscopic cell,

[3] *Creative Evolution. Space, Time and Deity. Emergent Evolution.* [4] P. 33.

and the entire development is plainly from beginning to end one of degree, directly observable as such throughout all its embryonic and later stages. The contrast between ovum and adult, therefore, is in the first place one of degree; but it is also, equally plainly, one of actual kind. For the adult organs and processes, *as such*, do not exist at all in the original cell; and if the term is to have any useful meaning, their slow development ultimately constitutes a difference *in kind*. Mr. Chesterton, indeed, appears to concede this point in saying that man's 'body may have been evolved from the brutes.'[5] But it is quite impossible to restrict this statement to the body alone; it must, logically, be extended to the mind. For the ovum is unconscious, and the exact moment when the embryo acquires consciousness is still very uncertain. But it is undeniable that just as nerve and brain slowly arise from what is neither nerve nor brain, so feeling emerges, not suddenly but gradually. Exactly in the same way the newborn infant is devoid of developed intelligence—even, it may be, of all intelligence in any useful sense of the word. But the slow dawn of its actual intelligence can be observed from day to day; and this further change in degree again yields the almost absolute contrast between the infant at one end of the scale and a Shakespeare or a Newton at the other; once more, most emphatically, a change in kind as well as in degree. So far indeed as intellect is concerned a strictly parallel advance, though on a more restricted scale, can now be effected by administering glandular extracts to mental defectives. Here the gain is observably a matter of gradual modification, while the complete change is undeniably in kind, *viz.*, that between imbecility and normal mentality, if not indeed between the absence and the presence of actual personality; and where these profound alterations are concerned it becomes impossible (once again) to describe them as 'mere' development or 'mere' degree.

What is true of the organism as a whole is equally true of its parts. The skeleton, *e.g.*, develops from soft cartilage, and this from still more undifferentiated tissue, which again differs *in kind* from the ultimate hard and rigid bone. I have already referred to nerves and brain; and to these must be added eyes and ears, feathers and hair—indeed, every important vital organ without exception. Similarly with many of the artificial products of human activity. For it is no exaggeration to say that the primal origin of every cathedral lies in the cave which the cave-man himself did not make, but found. From this, and again by imperceptible degrees, arose St. Peter's and St. Paul's; yet the contrast between the natural cave and the noble cathedral, like the contrast between the ovum and the genius, is undeniably one of kind; otherwise the word ceases to have any practical meaning.

But such instances are numberless. The ocean liner on the one hand, and the submarine on the other, have both slowly 'emerged' from the dug-out canoe of the savage; modern artillery from his blow-pipe; modern medicine from his arrow poison; music and poetry from his tom-tom and chant; and in every case alike degree has ultimately become kind. So, too, in social phenomena; Cromwell and Lincoln 'emerged' from the farmer and the backwoods lawyer; our empire from the warring Heptarchy, and the United States from the coast colonies.

But if, against Mr. Chesterton, the evolutionary principle must still be maintained, we must at the same time accept his protest against every attempt to *explain away* the final products of evolution. No matter how lowly their origin, these remain indubitably what they are. The empire is

[5] *The Everlasting Man*, p. 42.

an empire and not a tribe; the United States is no longer a colony but a nation; Shakespeare a genius, not a microscopic cell; and man not a 'political animal,' but a spiritual being with an incalculable future.

Liverpool. J. E. Turner.

PREACHING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE.*

By the average Englishman the Sacrament of the Church which is most esteemed is the Sermon. Great preachers, even in an age in which dogmatic systems are undermined and institutional religion has lost credit, still draw great congregations; and what is true of England and Scotland is even more true of America. The clergyman who really knows how to preach has learnt the way to influence, especially if his character and conduct be in harmony with his message.

We have read not a few books on preaching by such masters of the art as Phillips Brooks and Boyd Carpenter, but we have never read a more useful book than that of Dr. Samuel McComb. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, the best known of contemporary preachers, who writes an introduction to Dr. McComb's book, asserts that:—

> 'The homiletical currency has been badly over-inflated, and we need a return to a gold standard. These lectures are an endeavour to encourage that movement, to make preaching seem what it really is—a weighty responsibility, a fine art, an indispensable social function, a sacred entrustment of influence.
>
> The work of the preacher is being seriously affected by the profound changes going on in the mind of the modern world. The days of dogmatic and authoritarian proclamation from the pulpit are ended for intelligent audiences. Even propaganda, in its milder senses, is suspect . . . These lectures of Dr. McComb are a valuable contribution . . . he has given wise guidance and stimulating counsel for us all.'

There is the well-known saying that it is the soul that makes the theologian. We have often wondered whether this is correct. Dr. McComb insists that it is the soul that makes the preacher. Here we find ourselves in absolute agreement. Yet if the soul would preach it must learn how to use the voice, the mental powers, moral force, modern knowledge, and many other gifts and graces by which the attention of men is held and their face turned from darkness to light.

Dr. Garvie's book is very different from Dr. McComb's. It contains much of historical interest and is exceedingly readable. Dr. Garvie has on his title-page a delightful extract from the letter of an English merchant visiting Scotland.

> 'I came to Irvine, and heard a well-favoured, proper old man (David Dickson) with a long beard, and that man showed me all my heart. Then I went to St. Andrew's, where I heard a sweet, majestic-looking man (R. Blair), and he showed me the majesty of God. After him I heard a little fair man (Rutherford), and he showed me the loveliness of Christ.'

Whatever themes the modern preacher may choose, he will never be able to omit these. Dr. Garvie, while he insists on the need for modern

* *Preaching in Theory and Practice.* By S. McComb, D.D. (Oxford University Press. 7/6 net. 1926.)

* *The Preachers of the Church.* By A. E. Garvie, D.D. (James Clarke and Co. 6/- net. 1926.)

scholarship in the preacher, insists also that it should be used to help, and not to harm. Yet modern knowledge has created in religious circles a vast bewilderment of mind, and the modern preacher must deal with these modern problems, but always in reverent, robust, positive, practical, discriminating fashion.

Dr. Garvie, speaking of the Nonconformist ministry, is inclined to think that the depreciation of preaching is in some measure responsible for the steady decrease in the numbers of those who offer themselves for the Christian ministry. If the depreciation be due to the poor quality of the sermons delivered we are inclined to agree with this view.

H.D.A.M.

THE PASSING AND THE PERMANENT IN ST. PAUL.*

Religions, so the author of this book maintains, are of three types. These are designated respectively as prophetic, apocalyptic, and sacramental. The characteristic of the first type is 'its emphasis on ethical, reasonable, and spiritual nature . . . It is embodied in the Sermon on the Mount: it is, in general, the faith of the eighth century prophets of Israel, of the Deuteronomist Puritans, of Jeremiah. It has been prominent in the Puritan, Quaker, and Rationalistic movements. It may be called the Faith of Spiritual Nature' (p. 6). The second type is characterized by Apocalyptic, wherein 'natural and supernatural are conceived as separate entities, rather than the one as an aspect of the other' (pp. 7 f); a weakening of the sense of freedom results from the belief that all is determined directly by God; it is that type which Schweitzer and Johannes Weiss maintain to have dominated the mind of Jesus, and which, Mr. Bulcock might have added, is exercising great influence in Germany and Switzerland at the present time in the Dialectical Theology of Karl Barth and his school. In the third type, 'religion gathers round the sacraments. By baptism with water and in the potent name of Christ, the Spirit of God is imparted, and newness of life follows . . . The Spirit is not a name to denote a mere transformation or recentreing of the believer's former personality; it is something which comes from without: a man could be possessed by the Spirit even as he might be obsessed by an evil spirit. Spirit has a physical quality, and has to be imparted in a physical way' (p. 31). Mr. Bulcock would assign what he conceives to be the genuinely apocalyptic and sacramental elements in St. Paul to the 'passing,' the prophetic elements to the 'permanent.'

We must confess that we find Mr. Bulcock's method of classification for general purposes not altogether happy. There is much more in common between the Hebrew prophets and the Jewish apocalyptists in their general attitude towards religion than between either and the mystical type of piety which Mr. Bulcock regards as a sub-form of the prophetic faith. One of the most illuminating parts of Professor Heiler's treatise, *Das Gebet*, (which, we hope, will appear before long in an English dress) is his penetrating characterisation of the two types of religion, the prophetical and the mystical, and no division of the various types of peity can be satisfactory in which full recognition is not given to this fundamental difference. Mr. Bulcock's scheme is, however, in view of current discussions, admirably suited to the elucidation of his main thesis, and in so far it serves its purpose.

The considerable part which the Sacramental element plays in the thought of St. Paul is now generally recognised. As opposed to the older view,

**The Passing and the Permanent in St. Paul.* Studies in Pauline Origins, Development, and Values. By H. Bulcock, M.A., B.A., B.D. (Macmillan and Co., London, 1926. Price / .).

still championed in a modified form by Schweitzer, it is now usually held that the Pauline doctrine of the Sacraments was at least influenced by the contemporary mystery-religions. With the extremer forms of this view, Mr. Bulcock has little sympathy; he rightly reminds us that 'if Christianity adopted pagan elements it also transformed them by its ethical and spiritual emphasis' (p. 129). Here, he is in accord with other recent critics, among whom may be mentioned Professors Eduard Meyer and Percy Gardner, and Dr. Rawlinson. Even though the amount known about these religions is still small, greater familiarity with them is tending to have its proverbial consequence.

As to exactly where we are to seek the apocalyptic elements in St. Paul, the author leaves us somewhat in doubt. They are, if he uses the word 'apocalyptic' with its usual connotation, (and of this we are not sure; cp. p. 30), most obtrusive in the Epistles to the Thessalonians. These epistles as the two earliest (the early date for Galatians is dismissed in a few words) belong to a stage of St. Paul's development, it is contended, before his long stay at Ephesus. It was only then that the Apostle came under the influence of the Asiarchs and of Apollo especially, and was led to interpret his theology in a more distinctively Hellenistic form (pp. 101 ff.).

But it is the ethics of St. Paul which constitute his permanent claim to fame. 'His epistles are full of that spiritual and ethical tradition which comes from the Sermon on the Mount, by far the most significant and permanent element in St. Paul's writings. . . . A pure ethical and spiritual mysticism was at once the result of the message of Jesus, and the power which confirmed and maintained the gospel of Galilee and thrilled and energised Paul's personality to its fullest breadth and depth. Here we have returned to the permanent elements in Paulinism—to the Faith and Hope and Love which abide when Pauline theory and speculation have had their day and ceased to be.' (pp. 165ff.).

Even granted that such is the case when the question as to the permanent in St. Paul is raised, yet there still remains the question as to whether or not, by deducting all that is not definitely ethical we do not also deduct all that is distinctively Pauline. It must, of course, always be remembered that the great majority of St. Paul's letters were occasioned by definite practical situations, and that consequently it is quite unreasonable to suppose that it is possible to determine what was central in the Apostle's faith by discovering the subject on which there is the greatest number of verses in the *Corpus Paulinum*. Nevertheless, the whole spirit of this *Corpus*, and, it may be concluded, of the Apostle to whom we owe it, are as different from that of the Synoptic Gospels on the one hand as from that of the Fourth Evangelist on the other. By eliminating this difference, or by regarding it as of no permanent significance, Paul the theologian also ceases to exist or to have any permanent significance. Doubtless Mr. Bulcock does not believe this, but his thesis in many places seems to lead to this conclusion.

The book manifests on almost every page the author's wide acquaintance with the modern literature of St. Paul; and he weighs up the conflicting conclusions of the various strata of this literature with a freedom —one might almost say an eclecticism—which leaves nothing to be desired. If it is not a substitute for, it is at least a useful supplement to, such classics on St. Paul as P. Gardner, *The Religious Experience of St. Paul;* A. Sabatier, *The Apostle Paul;* Kirsopp Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul;* and, we may add, to the fine study by the Dean of St. Paul's in the first volume of his *Outspoken Essays.*

F.L.C.

THE NATURE OF DEITY.*

A recent volume of Dr. Turner's, employing the mechanical view of Nature as an argument for Theism, was reviewed lately in the *Modern Churchman*. Its sequel now appears, and the author attempts to discover, from our experience of the Universe, the nature of the Diety whose existence it guarantees. Instead of beginning at the bottom of the ladder, with space-time or the electron, about which entities we know very little, he begins at the top, with personality. This, so far as we can see, is the most finished product of the creative process up to date, and the only thing in the universe which we can be said to know from inside, or at first hand. Dr. Turner very suggestively regards personality as a highly developed and specialised form of 'control,' of which we see primitive examples in the relation of an atomic nucleus to its attendant electrons, or of a sun to its planetary system. A half-way stage between these extremes may be seen in the mastery of the animal organism over its surroundings.

Taking this view of personality as a basis, Deity may be regarded as a controlling power distinct from what it controls, and the relation between the two is similar to the body-mind connection in which our own experience seems to centre. 'The one is a microcosm, just as the other is a macrocosm.' Indeed, between Deity and humanity there does not exist that impregnable barrier which theologians, *ad majorem Dei gloriam*, have sometimes erected. For 'man's finitude or imperfection, inescapable though it must always remain, nevertheless shows itself to contain its own means of elevation and release alike in knowledge, emotion, conduct, and religion.'

Of course there is the question whether Deity is prior to the universe, in some sense in which personality does *not* seem to be prior to our bodies. If it be prior, the exactness of the parallel between the two is diminished. As Dr. Turner dissociates himself from Professor Alexander's view of Deity, we may assume that he does regard Deity as prior. Indeed in his chapter on *Creation* we have it expressly stated that 'Every aspect of the evolving universe is a moment in the realisation of divine purpose.' But it cannot be expected that any analogy should completely express the relation of God to the universe; and an analogy is satisfactory if it succeeds in expressing some important aspect of the truth.

Dr. Turner advances from the purely philosophical standpoint to that of religion; and his Deity is not only the God of Nature, but also the God of Religion. The dualism which T. H. Huxley rendered popular, and which is still very prevalent, finds no place in these pages. On the contrary, we may read a passage like the following: 'The purpose of Deity is the existence of reals capable of becoming more and more akin to Himself,' which is an echo of a well-known passage of St. Augustine. But Dr. Turner, in crossing from the sphere of philosophy into that of religion, does not plunge into the irrational, which involves another sort of dualism, recently popularised by Professor Otto, who tells us that the holy must always retain, as its distinctive criterion, a character that 'wholly eludes our power to comprehend and lies altogether outside what can be thought.' If this be only a protest against a certain type of shallow rationalism, there may be no harm in it; but the classic Christian theology, *e.g.* that of St. Thomas Aquinas himself, has always emphasized the rationality of the things divine. Deity, says Dr. Turner, 'is not severed from, but is one and

* *The Nature of Deity*. By J. E. Turner, M.A., Ph.D. (George Allen and Unwin. 10/- net. 1927.).

continuous with, the comprehensible.' Not, of course, that the divine attributes can ever be exhaustively apprehended by any finite mind, any more than the activities and contents of an intellect like Newton's would be intelligible to the untrained mind. Yet Newton's mind was not 'utterly other' (Otto's phrase) from our minds.

We welcome Dr. Turner's book as a valuable contribution towards a rational Christian theology; all the more so as he writes as a philosopher.

J.C.H.

THE WORD AND SACRAMENTS.*

This little book, as its title suggests, follows the true New Testament order. The first sermon, on the Ministry of the Word, is full of historical facts. Revivals, we are told, have always been due to the preaching of the Word, and in the New Testament the ministers of Christ are never called priests. But the Sacraments were not regarded as unimportant. 'We know that all were baptised and all were regular communicants.' Do we really know enough about the early Church to justify this statement? In the second sermon, on Modern Knowledge and Eucharistic Doctrine, the author predicts a general return to the 'westward position.' It is curious that a position used by the Popes themselves has not found imitators in the English Church. In the third sermon, on Self-examination and the Quieting of the Conscience, much sound practical advice is given. We are reminded that in the first exhortation in the Communion Office the word 'priest' (1549) was altered to 'minister of God's Word' in 1661. The conclusions of the Lambeth Conference of 1878 are usefully quoted on Confession. Readers of the *Modern Churchman* may like to be reminded of two valuable letters on this subject which appeared in January and February, 1924. The fourth sermon, on Works of Repentance, has some excellent advice on Fasting Communion. We are glad to see a reference to Bishop Jayne's book, *Anglican Pronouncements.*

The first appendix deals with Christ's high-priestly work in heaven, and contains, like the author's contribution to *Anglican Essays,* valuable quotations from Westcott, Hort, and Thirlwall. In the second appendix, on Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Atonement, much fog is cleared away, and we are given excellent notes on the words 'atonement' and 'propitiation.' The author favours the disuse of 'atonement,' which is not in the Revised Version of the New Testament. We venture to suggest that 'propitiation' and 'satisfaction' could also be spared. There are three other appendices: on the Liturgical Dress of the Clergy, the Preface 'Of Ceremonies,' and God the Father in Modern Thought.

'In the venerable parish church of Grasmere there is plain glass in the East window, and, as we look thus at the mountains and trees outside, we get the effect of worshipping God with Christian rites in the midst of the Great Temple of the Universe.' By a curious coincidence, the day after we read these words, a photograph of Grasmere church reached us, showing it completely framed in mountains, trees and water.

The archdeacon is a clear and convincing writer, never concealing a bold thought under conventional language. We commend this little book as a courageous statement of Anglican principles, in the defence of which he has already rendered so much valuable service.

T.F.R.

* *Four Sermons on current Church Questions*, with Appendices. By Archdeacon W. L. Paige Cox. (Blackwell, Oxford. 1/-.).

THEOLOGY AND LIFE.*

The modern man, we are constantly reminded, is not interested in theology. Usually, however, in such a complaint, theology is used loosely in contrast with religion; the former consisting of theories and subtleties which have no immediate relation with the latter and give little help. But that, says Dr. Selbie in his inspiring little book, shows that instead of being tired of theology, the modern man is 'making an unconscious plea for more theology and better.' What he has tired of is the abstruse technicalities whose meanings are clouded with 'authority.' It is, therefore, the writer's aim to give brief and untechnical discussions of a few of the great themes of the Christian faith such as the Christian idea of God, the mystery of the Trinity, Sin, Salvation, etc. And since the writer achieves simplicity this should prove a useful book.

The same problem was foremost in the minds of the several writers who have contributed essays to a book dealing with the work of the Christian Ministry in the Modern World. In a somewhat similar form these essays were originally given to a gathering of theological students at Swanwick, and they are mainly concerned with difficulties which the Christian minister must face in the presentation of the Christian faith. Dealing as it does with practical difficulties, there is much in this book which is really first-rate. To the thoughtful parish priest who is really trying to present the Gospel as a *living* message to his hearers, we commend the well-written contributions of Dr. Strachan and Dr. Selbie. The former deals with the question of how we may give 'a presentation of our faith which shall be intelligible to the modern mind.' The latter gives much practical advice on 'Preaching of the Gospel.' We may set the tone of the whole book by a quotation from the latter. 'If the preacher,' says Dr. Selbie, 'is able to show that he knows his Bible through and through; that he finds in it the fountain of his own inspiration; and that he has let it speak to him before he has tried to make it speak to others: if he shows, too, that he knows all that has been said in the way of criticism, both historical and exegetical, and that just because of the new light that has thus been shed upon it the Bible can be made to speak to men with a more positive and religious message than ever, he will be able to allay the fears of the timid and to meet the needs of all honest and enquiring souls' (p. 80).

J.P.H.

A MODERN APOLOGY FOR THE APOSTLES' CREED.†

'There seems to be a need for a modern apology for the Apostles' Creed,' says Prof. Baird in his preface to a book in which he sets out to show that the doctrines contained in that Creed 'are acceptable to modern thought in theology and philosophy.' It is a very readable book, lucid, designedly simple in language and giving a useful survey of modern criticism and research. We have gone very far from the day when it was believed that the Apostles fashioned the Creed by individual contributions, St. Peter beginning with 'I believe in God . . .'; and a useful feature of this book is the combination of exegesis with the story of the gradual development of the actual language of the Creed.

The word 'apology' is commonly used in two different senses, and after reading Prof. Baird's work we are not sure which meaning is the more

**Theology and the Modern Man.* By W. B. Selbie, D.D. (S.C.M. 1/6.)
**Theology and Life.* (S.C.M. 4/- and 2/6.)
†*Christian Fundamentals. A Modern Apology for the Apostles' Creed.* By Andrew Baird, B.D., B.Sc. (T. and T. Clark. 7/6.)

applicable. He desires 'to establish the authority and historicity of the statements in the Apostles' Creed'; but this cuts across his appeal to modern views, with the result that often he appears to be excusing rather than defending the Creed. He succeeds, of course, in showing that any creed which is to retain its authority must be capable of an interpretation consonant with modern thought and experience; he succeeds—though to a less extent—in showing that the Apostles' Creed is capable of such an interpretation; but he fails in his attempt to show that the interpretation he adopts has always been the real meaning of the Creed. Part of the ruins over which he steps is seen in the casual statements of the difficulties involved: 'We must hesitate before pronouncing dogmatically as to the exact manner of Christ's conception' (p. 79); 'the *crux* of the difficulty is that the modern mind has given up the belief in Hades as a kind of Hebrew Sheol' (p. 124); 'it is well for us to abandon foolish speculations about the possibility of the levitation of a physical body . . .' (p. 147). But in face of this it is difficult to believe that the modern interpretation is that which has been believed by the Church *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*.

Let us take, for example, the writer's exegesis of the clause 'the Resurrection of the Body.' Here Prof. Baird insists that in the modern view the resurrection of the body must mean 'the resurrection of personality . . . which is a process continually going on' (p. 277). We would prefer the phrase 'survival of personality,' but the meaning is the same. But we cannot follow the writer when he insists that this was the meaning to those who originally framed the phrase *carnis resurrectionem*. The weight of evidence is on the side of the literal view, and what the writer calls 'the sane interpretation of Origen,' the Church condemned as heresy. Similarly Prof. Baird's comments on the *huius carnis resurrectionem* in the Creed of Aquileia are forced and unconvincing. 'The elimination,' he says, 'of the word 'huius' in all later forms of the Creed shows that from the fourth century on, the Early Church adopted Origen's view and took the words to mean the resurrection of personality' (p. 269). But 'huius' was not in the *earlier* forms; why then, argue that its omission signified that the meaning was altered to the 'resurrection of personality'? It was a local addition which never took root, just as *invisibili et impassibili*, which appear in the same creed, found no permanent place. Surely, however, one can interpret the Creed in the way which Prof. Baird suggests without also believing that no progress of thought has been achieved since the early centuries.

There are a few minor inaccuracies; the quotation from the Creed of Aquileia (p. 116) should be 'descendit *ad inferna*'; the lines quoted on p. 151 are Tennyson's, and not Mrs. Browning's. But though we disagree with many of its conclusions, we can commend Prof. Baird's book as one containing much useful material. A modern-minded reader who desires a modern-minded apology for the Apostles' Creed will do better by reading Prof. Bethune-Baker's *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*. J.P.H.

PRACTICAL PURITANISM.*

To-day there is much unjust criticism of Puritanism, as though nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were, by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. Richard Baxter, the most voluminous, if not the very

* *Richard Baxter's Christian Directory*. Selected by Jeannette Tawney. (G. Bell and Sons. 1925. 6/- net.)

greatest, of the Puritans, did all in his power to make it a workable religion, and to judge by his ministry at Kidderminster he had a measure of success granted to few parochial clergymen. In 1673 he produced *A Christian Directory or a Summ of Practical Cases of Conscience,* written in 1664-65. It is not unworthy to rank beside Jeremy Taylor's *Ductor Dubitantium*. Mrs. Tawney has made a judicious and readable selection from Baxter's book, and Bishop Gore has written a preface to her volume. In it the Bishop says: 'I feel heartily grateful to Mrs. Tawney for the portions which she has selected and edited. And if I may judge by my own experience, I think a great number of ordinary Christians are likely to be very much interested by them . . . I will make no attempt 'to pick out the plums' from Baxter's pages. I hope that others will find him as interesting as I do. Sometimes—as in the section on usury—we shall wonder to see him so little alive to the magnitude of the changes in the organization of industry amidst the beginnings of which he lived. But it is not mainly because they are satisfying to us that I am recommending these selections to the public: it is rather because they suggest to us the urgent need for a casuistry of a like kind addressed to the Christian conscience to-day. There is no gap in our religious literature which it will be more difficult to fill, or which in my judgment more urgently needs filling.' We venture to think that the weakness of our Christian moral teachers to-day arises from the fact that instead of taking some very narrow department and treating it with real insight and thoroughness, they take the whole range of Christian conduct and deluge their readers with platitudes and generalities which are obvious where they are not false.

H.D.A.M.

ENGLAND'S GREEN AND PLEASANT LAND.*

The title of this book is not chosen to describe the contents, but to suggest by implication the imperative need of building a new Jerusalem in rural England. The author knows the countryside intimately, and there is a prophetic note of passionate grief and indignation in his unflinching analysis of the situation. Like the prophets of old, he brings his heaviest charges against the priests of his people. Yet the author has the gift of the famous preacher who first knocked his congregation down, but always concluded by setting them up again.

The rural housing of England, though picturesque, is too often insanitary and inadequate: and the inhabitants degenerate. The root causes are moral and economic. At present most of the constructive work is being done through education and local government, but 'there are limits to what can be done for these people, because there are limits to what they can be got to do for themselves: and the reason is that they are a community from which the spirited and hopeful men and women have been continuously withdrawn, generation after generation—a community which is hovel-housed, has almost always been hovel-housed, and is physically and mentally impoverished.' Moreover 'the hamlet is corroded with uncharitableness, the pettiest feuds and jealousies, paltry snobberies, and trumpery vanities': but 'at the root of the plant there is some life' (238 *f*). What is required first and foremost is moral and spiritual regeneration, and this should of course come through the clergy. But 'the Church in not a few villages is . . . *dead*; and in many more villages it is dying' (88). 'The first reason is that the parsons are, in the main, lacking in

* *England's Green and Pleasant Land.* Anonymous. (Jonathan Cope, 30 Bedford Square, W.C.1. 1925.)

intelligence, in character, or in spiritual experience. The second reason is that very little of what is read, sung, and said in the churches is now believed' (89).

Our criticism of this diagnosis in that the second hardly yet applies to country folk, of whose Neolithic beliefs our author himself gives an example in a mother who said of a weakling twin whose sister had died, 'Ah, the baby won't thrive none till the dead 'un be rotted' (161). At the same time, in spite of these awful crudities, such people are quick to realize whether services and sermons are in or out of touch with life. We well remember a labouring man's would-be courteous comment on an inappropriate sermon: 'Very good for them as understands it.' Insult, however, is added to unenlightenment when the country parson is an unintelligent obscurantist. Said an aggrieved parishioner to us about his Vicar: It's fair revoltin' to a man to see 'im a'uggin' an' a'kissin' that table.' What is really wrong with many clergy is not simply their ignorance but their failure to visit, or, if they visit, their failure to forget their position and to lay bare their hearts. Poor people have a dog-like instinct for detecting sympathy (*cf.*, p. 21), and they give in return an affection and devotion that shames, delights and sends one to one's knees. The cultural value of all this for the parson is surely greater than can be gained in any other profession. 'An entirely honest friend, purged of self-seeking and self-importance, comes to understand how full of weeds and darkness was his own mind, how untilled and untrained was his own heart' (239). Out of self-knowledge like this on the part of those who hold positions of authority among the people comes a mighty power for healing and uplifting them.

We regret that motives of delicacy prevent this earnest and spiritual author from disclosing his identity. We wish that he lived in our parish.

R.D.R.

A BOOK OF MODERN PRAYERS.*

Immanuel Kant was of opinion that as a man grew better so he prayed less. There may be cases in the highest stages of the moral and spiritual life where this is so. In those stages, where most of us live, we do undoubtedly find that a weakening faith and a declining moral standard go hand-in-hand with neglect of prayer. Therefore anyone, who can help us to pray more and better, does us a service. Dr. McComb comes in this class. His book opens with an admirable essay on the meaning and value of prayer, and is followed by sixty carefully selected modern prayers with appropriate meditations. We like them because they are simple and direct, modern in feeling and sincere in expression. The two following prayers are good examples of the rest.

'Lord Jesus, give us wisdom to understand and a will to obey Thy teaching concerning riches and poverty, buying and selling, and the conduct of business between man and man. Never let us forget that the order of industry is based on those spiritual principles Thou hast taught the world. Grant to the merchant, the producer, the employee, the consumer, to know the laws of fair compensation and profit, and help us to realise that in all our business dealings we are called to serve our fellows, to bless them, not to injure them. Grant that we may never desire to take something for nothing, and when we give, may it be with thoughtfulness and with due regard to the interests of the giver and the taker, so that those whom we

* *A Book of Modern Prayers.* Compiled and edited by Samuel McComb, D.D. (Longmans, Green and Co. 1927. Price, 6/- net.)

serve may prosper in things spiritual and in things material. For Thy Name's sake.'

'O Spirit of Truth! May the way of life be lighted up for all mankind! Grant us not only to see and abhor the evil but to know how to overcome evil with good. Send us prophets and leaders who come not to destroy, but to fulfil. In the face of all confusion and error, fraud and violence, and of man's inhumanity to man, grant that we may never lose our faith that right makes might, that truth and love are stronger than falsehood and hate, and that this is Thy world throughout all generations. Let Thy name be our strong tower and rock of defence. In that name may we set up our banners, and fight the good fight of faith and convert every defeat into a victory.' H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

MODERNISM AND THE YOUNG.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

Readers of the article on Modernism and the Young in your last issue may have felt that the practical suggestions at the end were a trifle slight as compared with the promise of the earlier paragraphs. The writer very truly emphasizes the importance of giving the child such general views as will not require to be altered later. May I suggest two matters in which the general view we allow to grow up in the mind of the child needs to be carefully watched, and where neglect or faulty teaching may hamper and weaken belief in later years.

(1) A pre-Copernican conception of the universe. Those who minimise the importance of this subject seem hardly to realise the extent of the revolution made by the astronomical discoveries of four centuries ago, nor the practical problems of religious belief, still largely unsolved, which they bequeathed to the world. By these discoveries one of the most useful props to religious belief, that of a physical higher and lower, was removed, and made permissible only in symbol; the task was laid on the world of learning to conceive of a heaven in no sense local, and of the reality of a God in no sense situated in space. That task, some will reply, has been long ago completed, and is recognised even in Sunday School books. It would probably be truer to say that for the mass of people it has been half completed. They have emerged from the stage at which pre-Copernican beliefs were literally and naively held, and have stuck fast at one where they are still dimly identified with what it is proper to believe. Probably more people than we realise do think of God as literally existing in space, and of heaven as a region literally above us. But whether such are few or many, there are undoubtedly immense numbers who, because they have never definitely discarded such conceptions, retain a shamefaced allegiance to them at the back of their minds which infects with unreality their whole scheme of beliefs. Such people are reluctant to speak of religious matters and do so in a tone of apology, not merely from a proper sensitiveness at exposing their deepest convictions, but rather from shame at the childish garb in which they are clothed.

The difficulty of the teacher here is to distinguish between obsolete beliefs which must be banned, and childlike ways of thinking which can never become obsolete and must be revered. The child has his beautiful dreamland of heaven and God in heaven. To shatter it rudely would be

an educational blunder of the first magnitude, and we are tempted to be content with the thought that nature, if left alone, will see to it that truer conceptions spring up in their own time. But this does not exempt us from the duty of assisting in the process of growth, and the lesson that reality does not consist in material existence is not one that the child will learn unaided.

(2) An obsolete view of the nature of Biblical authority. The change that has come over the thinking world with regard to the Bible is really something far simpler and far more fundamental than a mere acceptance of certain findings of historical or biological science. It is simply that we no longer believe in such a thing as the supernatural imparting of a knowledge of past events. Though believing most intensely in inspiration, we can no longer conceive of a writer being miraculously enabled to narrate events of which, by the ordinary channels of knowledge, he knew nothing. Such a conception of revelation is altogether too wooden and mechanical to be possible to modern minds. To our forefathers it was natural to divide knowledge of history or science into two halves, that which we ascertain for ourselves and that which is revealed to us, but to us knowledge already achieved and knowledge waiting to be achieved is one homogeneous whole. But with the rank and file this change has not been made. The argument 'if it is in the Bible it should be true' is still the grudging and piecemeal surrender of one belief after another to the demands of criticism. They have discarded verbal inspiration, but they still hanker after a divine disclosure of mundane facts.

What does our teaching do to counteract this state of things? We yield to the child's demand for stories; we acquiesce in their natural assumption that stories taken from a sacred volume are presumably true, and then we initiate them somewhat guiltily into the notion that it is 'not all literally true'; but all the time we have done nothing to prevent those conceptions arising in their minds that would make them expect it to be so.

Space forbids me to do more than mention a third common fault—a too facile conception of Christ's miracles. Let us by all means teach these, but let this side of the story be introduced with reserve and wonder, as a strange subject hard to understand and yet impossible to brush aside, a part of the story to be added after its simpler aspects have been already given.

J. C. Nunns.

The Vicarage, West Ham, E. 15.

THE ORIGIN OF THE EPIKLESIS.

Sir,

I suggest that there are very real grounds for apprehension at the introduction of an Epiklesis into the alternative order for the administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion.

As the late Dr. Adrian Fortescue rightly says in his book, *The Mass*: 'The Invocation of the Holy Ghost is not primitive. The first clear witnesses of it that we have are in the Fourth Century and in the neighbourhood of Antioch.'

This would seem to point to the possibility that the New-Nicene school as championed by the three Great Cappadocians had something to do with the conception that lies behind it, *i.e.* the Epiklesis.

Is the Epiklesis the result of the development of the idea of the Holy Spirit as a 'person' who is an independent source of Divine Grace?

The Cappadocians are sometimes regarded as interpreters of Athanasius, and yet they seem to have bequeathed to the Church the conception of three personalities plus an abstract impersonal essence!

How does this compare with the idea of the one God leading a threefold personal life?

Further than this Athanasius does not seem to go.

Now the introduction of an invocation to the Holy Spirit into the Alternative Order for the Holy Communion in the New Prayer Book can only serve to emphasize the idea that the three persons are three individuals, personalities as we understand them in relation to this life in time and place.

There are many people who are practical Tritheists, people who do in spite of what they say envisage the distinctions in the Godhead in terms of individuality.

The constant repetition of the *Gloria Patri* and, alas, the preaching of many of the clergy confirms and encourages the above state of mind, and now we are to have further encouragement in the form of an Epiklesis!

What is this but a return to fossilised dogma—a return to a position which is neither Primitive nor Catholic.

At a time when we are endeavouring to inculcate the idea of Divine Simultaneity we are faced with an Epiklesis in our Communion Office which implies Successiveness in relation to the Godhead. The distinctions are thus crudely set forth. Could anything be more anthropomorphic? The function of 'each person' is thus by implication suggested to the mind.

Have we forgotten that 'we say three "persons" not in order to express it, but in order not to be silent'?

IVAN R. YOUNG.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

May I be allowed to express my thanks to the kind donors of a very fine Flemish seventeenth century brass dish, which reached me last week?

In the accompanying letter from the Chairman of the Modern Churchmen's Conference Committee I was told that it was a symbol of appreciation of my work as Hon. Secretary to the Committee for thirteen years.

I am very grateful for both the appreciation and the symbol. I am more than grateful to the members of the Committee, whose cheerful hard work made it possible to run the Conferences. I can only wish my successors equal good fortune.

DORA NUSSEY.

Upper Ewe Croft, Ilkley.

THE LONDON ANNUAL GATHERING.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

I should be obliged if the notice of your readers might be called to the following arrangements for the gathering on Wednesday, 25th May.

The Annual Service will be held at St. Andrew's, Ashley Place, Westminster, at 11.30 a.m., when the preacher will be the Rev. H. K. Luce, Master of the King's Scholars, Westminster School. The Public Meeting will be held at the Caxton Hall, at 8 p.m., under the chairmanship of the Dean of St. Paul's, when the speakers will include the Rev. Canon V. F. Storr and the Rev. Canon C. E. Raven.

G. V. W. SIBLEY.